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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
PRIVACY-AWARE SECURITY APPLICATIONS IN THE ERA OF
INTERNET OF THINGS
by
Abbas Acar
Florida International University, 2020
Miami, Florida
Professor A. Selcuk Uluagac, Major Professor
In this dissertation, we introduce several novel privacy-aware security applications.
We split these contributions into three main categories: First, to strengthen the
current authentication mechanisms, we designed two novel privacy-aware alternative complementary authentication mechanisms, Continuous Authentication (CA)
and Multi-factor Authentication (MFA). Our first system is Wearable-assisted Continuous Authentication (WACA), where we used the sensor data collected from a
wrist-worn device to authenticate users continuously. Then, we improved WACA by
integrating a noise-tolerant template matching technique called NTT-Sec to make
it privacy-aware as the collected data can be sensitive. We also designed a novel,
lightweight, Privacy-aware Continuous Authentication (PACA) protocol. PACA is
easily applicable to other biometric authentication mechanisms when feature vectors are represented as fixed-length real-valued vectors. In addition to CA, we also
introduced a privacy-aware multi-factor authentication method, called PINTA. In
PINTA, we used fuzzy hashing and homomorphic encryption mechanisms to protect
the users’ sensitive profiles while providing privacy-preserving authentication. For
the second privacy-aware contribution, we designed a multi-stage privacy attack to
smart home users using the wireless network traffic generated during the communication of the devices. The attack works even on the encrypted data as it is only using

vi

the metadata of the network traffic. Moreover, we also designed a novel solution
based on the generation of spoofed traffic. Finally, we introduced two privacy-aware
secure data exchange mechanisms, which allow sharing the data between multiple
parties (e.g., companies, hospitals) while preserving the privacy of the individual in
the dataset. These mechanisms were realized with the combination of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) and Differential Privacy (DP) techniques. In addition,
we designed a policy language, called Curie Policy Language (CPL), to handle the
conflicting relationships among parties.
The novel methods, attacks, and countermeasures in this dissertation were verified with theoretical analysis and extensive experiments with real devices and users.
We believe that the research in this dissertation has far-reaching implications on
privacy-aware alternative complementary authentication methods, smart home user
privacy research, as well as the privacy-aware and secure data exchange methods.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation and Threat Models

With the advancements in the technology, our computers and mobile devices have
become our identities as they handle and store very sensitive personal information
such as identity numbers, bank account credentials, email passwords. Similarly,
nowadays, IoT devices (e.g., smart locks, smartwatches) have also become part of
our daily lives, and these devices record our daily activities. The amount of sensitive
user information recorded, handled, and stored by our computers, mobile devices,
and IoT devices is huge. The leakage of this information may result in both serious
security and privacy issues. Therefore, it is more important than ever to protect
these devices with robust security and privacy mechanisms. In this dissertation, we
address three different threats, where the sensitive user information is revealed by
the attacker.
In Part I of the dissertation, we investigate solutions against an attacker who
wants to access our devices by bypassing the existing authentication mechanisms.
Today’s authentication systems mostly rely on passwords. However, many practical
attacks have been demonstrated that the passwords can be either stolen or bypassed [Dic16, TGC16]. For example, they can be easily stolen via shoulder-surfing
or bypassed via phishing attacks. Specifically, in password-based authentication
systems, the user is verified one time, which does not guarantee that the identified user is the actual user throughout the login session. In order to strengthen
the current authentication systems, there is a need for alternative complementary
authentication methods. Continuous Authentication (CA) and Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) are two promising solutions. In CA, the user is periodically
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verified throughout the entire session, while in MFA, the user is verified via multiple independent authentication factors. There are several CA and MFA methods
proposed in the literature; however, there are two issues with the proposed methods. First, they are either not secure or not practical enough to be deployed in
a real-life applications [AAAU16, AAUA20]. Second, these methods are mostly
based on the biometrics to provide a more convenient and secure authentication.
However, biometric-based systems demand more user information in their operations, yielding privacy issues for users in biometric-based continuous authentication
systems [ALB+ 19].
In Part II of the dissertation, we investigate solutions against a nearby attacker
within the range of radio frequency (e.g., WiFi, ZigBee, Bluetooth Low Energy)
to our house, who can sniff and record all the network generated by the pairwise
communication of the smart home devices. Even though this communication is encrypted, an attacker can perform a fingerprinting attack, and infer the user activities
occurring at home [AFA+ 18]. The mechanisms like VPN or TOR do not protect
against such kind of adversary and the solutions like faraday cage is not realistic.
This type of attacker has an advantage of not being detected easily as it is a passive
attacker.
Finally, in Part III of the dissertation, we investigate solutions against an attacker called honest-but-curios attacker, who wants learn the about the user data
shared for genuine purposes. Previous works have shown the benefit of data sharing within distributed, collaborative, and federated learning [DCM+ 12, SCST17,
APP+ 18]. However, the hospitals as well as the patient may not want to reveal
their data to third parties. Here, the methods such as Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) [BDNP08] (e.g., homomorphic encryption [AAUC18], garbled circuits [H+ 11]) allow computation of a joint function (e.g., regression function) with-
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out revealing individual input of the parties. However, there are two issues SMC
does not address during the data sharing. First, SMC does not consider the conflicting relationships (e.g, politics, regulations) among members. Second, SMC does
not guarantee that the final result of distributed computation would not leak any
information about an individual in a sensitive dataset [EESA+ 12, NS08, GKS08].
Therefore, privacy of individuals and their data can be easily violated.

1.2

Research Problem

Considering the threats and the issues in the previous section, in this dissertation
we address seven unique but related research problems:
1. A Robust and Usable Continuous Authentication Method: Continuous Authentication (CA) is a good mechanism to re-verify a user identity periodically throughout a login session.

In the literature, a number of studies

have been proposed for the use of biometrics in continuous user authentication [PCCB16, FFS17]. However, one of the desired features in CA is nonintrusiveness [AAUA20]. Physiological characteristics like iris pattern or fingerprint are not applicable in this manner since they can not be extracted
seamlessly. More plausible approaches for CA would be behavioral characteristics [Sea16, ERLM17, WWZJ18] like typing rhythm, gait as they can be
collected without interrupting the user. Therefore, they are ideal candidates
to increase the security of the current systems as an additional authentication factor rather than a standalone authentication system. Among all behavioral biometrics, the most promising results are proposed using keystroke
dynamics [ASL15, WDL+ 18, CZY+ 15]. However, in a recent work [TGG13],
the reliability of classical keystroke dynamics is analyzed, and an interface
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was designed to help an attacker so that the attacker can mimic the typing
rhythm of a legitimate user by using the feedback provided by the interface.
Therefore, there is a need for a system, which is both reliable and usable.
2. A Privacy-Aware Biometric-based Continuous Authentication Protocol: In traditional biometric authentication systems, it is generally assumed that an authentication server and a decision module have access to feature vectors of users
in plaintext form. Even though the sensitive biometric data may be communicated through secure channels, and it may be stored in encrypted form, the
feature vectors would have to be decrypted during the verification phase. This,
in principle, violates the privacy of biometric data, and the adversaries may be
able to exploit this in their attacks [FDCA11, GR12, BGK+ 15, FLE14]. Such
vulnerabilities can be prevented in traditional password-based authentication
mechanisms by computing the hash of a password and storing this hash value
instead of the password itself. A matching decision is made by comparing the
two hash values. Here, the use of cryptographic hash functions provides some
level of protection because given the hash value of a string, it is computationally infeasible to determine the input string as a preimage of that hash
value. However, traditional cryptographic hash functions (e.g., MD5, SHA-2)
cannot be adapted in biometrics because even some slight changes in the input would result in a significant change in the hash function’s output. The
previous studies are either using the cryptographic primitives, which suffer
from high computational overhead and also they have been overlooking and
missing the details of a full protocol. Therefore, there is a need for a complete
privacy-aware biometrics-based continuous authentication protocol.
3. Privacy-Aware Multi-factor Authentication: In a typical MFA system, each
user is verified via the first authentication factor (usually password) along
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with a second or even a third factor such as smartcards [Kum04], fingerprints [BSSB06], or user’s mouse movements [ZPW11]. MFA solutions based
on physical devices or physiological characteristics depend on the introduction
of specialized hardware, such as a token or a fingerprint reader, which hinders usability and deployability by causing additional cost for manufacturing
and implementation. Alternatively, the more usable (and therefore more likely
to be widely-adopted) MFA solutions are based on users’ behavior; however,
they do little to protect the privacy of the user data as the data needs to be
revealed to the authentication server in plain form. This approach has two
kind of risks. First, the owner of the database server may use it for malicious
purposes (e.g., selling user’s information for economic interest). Second, if an
attacker succeeds in obtaining the database storing the user data, he/she can
masquerade as a legitimate user by crafting required authentication factors.
Therefore, there is a need for a system providing MFA while preserving the
privacy of user data.
4. Smart Home User Privacy: A myriad of IoT devices such as bulbs, switches,
speakers in a smart home environment allows users to easily control the physical world around them and facilitate their living styles. However, an attacker
inside or near a smart home environment can potentially exploit the innate
wireless medium used by these devices to exfiltrate sensitive information about
the users and their activities, invading user privacy. This allows an adversary
to efficiently aggregate extensive behavior profiles of targeted users. The smart
home devices are usually encrypted using standard protocols like WPA2, in the
case of WiFi, the contents of the exchanged messages or commands are hidden. However, the encryption only hides the payload, related meta-data (e.g.,
packet lengths, traffic rate) of the network traffic still leaks some informa-
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tion about the messages exchanged [SSW+ 02, VČČD15, SFSM13, LXZ+ 16,
CMSV16, CBS+ 18].

Some earlier works [SSW08, ARS+ 17, ARF17] have

shown that it is relatively easy to make some simple inferences such as device type inference [MMH+ 17], identifying the user occupancy via detecting
the mode transition between the device activities [CLBR16], or simple device
mode inference [ARS+ 17]. However, combining such partial information from
different smart home devices to get a more meaningful picture about a user’s
actions or his/her activity profile is challenging. This is because a successful attacker must aggregate information about actions over a longer period of
time from a multitude of smart home devices, which is only feasible if activity
detection and identification can be automated to a large degree to keep the
required effort manageable. Therefore, there is a need for the investigation of
this attack vector and promising countermeasures.
5. Policy-based Secure Data Exchange: Inter-organizational data sharing is crucial to the advancement of many domains including security, health care, and
finance. Previous works have shown the benefit of data sharing within distributed, collaborative, and federated learning [DCM+ 12, SCST17, APP+ 18].
Privacy-preserving machine learning offers data sharing among multiple members while avoiding the risks of disclosing the sensitive data (e.g., health-care
records, personally identifiable information) [EESA+ 12]. For example, Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) enables multiple members, each with its
training dataset, to collaboratively learn a shared predictive model without
revealing their datasets [MZ17]. These approaches solve the privacy concerns
of members during model computation, yet do not consider the complex relationships such as regulations, competitive advantage, data sovereignty, and
jurisdiction among members on private data sharing. Members want to be
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able to articulate and enforce their conflicting requirements on data sharing.
Therefore, there is a need for a system, where the members can easily specify
their requirements on the data exchanged without compromising the security
and privacy of the data and users.
6. Secure and Differentially Private Computations in Multiparty Settings: Secure
and private computation of statistical models is increasingly used in different
operational settings from healthcare [KHK+ 16, CAA+ 19] to finance [BTW12]
and security sensitive applications [FDCB15]. Given the distributed nature
of these applications, security and privacy are mostly achieved by utilizing
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC). SMC allows distributed parties to
compute a joint function (e.g., regression function) over their private inputs
without revealing those inputs to other parties. Each party learns the final
result, but no other information. However, SMC has a major privacy concern
for a targeted individual as it does not guarantee that the final result of distributed computation would not leak any information about an individual in
a sensitive dataset [EESA+ 12, NS08, GKS08]. As such, privacy of individuals
and their data can be easily violated. Therefore, there is a need for a mechanism, where individual parties do not see each others’ inputs and further
can not infer their data from the final constructed model. Indeed, combining
SMC with Differential Privacy (DP) could solve this privacy problem as DP
introduces sufficient noise into the final result to prevent any leakage about
a single individual. However, combining SMC with DP is not a trivial task.
Adding noise in a distributed manner may lead to a significant accuracy loss in
the final models, which may cause catastrophic consequences in, for example,
the healthcare domain. Therefore, enabling distributed differential privacy on
local data with differential privacy guarantees on final results is a challenging
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problem and needs a novel mechanism combining SMC and DP to provide
both data privacy and individual privacy.
7. Survey of Homomorphic Encryption Schemes: Legacy encryption systems depend on sharing a key (public or private) among the peers involved in exchanging an encrypted message. However, this approach poses privacy concerns. The users or service providers with the key have exclusive rights on the
data. Especially with popular cloud services, the control over the privacy of
the sensitive data is lost. Even when the keys are not shared, the encrypted
material is shared with a third party that does not necessarily need to access
the content. Moreover, untrusted servers, providers, and cloud operators can
keep identifying elements of users long after users end the relationship with the
services. Indeed, Homomorphic Encryption (HE), a special kind of encryption
scheme, can address these concerns as it allows any third party to operate
on the encrypted data without decrypting it in advance. Although this extremely useful feature of the HE scheme has been known for over 30 years, the
first plausible and achievable Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme,
which allows any computable function to perform on the encrypted data, was
introduced by Craig Gentry in 2009. Even though this was a major achievement, different implementations so far demonstrated that FHE still needs to
be improved significantly to be practical on every platform. Therefore, many
follow-up works are proposed in the literature to improve the FHE schemes
and it attracted the interest of people from very different research areas in
terms of theoretical, implementation, and application perspectives. Therefore, there is a need for a study providing a structured way to understand
the state-of-the-art HE schemes and to understand how HE or FHE would
applicable in the provision of privacy in other works in this dissertation.
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1.3

Research Objectives

In this dissertation, we introduced several unique solutions to the research problems
given in Section 1.2. Our objectives for these solutions are sevenfold:
• Objective #1: The proposed novel authentication mechanisms should increase the security of the existing technologies while keeping the usability and
deployment cost minimal.
• Objective #2: The proposed privacy-aware continuous authentication protocol should protect the biometrics of the users against both malicious attackers
and curious advertisers while allowing the continuous authentication.
• Objective #3: The proposed privacy-aware multi-factor authentication system should protect the user profiles against both malicious attackers and
honest-but-curious advertisers while allowing the authentication of the user
from multiple independent sources.
• Objective #4: While the proposed novel attack on smart home users mechanisms shows the feasibility of the multi-stage privacy attacks, the proposed
countermeasure should protect the privacy of the smart home users against
both local and remote adversaries.
• Objective #5: The proposed policy-based secure data exchange method
should allow the members to express their privacy requirements on the data
exchange.
• Objective #6: The proposed differentially private and secure data exchange
method should protect both the data privacy and individual privacy in the
dataset.
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• Objective #7: Our overview of HE schemes should provide an understanding
of the state-of-the-art HE schemes and how HE or FHE would applicable in
the provision of privacy in other works in this dissertation.

1.4

Contributions

With the objectives above in mind, the contributions of this dissertation are as
follows:
WACA: Wearable-Assisted Continuous Authentication. In this work, we introduced a usable and reliable Wearable-Assisted Continuous Authentication (WACA),
which relies on the sensor-based keystroke dynamics and the authentication data is
acquired through the built-in sensors of a wearable (e.g., smartwatch) while the
user is typing. The acquired data is periodically and transparently compared with
the registered profile of the initially logged-in user with one-way classifiers. With
this, WACA continuously ensures that the current user is the user who logged-in
initially. We also tested WACA against powerful attacks, including imitation, statistical attacks, and insider attackers. For this purpose, we designed a scenario for
the imitation attacks with real participants. On the other hand, we developed three
generic attacking scenarios for the statistical attacks that can also be utilized by
other future continuous authentication studies.
PACA: Privacy-aware Continuous Authentication. In this work, we constructed a lightweight, privacy-aware, and secure continuous authentication protocol, called PACA. Previous works have been overlooking this and missing the details
of a full protocol. PACA is initiated through a password-based key exchange protocol, and it continuously authenticates users based on their biometrics. Moreover, it is
generic in the sense that one can instantiate it using a large class of secure template
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generation and matching algorithms, and biometrics-based authentication systems.
Moreover, we also design an actual system (the system, its full implementation,
and its detailed evaluation) under the proposed protocol: a hybrid (password and
keystroke dynamics), continuous, and privacy-preserving biometric authentication
for utilized and optimized a wearable-assisted continuous authentication mechanism,
and NTT-Sec to handle the real-valued feature vectors while preserving the accuracy. The use of PAKE and NTT-Sec allows one to avoid TLS, any certification
authority, verification of certificates, and long term private keys [GGB13, ŠGGB15].
In addition, we performed a detailed security and privacy analysis of the proposed
protocol against eight different well-known attacks [RCB01] for the biometrics-based
authentication methods. We first identify several security requirements. Moreover,
we particularly described detailed attack strategies, and then analyzed the resistance
of our protocol against those attacks. Moreover, we deployed the proposed scheme
and provided extensive results with data collected from users wearing an Apple
smartwatch to assess the security, accuracy, and resource consumption. Particularly, we provided some concrete estimates for the security of the proposed system,
and we report on the timing results, and the false acceptance/rejection rates. Finally, we also measured the resource consumption on a real computing device (e.g.,
smartwatch).
PINTA: Privacy-Aware Multi-factor Authentication. In this work, we designed a privacy-preserving multi-factor authentication (MFA) system which collects
hybrid user behavior profiles to serve as a second authentication factor along with
the user password as the first. Instead of just focusing on one specific category of user
behavior, like system processes or user’s mouse movements, we integrated features
from several categories to generate a user’s profile. We also adopted fuzzy hashing
and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) techniques to ensure that a user’s personal
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information is not leaked to servers or a third party. For the experiments, we used a
user profile database derived from several public datasets [BSPvdM12, She12, KM12]
and a dataset we generated. We evaluated the performance of the proposed system
in terms of recall, false positive rate, size of information required for authentication, system overhead, and resource utilization. Our results show that the proposed
scheme can well detect imposters from legitimate users while protecting user privacy.
Peek-a-Boo: Smart Home User Privacy. In this work, we discovered a novel
multi-stage privacy attack against user privacy in a smart environment. It is realized
utilizing state-of-the-art machine-learning approaches for detecting and identifying
particular types of IoT devices, their actions, states, and ongoing user activities in
a cascading style by only observing the wireless traffic passively from smart home
devices. The attack effectively work on both encrypted and unencrypted communications. In contrast to earlier approaches, our multi-stage privacy attack can
perform activity detection and identification automatically, without extensive background knowledge or specifications of analyzed protocols. This allows an adversary
to efficiently aggregate extensive behavior profiles of targeted users. We evaluated
the effectiveness of the novel multi-stage privacy attack with 22 different off-the-shelf
IoT devices utilizing the most popular wireless protocols for IoT. Our experimental results show that an attacker can achieve very high accuracy (above 90 %) in
identification of the types, actions, states, activities of the devices and sensors. To
protect against this privacy leakage, we also proposed a countermeasure based on
generating spoofed network traffic to hide the real activities of the devices.
CURIE: Policy-based Secure Data Exchange. In this work, we introduced
a policy-based data exchange approach, called Curie, that allows secure data exchange among members that have such complex relationships. Members specify
their requirements on data exchange using a policy language (CPL). The require-
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ments defined with the use of CPL form the local data exchange policies of members. Local policies are defined separately for data sharing and data acquisition
policies. This property allows asymmetric relations on data exchange. For example, a member does not necessarily have to acquire the data that the other members dictate to share. By using these two policies, members specify statements of
who to share/acquire and what to share/acquire. The statements are defined using conditional and selection expressions. Selections allow members to filter data
and limit the data to be exchanged, whereas conditional expressions allow members to define logical statements. Another advanced property of CPL is predefined
data-dependent conditionals for calculating the statistical metrics between member’s
data. For instance, members can define a conditional to compute the intersection
size of data columns without disclosing their data. This allows members to define
content-dependent conditional data exchange in their policies. We validated Curie
through an example of real healthcare application used to prescribe warfarin dosage.
A privacy-preserving joint dose model among medical institutions is compiled with
the use of various data exchange policies while protecting the privacy of members’
healthcare records. Finally, we showed Curie incurs low overhead and policies are
effective at improving the dose accuracy of medical institutions.
Achieving Secure and Differentially Private Computations in Multiparty
Settings. In this work, we designed a novel protocol for achieving Secure Multiparty
Distributed Differentially Private (SM-DDP) computations on sensitive data. The
protocol provides the guarantees of both SMC and DP. SMC is provided through
Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [Gen09] while DP is provided via Functional Mechanism (FM) [ZZX+ 12]. An important characteristic of FM is that it injects noise
into the feature matrices (i.e., coefficients of objective function), which can be computed independently by each party in a multiparty computational environment. We
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explored this feature of FM and apply it to linear regression using our SM-DDP
protocol, but it can be applied to the computation of any statistical model function
that allows independent calculation from the local statistics. We show that the
accumulated noise in our protocol is still bounded and convergent by using the infinite divisibility property of Laplacian distribution [McN02]. Finally, we evaluated
SM-DDP protocol’s computational efficacy on linear regression using two real-world
datasets. We compared our results with the use of Centralized DP (CDP) in a multiparty setting. The intuition is that the distributed setting of DP (DDP), which is
proposed in this work, would cause a greater accuracy loss than the typical clientserver setting of SMC systems. However, we showed exactly same trade-off can be
achieved using the SM-DDP protocol. The extensive evaluation results indicate that
the proposed SM-DDP protocol yields minimal computational overhead—less than
a minute for 20 parties with 32 attributes and 10K samples. The individual parties obtain better accuracy than that would be obtained from a single party model.
Finally, SM-DDP is scalable while providing security and privacy guarantees.
Investigation of Practical Usage of Privacy-Aware Technologies In an effort
to better understand the state-of-the-art privacy-aware technologies, as part of this
dissertation, we also investigated the homomorphic encryption technologies. Particularly, we provided a comprehensive survey of all the main FHE schemes. We also
covered a survey of important PHE and SWHE schemes as they are the first works in
accomplishing the FHE idea and are still popular as FHE schemes are computationally very costly. Furthermore, we included the FHE implementations focusing on
the improvements with each scheme. In addition, we mentioned the challenges and
future perspectives of HE to motivate the researchers and practitioners to explore
and improve the performance of HE schemes and their applications.
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1.5

Ethical Considerations

As the collected data in these works may raise some ethical and privacy concerns, we
acknowledge that our research study with the human subjects was conducted with
the appropriate Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals (FIU-IRB-16-0296 and
FIU-IRB-18-0443).

1.6

Outline

The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 describes the related work of the studies in this dissertation.
• Chapter 3 describes the architecture of our wearable-assisted continuous authentication, called WACA.
• Chapter 4 describes the details of our privacy-aware continuous authentication protocol, called PACA.
• Chapter 5 describes the details of our privacy-preserving multi-factor authentication system called PINTA.
• Chapter 6 describes our multi-stage privacy attack on smart home users as
well the details of our countermeasure against that attack.
• Chapter 7 describes an overview of state-of-the-art homomorphic encryption
schemes.
• Chapter 8 describes our policy-based secure exchange approach.
• Chapter 9 describes our approach to combine the multiparty computation
and distributed differential privacy.
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• Chapter 10 explains our conclusions and the recommended future works that
can be built upon the studies in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we examine the related work of the studies presented in this dissertation.

2.1

Wearable-assisted Continuous Authentication

Currently, the most common method used to verify the user periodically depends
on session time-outs. In session time-outs, if the time window is kept too short, the
user’s convenience will be reduced due to frequent interruptions of the session for
authentication. On the other hand, if the time window is set too long, in the case
of a breach, the attacker would have more time on the victim’s system.
In the literature, a number of works have been proposed for the use of biometrics in continuous user authentication [Car03, KJ06, AMSS08, PCCB16, FFS17].
However, one of the desired features in the continuous authentication is transparency. Hard biometrics like iris pattern or DNA are not applicable since they
can not be extracted transparently. In another work [KYSR09], a special mouse
with a fingerprint sensor is proposed. In addition to requiring a custom mouse,
its reliability is also an issue. The ease of counterfeiting fingerprints was shown,
and the fingerprint-based biometrics was easily bypassed [Clu07, Clu13]. Facial
recognition methods may seem a good candidate; however, the liveliness detection is still an issue to be addressed, and several attacks are possible under practical conditions [DM09, BCF+ 13]. In addition, several other biometrics like pulseresponse [MRRT17] or eye movements [ERLM15] are also proposed. However, since
these approaches require special equipment, deployment costs are increasing significantly.
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Recent suspicions on keystroke dynamics. Among all the biometrics, the
most promising results are proposed using keystroke dynamics and mouse movements [ASL15, WDL+ 18, CZY+ 15]. However, in a recent work [TGG13], the reliability of classical keystroke dynamics are analyzed and an interface, called Mimesis,
was designed so that a user can mimic the typing rhythm of another user by using
the feedback provided by Mimesis. In another study [SP13], the statistical attacks
with bots generating synthetic typing patterns are examined for the conventional
keystrokes biometrics. In our work, we test WACA against both these imitation
and statistical attacks using similar configurations presented in these studies. We
show that WACA is secure against the powerful imitation and statistical attacks.
The detailed analysis of these attacks are given in Section 3.5.2.
Inference attacks using smartwatch sensors. Another direction on sensorbased keystroke research is using the motion sensors of wearables as a side channel
attack to infer some valuable assets like passwords. The main motivation behind
this attack is similar to WACA. Motion sensors will move in the same way with
keystrokes while typing and the wrist rotations and displacement will cause to leak
the keystrokes. This attack is deployed firstly on smartphones [MVBC12, OHD+ 12,
CC12, ASBS12, XBZ12], and recently on smartwatches [WLRC15, LDW+ 18]. Restricting access to motion sensors is not a realistic suggestion to defend against this
attack. In our work, we propose a pairing and synchronization session before using
the smartwatch with its paired computer. In this way, an encryption-supported
secure channel can be used to communicate between smartwatch and computer.
Comparative evaluation of WACA. In the literature, there is not a widely accepted standard framework to compare device authenticators. However, UsabilityDeployability-Security (UDS) framework proposed in [BHVOS12] is a highly accepted framework for web authentication schemes. To compare our work with its
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Table 2.1: Comparative evaluation of WACA using the UDS framework [BHVOS12]
with continuous authentication alternatives.

Security
na
#
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#
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#
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#
G
#
G

#
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#
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the benefit; no circle = does not offer the benefit.

alternatives, we remove some of the irrelevant and non-applicable benefits and use
only the relevant ones of the UDS framework. The complete list of benefits can
be found in [BHVOS12]. After also adding three new benefits, we end up with 18
benefits in total. Table 2.1 rates WACA using these 18 benefits. For space, we
cannot compare WACA to all continuous authentication methods proposed in the
literature. Therefore, we choose representatives for each continuous authentication
method.
WACA captures the sensor readings through a smartwatch without interrupting
the user, i.e., unobtrusively. However, unlike time-out or classical keystroke dynamics, it requires an extra channel to collect data, but obviously a smartwatch is a
not a customized hardware, i.e., it is an off-the-shelf device, so we say it partially
supports the benefit of Nothing-to-Carry and since its error is deficient, it also of-
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fers the advantage of Infrequent-Errors. On the other hand, WACA outperforms all
other methods in terms of security benefits. In addition to WACA, eye-movement
based authentication method also seems as secure as WACA. However, WACA’s
performance for usability and deployability is better. For example, WACA offers
much lower error rates, and eye-movement based methods require a specialized eye
or gaze-trackers and the user should be in a certain distance and in front of the eye
tracker which obstructs the usability of the eye-movement based methods. They
are more convenient for challenge-response type authentication methods [SRRM16]
even though they have the capability to provide data continuously and transparently. In brief, our conclusion from this comparative evaluation shows that WACA
offers better security benefits while keeping the usability at the same level as other
notable methods.

2.2

Privacy-aware Continuous Authentication

In the literature of Continuous Authentication (CA), keystroke dynamics and mouse
movements [BW12, TTY13] are the ones having the most promising results in terms
of usability and deployability as they can work transparently and have almost zero
cost. However, with a recent attack [TGG13], the reliability of classical keystroke
dynamics have become suspicious. The idea of using motion sensors to extract user
behavior is first used in smartphones [FBM+ 13, ZBHW14, TO13] and later used
for computer users by using smartwatch [AAUA20]. The advantage of the sensorybased approach is that sensors provide not only one-dimensional timing information
but also some features in other dimensions like the pressure of keystrokes and the
rotation of hand during key pressing. This obstructs the imitation attacks [TGG13]
and statistical attacks [SSCG16] since it requires to mimic the user’s acceleration
and rotation behavior simultaneously in three dimensions.
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Privacy Attacks on Keystroke Dynamics. Even though keystroke dynamics
is considered as a good candidate for continuous authentication and identification
systems, the information that can leak from the collected keystroke data raises
serious privacy concerns. It has been shown that the gender [FDCA11, GR12],
the demographics [BGK+ 15] or the emotional state [FLE14] of the user can be
predicted from keystroke dynamics. What the user is typing (e.g., password inference) [SWT01, ZW09] can also be effectively inferred from the keystroke dynamics.
Secure and Privacy-preserving Biometrics. There are three approaches proposed to address security and privacy issues in biometric schemes: biometric cryptosystems (BC), cancelable biometrics (CB), and keyed biometrics (KB). Some of
the key references include [JW99, JS06, DRS04] for BC, [JLG04, TGN06, RCCB07]
for CB, and [BCI+ 07, BBCdS08, Sto10, BBC+ 10, BG11] for KB. In addition to
these three main techniques, there are hybrid biometrics (HB), that blend BC, CB,
and multi-factor authentication [BCK08, FAD06]. Some of the above methods have
been used to secure multi-biometric traits simultaneously for improved performance
and security (see [NJ15, NMX+ 16], and the references therein). These constructions
can also be considered under HB.
Several theoretical and practical attacks (record-multiplicity, hill-climbing, masquerade attacks, and brute-force attacks) have been developed on BC and CB, many
of which result in a total break of the system with respect to irreversibility and indistinguishability. For attacks on BC and CB, see [SB07, STP09, RU12, WRDI12,
Tam14] and [NNJ10, FLY14], respectively. Several countermeasures have been proposed to guard against these attacks, including hardening with secrets [FAD06,
NNJ07, BA11], hybrid approaches and multi-biometrics [BCK08, RTWB16], employing encryption or signature schemes [Boy04, BCI+ 07, BBCdS08, BBC+ 10, BG11],
and new quantization and alignment methods [TMM15]. Recommended safeguards
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come at the cost of degrading performance and usability, increasing communication
and computational bandwidth to impractical ranges, and introducing secret parameters or trusted third parties. These are also the major common problems shared
over HB and KB in general. See [NJ15, NMX+ 16] for other drawbacks of HB and
KB.
Several cryptographic primitives including Secure Multiparty Computation [BA09,
EHKM11], Verifiable Computation [BCK+ 15], and Bloom Filters [RBBB14] have
been proposed for the secure biometrics. However, the main drawback of the cryptographic primitives is the computational overhead. Moreover, in addition to cryptographic primitives, the biometric template protection methods such as cancellable
biometrics [ASNM05, KPDD09] and biohashing [RU10] have been proposed for the
secure biometrics. However, Biohashing has been shown as vulnerable to several
attacks [KV10, KCZ+ 06] and even though cancellable biometrics is more secure,
they do not apply to behavioral biometrics, which is more ideal for continuous authentication.
Secure and Privacy-preserving Continuous Authentication. Although there
is extensive literature on the privacy-preserving biometrics, most of the work is on
physiological biometrics such as fingerprints, iris, etc. However, the physiological
biometrics are not feasible for a continuous authentication mechanism [SLM+ 16].
A potential solution is to use homomorphic systems [AAUC18] to address privacy
issues in template matching. A solution using a homomorphic system can be implemented with two main approaches. In the first approach, the user generates a
public key-private key pair for HE; the user encrypts his biometric data using his
public key, registers it with the server. At the time of verification, the user queries
the server with his fresh biometric data encrypted under the same public key. The
server uses the public key of the user and computes the encrypted and randomized
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distance between the template and the queried biometric, and sends it to the user.
The user decrypts using his private key and sends the randomized distance back to
the server. The server de-randomizes to recover the actual distance and outputs the
result (accept or reject). This approach requires users to maintain long-term and individual secret keys, highly interactive with non-trivial computation and bandwidth
requirements. See [SSNS14, SSNS15] for some recent implementations of this approach. In the second approach, the server generates public-private key pair for HE,
and users encrypt their biometric data under the server’s public key during registration and authentication. Even though the key generation/storage/decryption and
computations on the encrypted data are performed on two separated independent
components of the server, the server has the ability to decrypt and recover users’
biometric data, whence has to be trusted by all users in the system; see [YSK+ 13]
for some recent implementations of this approach. Indeed, it has also been shown
that the proposed protocol is vulnerable to biometric template recovery attacks under the presence of even a malicious computational server, which is only one of two
servers [AM14].

2.3

Privacy-aware Multi-factor Authentication

A number of researchers have proposed the design and implementation of MFA systems [PMZ+ 11, Ver12, SP12, JY11, ZPW11], with each presenting its own specific
advantages and trade-offs. Knowledge factor (i.e., passwords) is the most ubiquitous
authentication factor. It is widely known that the sole use of passwords has many
weaknesses. Nevertheless, passwords are still in use and are the de-facto standard
[BHOS12]. Thus, to reduce the security risk of the sole use of a knowledge factor,
researchers have added possession factor and identity factor to authentication sys-
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tems. MFA systems using passwords along with a possession factor are commonly
found in electronic commerce and online banking. Security tokens, also called OneTime-Password (OTP) tokens, is one of the most commonly-used possession factor,
which generates a pseudo-random number at pre-determined intervals (e.g., RSA
SecurID[AUT12] and VeriSign Security Token[Ver12]). Additionally, these cards
serve as an additional authentication factor, especially in corporate network environments. For instance, in [Kum04], Kumar proposed a secure remote user authentication scheme with smart cards for corporate networks. Unfortunately, an MFA
system with a possession factor usually depends on the distribution of some specific device, which is cumbersome and not user-friendly. Besides, the introduction
of physical devices may pose further security risks if the devices are lost, stolen or
replicated without the knowledge of the legitimate user. Czeskis et al. [CDK+ 12]
first consider the usability of an MFA system with a possession factor by proposing authentication through opportunistic cryptographic identity. Nevertheless, their
proposed scheme requires the presence of the user’s phone, which limits the usability
of the system.
Finally, authentication via an identity factor is also a well-studied area of research. Identity factors are further categorized as either physiological biometrics or
behavioral characteristics [YG08, SP12]. Physiological biometrics, such as fingerprints, iris, and face, have already drawn considerable attention in academia and
have been implemented widely in industry [BSSB06]. Behavioral biometrics, such
as mouse movements, keystroke dynamics [SO19, TCCL14, KDPP16], graphical
passwords, though not widely utilized, have also gained popularity in the research
community [JY11]. Similar to MFA systems with possession factors, MFA systems
with physiological biometrics suffer from relatively low usability and deployability
due to the implementation cost of biometrics recognition devices. Meanwhile, the
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Table 2.2: Comparative evaluation of PINTA .
Security Privacy Usability Low Deployment Cost
Password-only
#
G
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#
G
2FA
#
G
#
G
Czeskis et al. [CDK+ 12]
#
G
#
G
Sujithra et al. [SP12]
Bhargav-Spantzel et al. [BSSB06]
PINTA (this work)1
= offers the benefit; #
G = almost offers the benefit; no circle = does not offer the benefit.

downside of using behavioral characteristics is that the system may induce relatively
low authentication accuracy and large system overhead [ZPW11]. To the best of
our knowledge, no consideration has been given to the privacy issue when authenticating based on user behavior. This is critical, given that the validity of the specific
user characteristics shared with a site will likely significantly outlast the period of
time for which the site’s services are needed. That is, the shared characteristic is
not a mere pseudonym, but a characteristic that can identify a user for years to
come. Therefore, our goal in this work is to develop a privacy-preserving multifactor authentication system based on passwords along with hybrid user profiles,
that considers usability, privacy, and deployment cost.
Comparative evaluation of PINTA. In Table 2.2, we perform a comparative
evaluation of our proposed scheme in this work, PINTA, where we compare PINTA
with its alternatives in terms of the benefits offered by the schemes. As can be seen
from the Table 2.2, PINTA offers more benefits than its alternatives.

2.4

Smart Home User Privacy

Identification using the encrypted network traffic . The meta-data (e.g.
MAC, traffic rate) of encrypted network traffic triggers possible threats including
unintentional disclosure of the content or user. There is an extensive literature in
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the identification of the content from the encrypted network traffic. For example,
web page identification [SSW+ 02], web user identification [LL06], protocol identification [WMM06] are some of the research on the identification using the encrypted
traffic. Not only identification attacks, but also the countermeasures have been
studied in several studies [DCRS12, CZJJ12].
Smartphone Fingerprinting. Recently, this research has been extended to smartphone users. For example, Conti et al. [CMSV16] showed a way of identifying user
action on Android apps and Taylor et al. [TSCM16] presented their work on the
fingerprinting of apps from an encrypted network of the smartphone. In addition,
[SFSM13] fingerprints the smartphones using the network traffic captured generated
from the popular applications such as Facebook, WhatsApp. Finally, in [AHM+ 15],
Ateniese et al. showed a new adversary model that can infer the location of the user
from the encrypted network traffic.
Fingerprinting Methods. In all the aforementioned studies, either statistical
techniques [VČČD15] or machine learning methods [CMSV16] were used to infer
different sensitive information about the user and the context. Even ML has been
used for the task of identification such as user, device, or website identification, in
none of these studies, the attacks are timing-based as we have in our work.
IoT Fingerprinting. So far, in all the aforementioned studies the results showed
that the used methods are efficient and the threat is real, but the threat was limited
to the web and online privacy of the user. Now with the emergence of IoT, it has
been extended to every part of our daily lives and, with this, threats and countermeasures have also evolved. The number of studies on the IoT fingerprinting through the
network traffic has been increasing every day. Many studies have investigated the
device type identification problem, where it has been sometimes proposed for both
attacking [MMH+ 17, SBZD18, BTB17, DLT+ 19, SECK19] and improving the secu-
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rity of smart home platforms [OMM+ 19, OER19, BEM19]. Moreover, some other
works [CLBR16, ARF17, ARS+ 17, AHR+ 19, JFF19, TVMD20, RDC+ 19] worked
on the device activity (event) inference problem, where the phrases device activity
inference and user activity inference sometimes have been used interchangeably. In
our work, we refer to the device activity (event) as the activity inferred from only
one device. Even though sometimes the device activity and user activity would
be the same thing (e.g., ”coffee maker is ON” is the same as ”the user is making
coffee”), sometimes information from multiple devices is needed to infer one user
activity correctly (e.g., see Figure 6.4). We differentiate those two types of activities
and provide a more generalized activity types in the fourth stage of our attack when
we are modeling the user activities using HMM in Section 6.5.8.
Difference from existing work. Our work differs from the aforementioned studies
in several ways: First, we are proposing a comprehensive method of end-to-end
attack to infer the on-going user activities in a cascaded manner, where the previous
studies have focused on only one stage of the attack. Note that putting all the
different attack mechanisms and executing them successfully is a non-trivial task.
Second, we are proposing the use of HMM for user activity modeling, where the
device activities from multiple devices have been used to infer user activities. Last
but not least, for the analysis of our attack, we performed experiments using the
devices with WiFi, ZigBee, and BLE, where most of the previous studies have
focused only on one of those wireless protocols.

2.5

Survey of Homomorphic Encryption Schemes

Like our work in this dissertation, there are similar useful surveys in the literature.
In fact, unfortunately, some of the surveys only cover the theoretical information of
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the schemes as in [PPP+ 14, AS14] and some of them are directly for expert readers and mathematicians as in [Vai11, Sil13, Gen14]. Compared to these surveys,
our survey has a broad reader perspective including researchers and practitioners
interested in the advances and implementations in the field of HE, especially FHE.
Furthermore, while the survey in [AMFF+ 13] only covers the signal processing applications, other in [HP14] covers a few FHEs on only cloud applications. Since
our survey is not limited to specific application areas, we do not articulate these
specific application areas in detail but we list the theory and implementation of
all existing HE schemes, which can be used in possible futuristic application areas
with recent advancements. After [FG07] and [Aki09], many HE schemes were introduced. Compared to these useful surveys, our survey focuses on the most recent
HE schemes, since most of the significant improvements are introduced recently
(after 2009). Although [MOO+ 14] is one of the most recent surveys, it focuses on
the hardware implementation solutions of FHE schemes. This survey is not limited to hardware solutions, as, in addition to hardware solutions, it covers software
solutions of implementations as well in the implementation section. After [Wu15],
several new FHE schemes, which improves FHE in a sufficiently great way as to be
worthy of attention, were proposed in the literature. Finally, it is worth mentioning
that [ABC+ 15] provides a systematic explanation of the new terminology related to
FHE and [AKP13] provides security and a characterization of all existing group homomorphic encryption schemes, where they do not present all the HE schemes and
their implementations in detail. Compared to these useful prior works, nonetheless,
our survey is intrinsically different from the aforementioned surveys.
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2.6

Policy-based Privacy-aware Secure Data Exchange

Policy has been used in several contexts as a vehicle for representing configuration of
secure groups [MP06], network management [RJR+ 16], threat mitigation [FDCB15],
and access control [DZC+ 16]. These approaches define a schema for their target
problem and do not consider the challenges in secure data exchange. In contrast,
Curie defines a formal policy language to dictate the data exchange requirements

of members and enforces the agreement in collaborative ML settings.
On the other hand, secure computation on sensitive proprietary data has recently attracted attention. Federated learning [TBA+ 19, SCST17], anonymization [EESA+ 12], multi-site statistical models [Dan15], secure multi-party computation [BCD+ 09], and secure and differentially-private multi-party computation [ACA+ 17]
have started to shed light on this issue. Such techniques have been used both for
training and classification phases in deep learning [SS15], clustering [GLN13], and
decision trees [BPTG15]. To allow programmers to develop such applications, secure
computation programming frameworks and languages are designed for general purposes [HKoS+ 10, RHH14, O+ 16, BKLS18, EESA+ 12]. However, these approaches
do not consider complex relationships among members and assume members share
their all data or nothing. We view our efforts in this work to be complementary
to much of these works. CPL can be integrated into these frameworks to establish
partnerships and manage data exchange policies before a computation starts.
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2.7

Secure and Differentially Private Computations in Multiparty Settings

There have been many works on the secure computation of linear regression over
distributed databases [KLSR05, DHC04, KLSR09, SKLR04, HFN11]. In these, the
threat model is considered as a third party that does not have access to data,
but curious about it. However, one of the parties may want to release the model
function after computing function securely, which still poses threats to the individuals [NS08, GKS08, EESA+ 12]. DP copes with this problem as it injects a
certain amount of noise to the results of the queries to mask the individuals in
the database. Indeed, there have been different works about the DP [DKM+ 06,
DMNS06, Dwo08, MT07] and particularly about differentially private linear regression [CMS11, BST14, DJW13, F+ 14, JT13, ZZX+ 12, STU17]. However, these works
consider DP without SMC. Although they are useful, they only provide privacy guarantees that the output of queries does not carry information about the individuals.
Approaches combining SMC and DP to provide both individual-level privacy and
secure computation would be more secure. However, combining DP and SMC is not
trivial; indeed, it is a rather challenging task since the application of centralized
DP just after SMC in client-server settings would leak the model to an untrusted
data collector, which results in a privacy violation of individuals in the database.
Applying distributed DP directly on the local data held by the parties is more secure,
but if each user independently injects noise randomly, it may lead to an excessive
or uncontrollable amount of accumulated noise at the data collector end. Recent
works focused on combining SMC and DP [GXS13, CA13, SCR+ 11], but none of
them focused on linear regression. As pointed in [ZZX+ 12], the main reason behind
this is that the regression analysis involves an optimization problem, which makes
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it harder to control the required amount of noise, and if the data is also distributed
among parties, that makes it much more difficult to control the privacy-accuracy
trade-off introduced by DP. In another relevant work [PRR10], a combination of
SMC and DP is proposed for aggregate classifiers. However, this approach injects
the noise to the optimum model parameter. This resulted in excessive noise in the
global model and significant loss in the accuracy. Particularly, the experimental
evaluation shows that when the classifier is locally trained, the error rate obtained
from locally trained classifiers is higher than the optimum error rates that could be
obtained from a centralized approach. However, in our work, we take a different
approach from this work. We deploy FM [ZZX+ 12], which adds noise to local
statistics, which provides the same model as the centralized approach. Lastly, even
though a similar idea is proposed in [AHPW15], it is not analyzed in detail.
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PART I - PRIVACY-AWARE ALTERNATIVE AUTHENTICATION
METHODS
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CHAPTER 3
WACA: WEARABLE-ASSISTED CONTINUOUS
AUTHENTICATION

3.1

Introduction

The majority of the current user authentication methods rely on password authentication. However, password authentication methods are subject to many security drawbacks [BHvOS15, GU13]. Many practical attacks have been demonstrated
that the passwords can be either stolen or bypassed [Dic16, TGC16]. To mitigate
these threats, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) methods were proposed [Dis17,
SKH+ 19, ALB+ 19]. In MFA, the user credentials are checked from two or more independent sources, and even if the attacker steals one factor, it would still have
to overcome the burden of other factors.

Though, whether it is one-factor or

MFA [ALB+ 19], a one-time login process does not guarantee that the identified
user is the real user throughout the login session. Even if it is a legitimate insider
who has been authorized once, a forever access is provided in most cases not to
interrupt the current user.
An authentication mechanism, which re-verifies the user periodically without
breaking the continuity of the session, is vital [Goo16]. For example, users may
share their passwords with family members, friends, colleagues, or an alreadyauthenticated user may walk away without locking his/her computing platform (e.g.,
laptop) for a short time or may intentionally hand it to a non-authenticated coworker trusting that s/he will not perpetrate anything nonsensical or malicious or
a malicious former employee or disgruntled worker may want to use his/her former
privileges. In all these cases, as long as the original login session is actively used,
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there is no mechanism to verify that the initial authenticated user is still the user
in control of the computing environment.
In this chapter, we introduce a novel Wearable-Assisted Continuous Authentication framework called WACA, where a wearable device (e.g., smartwatch) is used
to authenticate a computer user continuously utilizing the motion sensors of the
smartwatch. Specifically, WACA uses sensor-based keystroke dynamics, where the
typing rhythm of the user is captured by the motion sensors of the smartwatch worn
by the user. In essence, keystroke dynamics is one of the behavioral biometrics that
characterizes the users according to their typing pattern. Note that most conventional keystroke-based authentication schemes in the literature [TTY13] have used
dwell-time and flight-time as unique features of the users. These features are directly obtained by logging the timing between successive keystrokes. However, in
WACA, the feature set is richer and more flexible since 6-axis motion sensor data
can provide not only timing information, but also the key-pressing pressure, hand
rotation, and hand displacement, etc. Our feature set consists of 14 different sensory
features from both time and frequency domains. These features are applied to 6axis motion sensor data, obtaining 84 features in total, jointly considering the 6-axis
data. Finally, different distance measures are used to compare the registered and
the unknown profile of the user as it was shown that they performed well in similar
contexts [KM09a, SPW13]. Also, in another work [MMC+ 14], users are classified
according to the sequence of interactions (e.g., typing, scrolling), where the user
wears a bracelet with motion sensors and radio. However, that work [MMC+ 14] has
been shown as insecure in another work [HSU+ 16]. As explained, our work differs
from other works in several ways to tackle those flaws and strengthen our design.
We tested the performance, efficiency, and security of WACA with more than
thirty real users and data collected from them. We specifically evaluated WACA in
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3.1: (a) The reference coordinate system for accelerometer and gyroscope
sensors. (b) A sample raw data collected from the accelerometer of the smartwatch
and keystrokes detected by using peak detection methods while typing the word
”smartwatch”.
terms of three metrics: (i) How accurately can it authenticate the genuine users and
lock out the and impostor users? (ii) How fast can it detect an impostor? (iii) How
accurately can it identify an impostor from its typing pattern? Moreover, we also
evaluated the robustness of our proposed method against powerful attacks, including, imitation [TGG13, HSU+ 16], statistical [SP13, SSCG16], and insider attacks.

3.2

Design Rationale: Why Should it Work?

In this section, we study how motion sensors of a smartwatch are impacted when
typing on a keyboard and see if the data can be used to identify users. Particularly,
we analyze a case that a user wears a smartwatch and types on a qwerty-type builtin keyboard of a computer. Our goal is to collect keystroke information from the
built-in motion sensors (i.e., accelerometer and gyroscope) of the smartwatch during
the typing activity. To collect smartwatch sensor data, we developed an Android
Wear app that records the raw sensor readings from the motion sensors.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of two different users’ (a) accelerometer (b) gyroscope readings while typing the same text.
In our experiments, we used linear acceleration composite sensor data, which
combines the data of accelerometer and gyroscope to exclude the effect of gravity1 .
Note that the accelerometer and gyroscope sensors provide three-dimensional sensor
data, where the reference coordinate system associated with the sensors are illustrated in Figure 3.1a. As z-axis of the accelerometer sensor is directly affected by
the key up-down movements of a user while typing, the most significant changes are
observed in the z-axis. Therefore, the z-axis of the data provides the best information for keystroke features such as holding time, pressing pressure, etc. Moreover,
another observation is that even if the device is placed flat on a desk, the sensors
generate a certain level of noise, which needs to be removed by filtering, as explained
later.
Sample data in Figure 3.1b was acquired from the z-axis of the accelerometer
while typing the word “smartwatch”. It can be seen how the value of the accelerometer makes peak points. As the acceleration through the gravity corresponds to the
going down of the accelerometer, the peak points in the figure correspond to the
keystrokes in the typing activity. While the amplitude of the peak is related to how
strong the key press is, the width of the peaks is associated with how long the key
1 For

brevity, we use acceleration to refer to the linear acceleration.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of the same user’s sensor data over two different time intervals with (a) accelerometer, (b) gyroscope.
is pressed. These are simple statistics that can be used to identify users. These and
other features will be further analyzed in detail in Section 3.4.
Moreover, we conducted two more simple experiments using the accelerometer
and gyroscope data on the smartwatch, and we made the following two observations:
• Observation 1: Different users exhibit different patterns even if they type the
same text.
In this experiment, we compared the data collected from two different users
while typing the same text. Figure 3.2 presents the sensor data of the two users’
accelerometer and gyroscope data for a given time interval. The distribution of the
accelerometer data in Figure 3.2a shows clear differences such as the magnitude of
peaks, inter-arrival time of peak points, the width of peaks, etc. On the other hand,
the gyroscope sensor measures the rotation of the watch. As seen in Figure 3.2b,
the number of peaks or the magnitude of the peaks are different for different users;
so these features are viable candidates to recognize different users.
• Observation 2: Same user follows similar patterns over different time intervals
even while typing different texts.
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In the second experiment, the data was collected from the same user over two
different time intervals corresponding to the different texts, and the plots are given
in Figure 3.3. As seen in Figure 3.3a, the amplitudes and widths of the peaks are
similar in magnitude, but with a phase shift, meaning leading or lagging. On the
other hand, the same leading or lagging of similar shapes can also be seen in the
gyroscope data in Figure 3.3b.
These two observations justify the rationale that keystroke dynamics obtained
from smartwatch accelerometer and gyroscope sensors can differentiate different
users as classical keystroke dynamics and the same users can be detected over different times even while typing different texts. Although these are just preliminary
observations, our framework will be further tested and evaluated with extensive
experiments using real user data in Section 3.5.

3.3

System Model

In this section, we explain design goals, our assumptions, and the adversary model.
Design Goals: In WACA, our design goals is similar to the ones given in [PPJ03]:
Our system should be universal (i.e., the biometric features exist for everyone),
unique (the features are specific for everyone), permanent (the biometric features
always exist), transparent (the system works without interrupting the user), continuous (the system should provide continuous user data), and accurate (the system
works with low error rate). WACA achieves the first five goals by its design and the
accuracy is tested in Section 3.5.
Assumptions: For WACA, the following assumptions are considered:
• We assume that the user wears a smartwatch, which is equipped with motion
sensors and either Bluetooth or WiFi. We also assume that an app to collect
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the motion data is already installed on the smartwatch, and it is paired with
the computer that will be authenticated. For our work, we built a custom
Android Wear app to collect and process the sensor data.
• We assume that by pairing devices, a secure communication channel is already established between the computer and smartwatch as well as between
the computer and the remote or local authentication server. This secure communication channel should keep the sensor data secure in both transitions and
at rest.
• The WACA framework acts as a complementary second-factor, and it has the
flexibility to work any first-factor authentication system, and it is assumed
that the system has already a first authentication factor. The first factor
could be one of the password-, token-, or biometric-based systems. Note that
the first factor of authentication is beyond the scope of this work.
Adversary Model: The primarily considered adversary model is an attacker who
somehow bypassed the first factor (e.g., password, token) of the authentication system and it has physical access to the computing terminal. The attacker is likely
to be an insider or co-worker, but it can also be an outsider, just passing by the
victim’s computer. Attacker’s goals can include, but not limited to, trying to get
some important information from the victim’s computer, taking action on behalf of
the victim, or trying to get access to the assets that s/he does not have permission
(i.e., privilege abuse). More specifically, we consider the following attack scenarios
by considering WACA is deployed in a real-world system:
• Attack Scenario 1: The victim is one of the employers and forgets to lock his
computer and an outsider (e.g., a mail courier) who is just passing through
the office tries to get access to the victim’s computer. In this scenario, if
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the attacker is not aware of WACA, s/he will attempt to use the victim’s
computer. If the attacker is aware of WACA, s/he will first look for the
victim’s smartwatch and then try to keep the system logged in.
• Attack Scenario 2: We consider the attacker can also be a malicious insider and
thereby the attacker also has a registered smartwatch, but its typing profile
is registered together with its username. This type of attacker tries to get
access to the system’s assets that s/he does not have permission (i.e., privilege
abuse). In this scenario, the attacker watches its victim (e.g., supervisor) for a
proper timing that its victim leaves the computer unlocked for some time to go
to lunch or to get coffee, etc. (aka lunchtime attack [ERLM15]). The attacker
can either try to bypass the system via providing data from his smartwatch
or can try to use the victim’s smartwatch somehow obtained (e.g., can steal it
or victim can leave it behind).
• More Powerful Adversaries: Furthermore, a powerful adversary can be aware
of WACA and try to defeat it using special tools and skills by imitating legitimate users [TGG13, HSU+ 16] or launching statistical attacks [SP13, SSCG16].
This powerful adversary (insider or outsider) can be a human or a trained bot.
In imitation attacks, the attacker wears the victim’s smartwatch either via after stealing it, or the victim can leave it behind for a while and the attacker
can try to impersonate the victim. On the other hand, the statistical attack
is more complex and requires special tools and skills. Hence, WACA also
considers these powerful attack scenarios in its adversary model.
The security evaluation of these attack scenarios and how WACA is robust
against insiders, imitators, and statistical attackers are explained more in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2.
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Figure 3.4: WACA framework architecture and key components.

3.4

WACA Architecture

In this section, we present the details of the WACA. WACA is a typing-based
continuous authentication system using the accelerometer and gyroscope sensors of
a smartwatch. WACA framework is complementary to the first-factor authentication
mechanisms, and it is flexible to work with any first factor.

3.4.1

Overview

WACA consists of four main stages: Preprocessing, Feature Extraction, User Profiling, and Decision Module. These stages, which are shown in Figure 3.4, work as
follows:
• First, the raw sensor data is acquired from a smartwatch (1) through an app
installed on the watch. Then, the raw data is transmitted to the computer
through a secure wireless channel, and the rest of the stages are performed on
the computer except that Authentication Server (AS) is located in a trusted
place.
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• As the collected data includes a certain level of noise, in the preprocessing
stage, the raw data is cleaned up by filtering (2) and transformed into a proper
format for the next stages.
• Then, incoming data is used to extract a set of features (3). This set of
features, namely feature vector, represents the characteristics of the current
user profile.
• In the enrollment phase (9), the created feature vector is stored in the AS.
• In the verification phase (4), the queried user profile is dispatched from the
AS to the decision module (10, 11).
• The decision module computes a similarity score between the returned profile
and the provided profile for the current user to make a binary authentication
decision (match/no match). If the decision is a no match (5), then the user’s
access to computing terminal will be suspended, and the user will be required
to re-authenticate using the primary authentication method (e.g., password).
• However, when the decision is a match (6) then the user’s access will be maintained. The profile of the current user in the AS will be updated after the
correct match of the user profile (7). In WACA, this update frequency is a
system parameter and can be set by the admin in the security policy. An
optimum value of this parameter can be set after experimenting with different
values in a real-world implementation. In this way, the user profile will be
kept up-to-date over time.
• Whenever a typing activity is initiated on the keyboard of the computer,
the smartwatch will be notified (8) again by the terminal to start over the
authentication process continuously.
In the following subsections, we explain the details of WACA and its key stages.
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3.4.2

Data Collection

In WACA, data collection refers to capturing sensor readings from the user’s smartwatch through a secure wireless communication channel (i.e., via WiFi or Bluetooth). An app is installed on the smartwatch to listen to the physical sensors.
Then, the raw sensor data is transmitted to the computer through a secure communication channel.
Each row of the collected raw data of accelerometer is represented in the format
of acc
~ =< ta , xa , ya , za > and gyroscope is represented as gyro
~ =< tg , xg , yg , zg >,
where t stands for timestamps and x, y, z represent the different axis values of the
accelerometer and gyroscope sensors. Each of t, x, y, and z is stored as a different
vector. The length of the vectors directly depends on the sampling rate of the sensors
and the time interval of the data collection. In WACA, the parameter sample size
refers to the length of these vectors, and it is set as a configurable parameter while
the parameter sample rate is a constant system parameter that is characterized by
the wearable device and app.

3.4.3

Preprocessing

In WACA, preprocessing stage refers to the preparation of raw sensor readings for
the next stages. It consists of cleaning and transformation of the raw data. In the
cleaning part, the noise is removed. To remove the effect of the noise from data,
we apply M-point Moving Average Filter (MAF), which is a simple low-pass filter
and it operates by taking the average of M neighbor points and generates a single
output. M-point filtering in equation form can be expressed as follows:
ẏ[i] =

M −1
1 X
ẋ[i + j],
M j=0
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(3.1)

where ẋ is the raw sensor data, ẏ is the new filtered data, and i indicates the
current sample that is averaged. The filtered data becomes smoother than the raw
data without altering the value at that point.
After filtering the noise, the data is transformed into appropriate forms for the
next stage. Particularly, different types of sensor data are separated according to
an assigned ID number during the sensor registration and then x, y, and z axes of
the sensor values are recorded as different vectors e.g., x~a =< xa 1 , ..., xa n > and
x~g =< xg 1 , ..., xg n > for a profile of n samples.

3.4.4

Feature Extraction & User Profiling

In WACA, Feature Extraction (FE) refers to the transformation of the time series
raw data into a number of features. In order to create the feature vector, each
feature is computed using the data vectors. As an example, the first feature is
calculated from a function f , i.e., f1 = f (xa , ya , za , xg , yg , zg ) and the second feature
is calculated from another function g, i.e., f2 = g(xa , ya , za , xg , yg , zg ) etc. Then,
the final feature vector f~ =< f1 , f2 , ..., fn > is generated using all the calculated
features.
As each element of the feature vector has different ranges, some of the features
can be dominant in the distance measurement. To prevent this and create a scaleinvariant feature vector, we apply normalization to the feature vector to map the
interval [xmin , xmax ] into the unit scale [0,1]. We formulate this linear normalization
process in WACA as follows:
xnew =

x − xmin
,
xmax − xmin

(3.2)

where xmin and xmax are the minimum, and maximum value of the features of the
user’s enrolled templates.

44

Table 3.1: Feature set extracted from sensor data in WACA.
Domain

Time

Frequency
Total #

Feature
Mean,
Median,
Variance,
Average Absolute Difference of Peaks,
Range,
Mode,
Covariance,
Mewan Absolute Deviation (MAD),
Inter-quartile Range (IQR),
Correlation between axes (xy, yz, xz),
Skewness,
Kurtosis
Entropy,
Spectral energy
-

Length

12 ∗ 6 = 72

2*6=12
84

After generating the final feature vector f~, in the user profiling stage, a user
profile p~ is generated by adding the user ID and start and end timestamps of the
data sample, i.e., p~ =< userID, tstart , tend , f~ >. If the user is in the enrollment
phase, this profile is transmitted to the AS to be stored in a database. Finally, if
the user is unknown, and a typing activity notification comes from the computer,
the profile is passed to the Decision Module.
The feature set used in our framework is presented in Table 3.1. These features
were chosen as they performed well in similar contexts [KM09a, SPW13].

3.4.5

Decision Module

The last stage in WACA is the decision module. The task of this stage is classifying
the user as authorized or unauthorized for given credentials entered during the initial
login. For authentication, we use distance measures. The distance measure methods
simply calculate the distance between two vectors or data points in a coordinate
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plane. It is directly related to the similarity of compared time-series data sets. The
most widely used distance measure is Euclidean Distance. It is actually just the
distance between two points in vector space and is the particular case of Minkowski
Distance, which is expressed as follows:
distance(~x, ~y ) = (

n
X
1
(xi − yi )p ) p ,

(3.3)

i=1

where ~x = (x1 , x2 , ..., xn ) and ~y = (y1 , y2 , ..., yn ) are the set of sensor observations to
be compared. If p = 2, it is Euclidean distance and has been extensively used in the
keystroke-based authentication methods. WACA calculates the distance and returns
the result by comparing it with a configurable predetermined threshold value (i.e.,
genuine if distance < threshold, impostor if distance ≥ threshold), the impact of
which is analyzed in Section 3.5.1. Indeed, this threshold measures the confidence
of the decision for a given user.
In addition to Euclidean and Minkowski Distances, there are several distance
measurement methods utilized in biometric authentication systems which may perform differently depending on the context. Therefore, we also tested different distance metrics in our experiments to see, which shows the best for WACA. Other
distance metrics that we tested in our experiments are Cosine Distance, Correlation
Distance, Manhattan (Cityblock) Distance, and Minkowski with p=5. The performance of each one is given in Section 3.5.1.

3.5

Performance Evaluation

We tested the performance, efficiency, and security of WACA with more than thirty
real users and data collected from them. We specifically evaluated WACA in terms of
three metrics: (i) How accurately can it differentiate between genuine and impostor
users? (ii) How fast can it detect an impostor? (iii) How accurately can it identify
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an impostor? In for these purposes, we first conduct authentication experiments. In
these, we measure how WACA performs when users type a different or the same text.
We also analyze how the sample size and the detection technique impact WACA’s
performance. The effect of the sample size allowed to evaluate the quickness of
WACA. Finally, we also conducted an experiment to show how successful WACA
would be in identifying insider threats.
Data and Collection Methodology. In our experiments, we collected data from
342 human subjects.

3

During the collection of data, an Android Wear smartwatch

with an installed data collection app was distributed to the participants, and the
participants were asked to type a text. The participants were free to choose the
hand (left/right) on which they wore the smartwatch. The choice of the hand that
the participants wore the smartwatch was left to the participants. Moreover, they
were also given the freedom to adjust the sitting position and the keyboard and
screen position according to their comfort levels. It is also worth noting that sitting
and wrist position (i.e., if it is resting on the table or maintained in the air) may
affect the performance. Therefore, a real-world implementation may require further
calibration before enrolling the users to the system.
Throughout these experiments, we utilized a standalone qwerty keyboard to have
generic results. Before typing each text, the participants were also given enough time
to read the texts to make them familiar with the text as typing a familiar text is a
more common activity.
2 Not

all of them participated in all experiments.

3 Our

research study with the human subjects was conducted with the appropriate
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals.
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The participants were involved in two typing tasks conducted in two different
sessions. They were asked to type with their normal typing style without noticing
that their data was recorded. The two data sets were compiled as follows:
• Typing Task-1: 20 participants are involved in this task, and the participants
were asked to type a story from a set of short and simple stories from the
American Literature4 for four minutes. The story was chosen randomly by the
participants. On average, four minutes of data corresponds to 25000 samples
for each participant (Total: 850000 samples).
• Typing Task-2: 20 participants are involved in this task and for this data
set, all the participants were asked to type the same text5 for four minutes.
For each participant, almost the same amount of data is collected as Typing
Task-1. This dataset is essential to be able to measure the quality of the
features.
• Typing Task-3: 34 participants are involved in this task, and the participants were instructed to imitate someone else’ typing pattern by watching the
prerecorded video of the other person. For these experiments, one of the participants was recorded on video while typing a short and simple sentence for
15 seconds from a perspective that the hand motions, smartwatch, keyboard,
and the screen could be seen. Although it was not required, the perspective
allowed to infer what the victim was typing by watching. This dataset was
primarily used to analyze the attacking scenarios.
Note that in all the experiments, the dataset obtained from all these tasks were
always used by dividing them into equal size chunks. Therefore, even if all the
4 https://americanliterature.com/100-great-short-stories
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Adventures_of_Tom_Sawyer
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participants in Typing Task-2 typed the same text, the compared samples always
corresponded to different texts for a participant.
Moreover, in our experiments, we split the collected data sets into equal size
chunks, called sample size. It is the number of samples (i.e., row) in a chunk.
Each chunk consists of 8 columns of data, two of which are timestamp, and the
others are 6-dimensional sensor data. The sample size is the main system design
parameter in our experiments as it has a direct impact on the time required to
collect data. Particularly, the time t required to collect data with the sample size
can be represented as t = sample size/100 in seconds as the sampling rate in our
experiments was 100Hz.
Performance Metrics. In the authentication experiments, we used Equal Error
Rate (EER) as it is a commonly accepted metric to assess the accuracy of WACA.
EER is calculated using two metrics: False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Reject Rate (FRR). FAR is the rate of incorrectly accepted unauthorized users among
all the unauthorized attempts: The increase in FAR is a direct threat to the system’s security level (i.e., confidence level on the decision). For more valuable assets,
increasing the threshold will decrease FAR. On the other hand, FRR is the rate
of incorrectly rejected authorized users among all the legitimate authentication attempts. Contrary to FAR, FRR can be decreased by decreasing the value of the
threshold. Indeed, the threshold value effectively measures the confidence of the
decision for a given user. Finally, EER is the point that gives the closest FAR and
FRR point for a given threshold (ideal EER is the intersection point of FAR and
FRR) and the lower the EER, the better is an authentication system.
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3.5.1

Results

In this section, we present and discuss the evaluation results.
Impact of the text dependency. In this experiment, our goal is to analyze how
EER changes among the participants. We try to answer: How does WACA perform
with the typed text? This is also a more advanced analysis of the framework and the
fundamental idea than that of in Section 2.
Specifically, for this experiment, we used Typing Tasks 1 (any text) and Typing
Task 2 (the same text) dataset and we fixed the sample size to 1000 and used Manhattan (Cityblock) as a representative distance measure to compare the samples.
Note that as later shown and analyzed in Figures 3.7-3.8, this distance metric was
chosen as it performed the best among the different distance measurement techniques. This is because Manhattan is rectilinear distance, considering the absolute
differences and is more suitable for natural settings [KCB03, PGR07, BG04]. For
each sample of a particular user, we computed the differences from other users’ samples. For this purpose, we computed the N × N dissimilarity matrix, where N is
the total number of samples for all the participants. The dissimilarity matrix was
calculated by measuring the similarity of each sample to all the other samples using
leave-one-out cross-validation6 method [JL10].
Then, for a given threshold and participant, the ratio of the rejected and accepted
samples was computed to obtain FRR and FAR, respectively. This process was
repeated by incrementing the threshold by 0.01 in each step for all the samples of
all the participants. This gave us a set of EER for each participant. Note that in
a real system, FAR/FRR rate can be tuned according to the system preferences,
6 Even

though to show the feasibility of our method, we tested our method with leaveone-out cross-validation, collecting and storing more than one samples from each user at
the enrollment phase may impact the accuracy in real-life implementations.
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Figure 3.5: EER for each participant with a sample size of 1000 using Manhattan
(Cityblock) distance metric during Typing Task-1. Average EER is 0.0513.
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Figure 3.6: EER for each participant with a sample size=1000 using Manhattan
(Cityblock) distance metric during Typing Task-2. Average EER is 0.0647.
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Figure 3.7: Average EER according to different sample sizes using different distance
metrics while users are performing Typing Task-1.
but here our purpose is to find an acceptable performance metric for WACA. The
results are plotted in Figure 3.5 for Typing Task-1 and Figure 3.6 for Typing Task-2.
Average EER for the Typing Task-1 experiment was 0.0513. Figure 3.6 compares
the EER of participants for the Typing Task-2 experiment. Average EER for this
experiment was 0.0647.
If we compare the ERR of each participant in both the experiments, we see
that they are also close to each other, where a few of the participants perform
very distinctive behaviors (e.g., participant 15). However, the overall distribution of
EER over the participants is similar in both the experiments. Recall that in Typing
Task-1, all the participants typed different texts, while they typed the same text in
Typing Task-2.
Overall, in this analysis we report the average EERs of both the experiments are
close (around %1), which supports the usability of WACA regardless of the typed
text for the continuous authentication session.
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Figure 3.8: Average EER according to different sample sizes using different distance
metrics while users are performing Typing Task-2.
Impact of the sample size and the distance measuring technique. In these
experiments, our goal was to assess how different sample sizes and the distance
measuring techniques used in WACA impact the performance. For this, we varied
the sample size from 300 to 3000 and utilized five different distance measuring
techniques, Euclidean (p=2), Cosine, Correlation, Cityblock, and Minkowski (p=5).
Again, two types of participant dataset, Typing Task-1 (any text) and Typing Task2 (the same text), were used. Figure 3.7 (Typing Task-1) and Figure 3.8 (Typing
Task-2) present the main results when the sample size increases.
As can be seen in Figure 3.7 when the participants typed different texts, the
EERs are generally decreasing with the increase of sample sizes as expected. The
EERs go under 0.05 after the sample size of 1500 for all the distance metrics utilized
except for Minkowski (p=5). Then, the EER is converging to the value of 0.01-0.02
through the sample size of 3000. In the best case, EER 0.007 is achieved with
the sample size of 2750 for the Manhattan (i.e., Cityblock) distance measurement
technique.
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Figure 3.8 presents the results of the same-text experiment (Typing Task-2). As
in Figure 3.7, the general behavior is that the EERs are decreasing with the increase
of the samples. The lowest EER of 0.01 is achieved using the Cityblock distance
measuring technique at 3000. We also see the convergence of EER in Figure 3.8
as Figure 3.7. Plots are starting to converge around sample sizes 1500-2000 and
converging to 0.01 for Cityblock and Correlation distance measuring techniques. We
also see that at 3000, 0.02 EER is obtained for Cosine and Correlation techniques.
However, if shorter data collection time is of interest, a sample size of 2000, which
needs 20 seconds for data collection, gives 0.03-0.04 EER. However, if we increase
the sample size, both the accuracy and the data collection time are increasing. This
means the time needed to catch an adversary or more generally, the re-verification
period would also increase. Therefore, an optimal sample size should be adjusted
according to the preferences in a real application based on the usage needs or security
policies.
To conclude, the features in WACA can successfully differentiate the users from
their typing rhythm with a minimal error rate (1%) independent of the typed text.
There is an inherent trade-off between the EER and data collection time, which
should be configured according to the security needs of an organization.
The accuracy of insider threat identification. As noted earlier, the insider
threat detection is important in continuous authentication systems as a potential
attacker is likely to be an insider. To effectively locate such an insider attacker
within an organization where WACA is employed, an identification mechanism is
needed. Depending on the security policy of the organization, the management may
want to do an investigation to find the insider attacker. In this case, we will have
many unknown samples of the attacker to find the owner of the samples, and we
will need a one-to-many classification task to exactly detect an insider attacker. For
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Table 3.2: Evaluation of the insider threat identification results with seven different
machine learning algorithms. MLP yields the best result and the training/validation
graphs of the MLP algorithm are given in Table 3.9.
Classifier
SVM
Random Forest
Naive Bayes
Decision Tree
MLP
kNN
Logistic Regression

Typing Task-1
98.7
98.9
93.6
62.1
99.0
96.4
90.5

Typing Task-2
98.1
97.8
87.3
62.1
99.2
96.8
93.7

this purpose, we fix the sample size to 1500 and the number of training sample to
five. With those parameters, we tested different machine learning algorithms and
results are presented in Table 3.2. Here, we assume that the insider’s data is also
stored in the authentication server’s database (training set) as a legitimate user.
According to the results given in Table 3.2, the most accurate results are obtained
with the Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) algorithm. This happens because of two
reasons. First, MLP is a neural network model, which maps a set of input data
into a set of outputs through the interconnected processing elements (neurons).
The main advantage of MLP is that it approximates highly nonlinear functions
between input and output [GD98]. Second, when we look at literature [ASL15,
SIG+ 19, MT16, BVACM18, BCE+ 18], MLP is giving very high accuracy with the
features obtained from noisy sensor data collected from devices like smartphone or
smartwatch. Moreover, Table 3.3 shows the parameters used in the machine learning
algorithms given in Table 3.2.
We also analyzed the impact of the sample size and the size of the training data
on the accuracy. For this, we focused on two test scenarios that would be relevant in
real investigations and tested the efficacy of 7 different machine learning algorithms.
As seen in Table II, MLP performed the best and accordingly we picked MLP as a
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Figure 3.9: a) Training and b) Validation curve of MLP algorithm. Please note that
since the validation set size is 0 as provided in Table 3.3, the two curves are same.
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Table 3.3: Parameters used in the Machine learning algorithms in Table 3.2.
Classifier
SVM
Random Forest
Naive Bayes
Decision Tree

MLP

kNN
Logistic Regression

Parameters
The complexity parameter c = 1, γ = 0.01
Polynomial kernel with exponent 1
# of iterations (trees) = 100,
# of features = unlimited
Kernel estimator = False
Supervised Discretization = False
tree= J48,
confidence factor = 0.25
# of hidden layers = (attribs + classes) / 2
# of neurons per hidden layer = 1
Learning rate = 0.3
Momentum = 0.2
Validation set size = 0%
Validation threshold = 20
k=1
Search algorithm : linearNNSearch
Distance function : Euclidean Distance
Ridge = 10−8

representative algorithm to be used in these scenarios: Scenario 1: 7 In order to show
that MLP does not show any over-fitting, we plot the training and validation curves
in Figure 3.9. In the first scenario, we built our test model using the same text
and tested again using the same text with the 5-fold cross-validation technique. For
this scenario, we utilized Typing Task-2 Dataset for both the training and testing.
This type of scenario can be useful as all the users are asked to type a provided
text, and during the investigation, all users are requested again to type the same
text. The results are presented in Table 3.4. Scenario 2: In the second scenario,
the test model was trained with the same text dataset, which is the same for all
the participants and tested using random-text experiments, where each user typed a
randomly chosen text. For this scenario, we utilized Typing Task-2, Typing Task-1
7 Please

note that this is different the Typing Task-1 in Figure 3.2.
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Table 3.4: The accuracy results insider threat identification experiments for different
sample sizes in Scenario 1 and 2.
Scenario 1: Accuracy
Training Set
Sample size
1
2
3
1500
77.8 93.7 97.2
1000
62.8 87.6 93.8
500
37.5 63.7 75.9
250
28.5
43
53.1
Scenario 2: Accuracy
Training Set
Sample size
1
2
3
1500
55.8 80.1 88.7
1000
51.7 82.7 83.2
500
29.9 51.3 66.7
250
22.1 33.6 41.9

(%)
4
5
98.4 99.2
95.3 97.1
83.1 89.6
61.8 62.1
(%)
4
89.8
86.1
73.8
49.8

5
91.8
86.8
76.5
54.1

Table 3.5: Time taken to build the MLP model used in

Scenario 1 in Section 3.5.

Time taken to build the model (seconds)
Training Set
Sample size
1
2
3
4
5
1500
0.99 2.02
3
3.99
4.94
1000
1
1.99 2.98 3.95
4.94
500
0.98 2.02 3.01 3.98
4.95
250
1
1.95 2.93 3.92
4.95

Datasets for training and testing, respectively. This scenario is suitable for cases
where all the users are enrolled using the same text, but a user is verified while
typing a random text. The results for this test scenario are presented in Table 3.4.
As can be seen in Table 3.4, in the best case, 99.2% identification rate of an
insider threat can be achieved with the sample size of 1500 while the model is
trained with five samples. Even with two samples of the insider, 93.7% accuracy
rate can be achieved with the sample size of 1500. Finally, we also present the model
training time for the insider threat detection in Table 3.5 and 3.6.
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Table 3.6: Time taken to build the MLP model used in

Scenario 2 in Section 3.5.

Time taken to build the model (seconds)
Training Set
Sample size
1
2
3
4
5
1500
1
1.97 2.97 4.01
4.99
1000
1
1.99 2.95 4.04
4.93
500
0.99
2
2.98 3.98
4.98
250
0.99 1.96 3.02 3.96
4.96

Scenario 2 aims to answer the question of ”Can an insider be identified while
typing a random text even if s/he is enrolled while typing a given text ? ” Table 3.4
presents the result of this question for Scenario 2. As can be seen from Table 3.4,
similar to Scenario 1, the accuracy rates increase as the sample sizes and training
set increase, and the time to build model and time required to catch the attacker is
also increasing. Three training samples and the sample size is 1500 or four training
samples with the sample size of 1000 may be the two most optimal choices for real
cases.
Overall, WACA can achieve 0.01 error rate with almost 30 seconds of the data
collection (see Figure 3.7 and 3.8) in the best case. If a shorter time is of interest,
0.02 error rate is achieved with 20 seconds of the data collection. Moreover, if five
training samples with 1500 sample sizes are obtained from a potential insider threat,
WACA could identify the insider with 99.2% accuracy rate while typing the provided
text (see Table 3.4) or with 91.8% accuracy rate while typing a random text (see
Table 3.4).
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3.5.2

Advanced Attacks on WACA with More Powerful Adversaries

In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of WACA against two powerful
attacks: imitation [TGG13, HSU+ 16] and statistical [SP13, SSCG16] attacks. In
these attacks, the attacker is aware of WACA and can try to defeat WACA using
special tools and skills.
Numerous attacks against classical keystroke dynamics that exist in the literature can also be used to attack WACA. The attacker can be a human or a trained
bot. A human-type attacker can perform zero-effort attacks8 [RP13] or imitation attacks [TGG13] to defeat the WACA’s authentication system. In zero-effort attacks,
the attacker tries to defeat the authentication system without any effort or prior
knowledge. Zero-effort attacks will not be successful due to the low EER values in
WACA as analyzed in the previous sub-sections. However, the effectiveness of the
imitation attacks performed by a human should be investigated as noted in some
recent studies [TGG13, HSU+ 16].
In addition to these attacks, another recent attack against the behavioral biometrics [SP13, SSCG16] has emerged, which is called statistical attacks. In this attack,
a bot is first trained using typical user data from a large population. Then, the
bot generates random permutations of the features to mimic a legitimate user. In
addition to human and robot attacks, a replay attack using a key-logger [GOC12] is
noted in the literature, which can also be performed against the keystroke dynamics.
However, a key-logger installed on the computer can obtain only the timing of the
keystrokes, which is solely not enough to use it in a replay attack against WACA as
8 Also

called zero-information attack.
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there is not a way that a key-logger can obtain the three-dimensional sensor data
collected by the smartwatch.
In the next sub-sections, we consider these two powerful attacks (imitation and
statistical) and investigate the effectiveness of WACA against them. In these cases,
the attacker would have somehow obtained the victim’s smartwatch or manipulates
his smartwatch. We use the zero-effort attacks as a baseline to evaluate the success
of the imitation and statistical attacks. In imitation attacks, the attacker either can
steal the victim’s smartwatch or the victim can leave it behind for a while, then
the attacker wears the victim’s smartwatch and can try to impersonate him while
attacking. On the other hand, the statistical attack is more complex and requires
special tools and skills. In this type of attack, we assume the attacker can provide
its input data to the system. It manipulates its username and profile data to get
access to the computer that he does not have permission.

Imitation Attacks
In this subsection, we evaluate the performance of an imitating adversary, who knows
that WACA is already installed on the current system. The adversary is assumed to
be watching his victim by standing nearby or trying to imitate the victim’s typing
style by looking at the previously recorded video of the victim while typing. S/he is
also assumed to be opportunistically waiting for the right time to mimic the victim.

To replicate this imitation attack scenario, we recorded a 15 seconds video of
a legitimate user and presented this video to an attacker (i.e., another participant
in our experiments). The video showed the user as s/he was typing and thus the
hand, fingers, watch and keyboard were all visible. By watching the video (multiple
times allowed in experiments), the attacker tried to imitate the legitimate user.
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Figure 3.10: Attacker accept rates for different sample sizes. The results show that
an imitation attacker has no more advantage than a zero-effort attacker.
Note that this scenario would increase the chances of a successful attack when
compared to a real-life case where the attacker would possibly only have limited
opportunity to watch a victim. We also collected the victim’s typing data to evaluate
the performance of the attackers. We computed EER for this attack scenario and
compared it with the case when there was a zero-effort for the attack. In the zeroeffort attack, we used the data set obtained in Typing Task-1 Dataset. We applied
the leave-one-out method [JL10] by leaving the victim’s data out as in the other
authentication experiments While calculating EER (i.e., the intersection of FAR
and FRR) of the victim. In the imitation attack, since we only had the impostor
attempts, EER would be equal to the attacker’s acceptance rate. We also note
that WACA was directly tested without any change. The results are presented in
Figure 3.10.
As presented in Figure 3.10, the attackers have different success rates (attacker
accept rate) for different sample sizes. The highest success rate was achieved when
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Figure 3.11: 3 different statistical attacks against WACA with different sample sizes.
the sample size is equal to 500, but the success rates are decreasing to the much
lower rates as the sample sizes increase. A sample size of 500 corresponds to almost
2-3 keystrokes for the sampling rate used, which is not enough to measure and
settle down for some of the features. So, this is not practical from the attacker’s
perspective. Beyond 1500, which corresponds to 15 seconds of sensor readings, the
probability of an attacker to imitate a user is significantly decreasing (i.e., 0.04).
These results indicate that even though an attacker is aware of WACA in a targeted
system, s/he still has a meager chance to be successful.

Statistical Attacks
In this subsection, we evaluate WACA against statistical attacks. In this attack
scenario, it is assumed that the attacker has a database obtained from AS consisting
of the user profiles. Similar to the imitation attack, it is also assumed that the
attacker can provide its input to the system. As mentioned earlier, this can occur
either by obtaining the victim’s smartwatch or if the attacker is an insider, it can
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manipulate its input data to deceive WACA. It is also worth mentioning that we
assume the attacker has only a limited amount of time to attack; therefore, it only
tries the data that has the highest chance to get in, which we refer to as topBins in
the attack algorithm that will be utilized and noted below.
Note that statistical attacks are very powerful attacks and it is successfully implemented to bypass the conventional keystroke-based systems [SP13]. It is based
on the generation of fake (synthetic) inputs using common features of a given population. The idea behind this attack is using the random combination of the most
common features of the population to defeat the authentication system. We designed
the following attack scenario to test WACA against the statistical attacks.
In our attack, we used both Typing Task-1 and Typing Task-2 dataset as input.
Each participant was chosen as a victim iteratively, and the other participants’
samples were used to generate forged data samples. Then, the forged samples were
used to attack the victim. For this, a histogram was created for each feature of all
the participants in the dataset except the victim. The forged samples were generated
as in Algorithm 1.Overall, we created three different statistical attackers with three
different capabilities (bin sizes in the histogram). Statistical Attacker-1, Statistical
Attacker-2, and Statistical Attacker-3. Before running the algorithm for attacking
WACA, we first calculated the EER for each user without adding any forged data.
Similar to the imitation attacks, the attacker acceptance rate in zero-effort attack
corresponds to the average EER. We conducted experiments without attack under
varying sample and bin sizes. The results are shown in Figure 3.11.
In Figure 3.11, we can see that bin number 50 has the most successful result on
attacking victims. This is because if we increase the bin number and keep the bins
with the highest number of occurrences constant, the width of the bins will narrow;
so, the range of the forged data will be confined to a very small range. On the other
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Algorithm 1 Calculation of EER for a statistical attacker.
Require: SamplesM XN []: M is # of samples and N is # of features
Require: outN umber: # of generated forged samples
Require: binN umber: # of bins
Require: topBins: # of top bins used to generate forge samples
Ensure: new eer: # new error rate against the attack
1: for each user do
2:
victim ← user;
3:
victimSamples ← getSamples(victim);
4:
attackSamples ← getSamples(∼ victim);
5:
combin[] ← ComGen(N, outN umber, topBins);
6:
for each forgeid si ∈ attackSamples do
7:
for each feature fj ∈ attackSamples do
8:
[f req, edges] ← histGen();
9:
[∼,index] ← sortBins(f req);
10:
index(topBins + 1 : end) ← [];
11:
m ← edges(index(combin[fj , f orgeid]));
12:
f orgedSamples ← random([m, m + 1]);
13:
end for
14:
end for
15:
victimSamples ← addSamples(f orgedSamples);
16:
D ← calculateDissMatrix(T estingSamples);
17:
eer f or victim ← calculateEER(D);
18: end for
19: new eer ← mean(eer f or victim);
20: return new eer

hand, if we decrease the bin number significantly, the less frequently occurred bins
will also be included in the sample generation range, which will reduce the success
rate of the attacks. Finally, we note that in the attack scenario, we choose each user
in our dataset as a victim in an iterative way. These results show that despite the
small increase compared to zero-effort, the attacker does not have a chance to defeat
WACA using the systematically generated fake data due to its high dimensional
feature vector in WACA’s design.
As a summary, neither the imitation nor statistical attacks put WACA in danger
as their success rates are very close to zero-effort attacks.
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Table 3.7: Resource consumption of the smartwatches used in the experiments: LG
Watch R and Samsung Gear Live.
LG G
Watch R
CPU (no WACA)
4.5%
CPU (w/WACA)
7.5%
Memory (no WACA)
4.5 MB
Memory (w/WACA)
15.2 MB
Battery
10Hz
1.1%
30Hz
1.6%
100Hz
2.1%
Data Size
10Hz
0.3 MB
30Hz
0.6 MB
100Hz
4.1 MB

3.5.3

Samsung
Gear Live
4.5%
16.8%
4.5 MB
13.8 MB
1.2%
0.3%
2.4%
0.3 MB
0.9 MB
6.5 MB

Resource Consumption

In WACA, a smartwatch, a computer, and an authentication server work together.
In this subsection, we only analyze the resource consumption of relatively constrained smartwatches. It is worth noting that we monitored the consumption of
our application while it was running continuously; however, in WACA, the data
collection app does not have to be running continuously. It can happen periodically or on-demand because the data collection runs only when the smartwatch is
notified by the computer that the user is typing on. We analyze the performance of
both LG G Watch R and Samsung Gear Live smartwatches used in the experiments.
Both smartwatches have Cortex-A7 at 1.2GHz and 512MB RAM, but Samsung uses
300mAh battery, while LG is using 410mAh battery. The results are presented in
Table 3.7.
In all the experiments, we both monitored the memory and CPU resource utilization of the smartwatches in the default mode (i.e., not actively running any app
- no WACA) and while the app was running (w/WACA). In the default mode, both
smartwatches used almost 4.5MB memory and 4.5% CPU their consumption while
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the app was running, as shown in Table 3.7. As compared to the default memory usage (no WACA), the memory consumption in the smartwatch in WACA is
increasing, but it is still at an acceptable rate.
In addition to memory and CPU consumption, we also analyzed the power consumption and data size while running our app for 10 minutes. We excluded the
power consumption of the screen as the screen can be turned off or the smartwatch
can be in the ambient mode during the data collection of WACA. We see that the
power consumption of the app scales by the sampling frequency. However, when we
decrease the sampling rate, the time needed to collect a certain amount of data will
also increase. Hence, the optimum sampling rate should be tuned according to the
desired security policy.

3.6

Discussion

Security Policy Implementation Considerations. WACA works by checking
if the current user’s profile matched the profile of the logged-in user. When an
unauthorized access attempt is detected, the reaction depends on the previously
decided security policy. Depending on the security policy, when an attacker is
detected, the screen can be locked, and the user can be challenged to re-login; the
management and security teams can be alerted in real-time, or a notification e-mail
can be sent to the registered e-mail of the logged-in user, and so on. Moreover, we
showed that WACA could differentiate an insider from an outsider accurately. In
suspicious cases, the administrator can do further investigation to detect the insider,
and as we noted earlier, the insider detection is possible in WACA. We also note
that even if WACA catches an insider attacker, WACA can not know if the attacker
has the full key, which is out of scope this work. Therefore, even if the system is
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logged-out, an insider can log-in again if it has the full key. Therefore, resetting
the initial authentication factor should be considered in the security policy in this
case. Finally, the server can also log the failed attempts to prevent attacks aiming
to drain the smartwatch’s battery.
Moreover, if WACA is deployed in an environment where typing is not required
much, the actions that will be performed when the user is not typing should be
defined in the security policy. A straightforward solution to this problem can be
reducing the system to default security, i.e., locking out the user if there is inactivity
for a certain duration.
WACA captures the typing patterns of the user only from one wrist. If the wrist
wearable is on the left hand, for example, the typing pattern for the words ”and” and
”aod” would be the same. This can be perhaps exploited by the attacker by using
the letters on the right. However, this would be a remote possibility. In WACA,
we wanted to test our proposed method in a more realistic scenario assuming a user
will wear a wearable on both hands might be an unrealistic assumption. However,
in highly extreme cases, i.e., highly critical environments, two smartwatches can be
utilized to collect data from two hands of the users. This will prevent against this
type of attack. This should be considered while deploying WACA in a real-world
application.
Privacy. In WACA, the computer and the wearable are the devices that belong to
the user or belong to the same authentication realm and thus are trusted. The only
device that may threaten privacy is the AS. As for the security of the data at rest
at the server, the existing industry standards such as AES, RSA, ECC, RC4, can
be employed to establish the security of the data in these cases. In WACA, after
collecting the raw sensor data from the smartwatch, either the raw sensor data can be
transmitted to the AS, or the features can be computed on the smartwatch and the
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feature vector can be transmitted.No data is stored on the watch and as noted in the
Assumptions Section (Section 3.3), this channel is secured with existing methods.
If the raw sensor data is sent to the AS, the AS may try to infer the user’s typed
characters from the raw sensor data. The more secure way would be to compute
the features on the smartwatch and to keep the feature vectors of the profiles of the
users in the AS. In that case, the transmitted feature vector has only the mean of the
values of the multi-dimensional sensor data and thus inferring the typed characters
would not be possible at the AS.

3.7

Conclusion

In this chapter, we introduced a novel Wearable-Assisted Continuous Authentication (WACA) utilizing the sensory data from the built-in motion sensors available
on smartwatches. WACA is a practical and usable wearable-assisted continuous
authentication system that combines the functionality of wearables and usability
of continuous authentication. Particularly, WACA decreases the vulnerable time
window of a continuous authentication system to as low as 20 seconds, prevents the
privilege abuse and insider attacks and also allows the insider threat identification.
We evaluated the efficacy and robustness of WACA with real data from real experiments. The results showed that WACA could achieve 1% EER for 30 seconds or
2 − 3% EER for 20 seconds of data collection time and error rates are as low as 1%
with almost a perfect (99.2%) insider threat identification rate.
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CHAPTER 4
PACA: A LIGHTWEIGHT PRIVACY-AWARE CONTINUOUS
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL

4.1

Introduction

Efforts to improve the security of the authentication services have historically progressed from what-you-know (i.e., passwords) to what-you-have (i.e., tokens), then
to what-you-are (i.e., biometrics) as attacks have increased in sophistication and
become widespread [TGG13, SSY12]. While the deployment of biometric authentication systems increases the usability of the authentication systems, the plethora
of cyber-attacks demands more user information from biometrics, which introduces
additional security and privacy challenges in the authentication systems. In this
landscape, another challenge is due to the nature of one-time authentication, which
verifies users only at the initial login session regardless of being single- or multifactor. This is a serious security risk as once the attacker bypasses the initial
authentication, it will have a forever access or if the user leaves the system intentionally/unintentionally unlocked, anyone such as an insider or a strong outsider
adversary [ALUK19], who has physical access to the system will have access to the
system without the actual user notification. Therefore, the user should be continuously monitored and re-authenticated. In the literature, several solutions such as
time-out or token (or even RFID) based solutions are proposed to address these
issues in the authentication systems [KSC10]. Indeed, biometric-based systems are
considered to be ideal and usable for such cases as they can not be easily misplaced
unlike tokens, or forgotten unlike passwords, or easily forged by an imposter.
In this chapter, we tackled these challenges and constructed a novel lightweight
privacy-aware continuous authentication protocol, called PACA. In our protocol, we
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utilize the password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) primitive, which we adapt
for the biometric continuous authentication. This provides basic security requirements of our protocol, such as a secure channel between the user and server, mutual
authentication, forward secrecy, as well as the resistance against pre-computation attacks. In our design for an actual privacy-aware continuous authentication method,
we utilize a secure and noise-tolerant template generation and matching technique
called NTT-Sec-R, and combine it with a wearable-assisted continuous authentication method called WACA. NTT-Sec-R irreversibly transforms the feature vectors,
but still allows us to distinguish genuine pairs from imposter pairs. The novel security enhancements proposed in this chapter are applicable to a wide range of
biometric authentication mechanisms when feature vectors are represented as fixedlength real-valued vectors. One of the important applications of such systems is
sensor-based keystroke dynamics, which could be used in the authentication of computer [AAUA18, AAUA20], smartphone [LL17], and wearable [FBM+ 13] users.

4.2

System and Security Model

In this section, in order to understand the threat model, we present the basic security
requirements of the protocol. Then, we also present the system components and
parameters of the protocol, and the assumptions made.

4.2.1

Security Requirements of the Protocol

The security requirements of our continuous authentication protocol are as follows:
Secure channel. The communication between the user and the authentication
server should be secure against any eavesdropping or interception.
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Figure 4.1: System components of our proposed continuous authentication protocol,
PACA. The detailed definitions are given in Section 4.2.2.
Mutual authentication. The proposed authentication protocol should support
the mutual authentication between the user and the authentication server.
Forward secrecy. This protects past sessions and session keys even after the
long term secret keys of the parties, future sessions, and future sessions keys are
compromised.
Resistance against known attacks. In addition to the security requirements
above, our proposed protocol should be resistant to the main threats known against
privacy-aware biometrics-based authentication protocols [RCB01, PM17]. We split
these threats into four categories: 1) Password recovery attack, 2) Impersonation
attacks, 3) Session intervene attacks, and 4) Biometric recovery attacks. The more
details about the attacks and their analysis for PACA are explained in Section 4.4.
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Table 4.1: The symbols used throughout the chapter.
Symbol
Useri
Idi
Pwdi
Bioi,t
UsrDevi
UsrDevi,k
Ext
fi,t
ti,t
TempGen
TempComp
s
DBi
SerDevk
CAS
Ti
Time
NumQuer
NumMatch
MinQuer
MinMatch
Ki

Description
i’th user
the identity of user i
i’th user’s password
Biometrics of the user i at time t
i’th user’s device
the k’th device of the i’th user
Feature Extraction
feature vector of user i at time t
biometric template of the user i at time t
Template Generation algorithm
Template Comparison algorithm
similarity score
Information of the user i at database
k’th Server Device
Continuous Authentication Server
threshold value of the user i
constant time
number of query
number of match query
constant number of minimum query
constant number of match query
shared session key between user i and server
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4.2.2

System Components and Parameters

Our continuous authentication protocol consists of three main components: 1)
Password-authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE), 2) User, and 3) Continuous Authentication Server (CAS). Figure 4.1 illustrates the interactions between the main
components of the protocol. (1) User extracts the elements of the feature vector via
a feature extraction algorithm and transforms the feature vector to its corresponding
template through template generation function. (2,3) After that, the template is
transmitted to (CAS) through the secure channel provided by the PAKE protocol,
which also provides the mutual authentication between the user and the server and
forward secrecy properties. (4,5) After receiving the user’s template, the AS also
extracts the user’s information from the database and compares it with the incoming
the template of the user via the template comparison function, which return a similarity score. The server device decides the authentication result by comparing this
similarity score with a predetermined threshold value. In the end, the final authentication result is returned to the user side via the underlying PAKE method. Before
explaining the details of our protocol and its components, we also give the description of the symbols used in the protocol in Table 4.1. In the following sub-sections,
we explain the details of the components.
1. Password-authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE). Our authentication protocol utilizes a (strong) password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) method with
some strong security properties. OPAQUE [Kra18] and SRP-6 [Wu07] are examples
of such a protocol that satisfy the following features:
1. Public key infrastructure (PKI) is not needed because PAKE protocols reduce
the security of the system to only the user’s password without relying on an
outside keying material such as public keys [Kra18]. This is a big advantage
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from the efficiency point of view because TLS, any certification authority,
verification of certificates, long term private keys, etc. are not required. Another advantage from a security point of view is that any potential failure in
PKI is not an issue anymore (such as invalid certificates [Osb], stolen private
keys [Kas], etc.).
2. A user and server can mutually authenticate each other.
3. The server stores only a cryptographic transformation of the user’s password.
The password is never sent in clear, and the server does not learn the password
of the user.
4. Pre-computation attacks [Kra18] are not applicable. Such attacks do apply
to some password-based protocols if salts are not used, or they are sent in
clear from a server to a user, but they do not apply to the specific PAKE
instantiations as specified above.
5. To recover the password of a selected user, the adversary can only mount
an exhaustive offline dictionary attack after compromising user data on the
server. This attack can not be avoided but it is computationally not feasible as
only the cryptographic transformation of the password is stored on the server.
2. User. Throughout this chapter, Useri = (Pwdi , Bioi,t , UsrDevi ) denotes a user
indexed with i, her password, her biometric data indexed with t, indicating different
measurements of the biometric data of a user, and her device used for collecting the
biometric data. A user has access to feature extraction and template generation
algorithms:
• fi,t ← Ext(Bioi,t ): denotes a feature extraction algorithm. The parameter t
considers that different measurements of the same biometric data may result in
different feature vectors, i.e., in general, fi,t1 6= fi,t2 for t1 6= t2 . We assume that
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the feature extraction always runs on a user device such as user’s computer.
Biometric data and extracted features are stored only temporarily on this
device, and they are deleted after communicated to another device or entity
in our protocol.
• ti,t ← TempGen(fi,t ) refers to the one-way transformation of the feature vector
into a more secure template, while allowing comparison on the transformed
version as well as providing irreversibility and indistinguishability [JNN08] and
it corresponds to the traditional hash in password-based systems. Similar to
the feature extraction, the operation can be performed on the user device.
3. Continuous Authentication Server (CAS). CAS denotes an authentication
server that validates or invalidates an enrollment or an authentication query initiated
by a user (or by an adversary who is trying to impersonate a user). CAS indicates the
validity or invalidity of a query by an output of 1 or 0, respectively. CAS has access
to a template comparison algorithm and manages a database and server devices that
the users interact with:
• s ← TempComp(ti,t1 , ti,t2 ): denotes a template comparison algorithm that
takes two templates ti,t1 and tj,t2 captured at two different times as input,
and outputs a similarity score, s ∈ R quantifying the similarity of the underlying biometric data pair (Bioi,t1 , Bioj,t2 ).
• DB denotes a database that stores information about the users who are enrolled with CAS. For convenience, DBi denotes the information about Useri .
This information is comprised of the user’s identity, a cryptographic transformation of her password, and her biometric template along with her matching
thresholds. The full definition is given in Section 4.3.
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• SerDev denotes a server device which the user is trying to log in, such as
desktop or laptop computers of the user. CAS may manage more than one
server device. In this case, the k’th device of CAS is denoted SerDevk .

4.2.3

Assumptions

We list our assumptions regarding the components of the system as follows:
• In general, Bioi,t1 6= Bioi,t2 . We assume that each user has at least one device
that can extract biometric information of that user. In one of the applications
described in this chapter, we equip users with a smartwatch that extracts the
typing behavior of its user. As they are commodity devices, they are easily
accessible to many users.
• The user-specific values and devices are distinct and not shared among other
users in a regular run of our protocol. More formally, we assume Useri 6= Userj ,
Bioi,t1 6= Bioj,t2 , and UsrDevi 6= UsrDevj for i 6= j. It also worth noting that a
malicious user may control a user device, or a user password may be stolen,
but we treat these scenarios as attack scenarios and analyze them in detail to
show how our work is robust against these attacks in Section 4.4.
• A user may have more than one device. In this case, the k’th device of the
i’th user is denoted UsrDevi,k .
• We assume the adversary is a computationally bounded, active adversary who
tries to achieve some adversarial goals in Section 4.4.2 to break the security
and/or privacy of the users or the system.
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4.3

Continuous Authentication Protocol

In this section, we describe our novel continuous authentication protocol, which includes both the password authentication phase and continuous authentication using
the biometrics of the user. Particularly, in our continuous authentication protocol,
a user, Useri , is involved in two phases. The enrollment phase is implemented only
once and can be implemented at any time before the authentication phase. The
authentication phase consists of two parts. The initialization part is implemented
only one time, but it has to be implemented every time the user wants to log in. It
is required to establish a secure and authentic channel between the user and CAS.
Finally, the authentication phase is performed periodically, in which the period depends on the underlying biometrics-based authentication mechanism. The quicker
and more accurate systems are better for security. We explain the details of enrollment and authentication phases below and illustrate them in Figure 4.2, 4.3,
and 4.4, respectively.

Enrollment Phase
In the enrollment phase, a secure template is generated from a biometric trait and
stored in CAS. The following are the steps of the enrollment phase:

𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖

Enrollment

• 𝑡𝑖,𝑡 ← 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐺𝑒𝑛(𝐸𝑥𝑡(𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 ))
• 𝑃𝑤𝑑𝑖′ ← 𝑃𝑤𝑑𝑖

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠
𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟
(C𝐴𝑆)

𝑃𝑤𝑑𝑖′ , 𝑡𝑖,𝑐𝑡𝑟0 , 𝐼𝑑𝑖

• 𝐷𝐵𝑖 = (𝐼𝑑𝑖 , 𝑃𝑤𝑑𝑖′ , 𝑡𝑖,𝑐𝑡𝑟0 , 𝑇𝑖 )

time

Figure 4.2: The enrollment phase of our proposed continuous authentication protocol.
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Initialization
𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖
𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑦

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠
𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟
(C𝐴𝑆)

PAKE

• If 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖 outputs 0 then halt, otherwise
continue
• 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖 receives the shared session key
𝐾𝑖
time

• If AS outputs 0 then halt, otherwise
continue
• CAS receives the shared session key 𝐾𝑖
• CAS grants access to 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖 on a server
device 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑣
• CAS sets the constants 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒, 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑟
and 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ

Figure 4.3: The initialization phase of our continuous authentication protocol.
1. Useri computes ti,0 = TempGen(Ext(Bioi,0 )).
2. Useri registers a cryptographic transformation of her password Pwdi , her template ti,0 along with her identity, Idi by following the underlying PAKE protocol. Note that during enrollment, CAS may want to authenticate Useri
and her information through her physical presence.

Moreover, CAS may

store additional information about the user in DBi such as her matching
threshold value Ti . The final stored information for each user is shown as
0

DB i = (Idi , P wdi , ti,ctr0 , Ti ).

Authentication phase
In the authentication phase, a user’s biometric template is periodically verified by
the authentication server after a secure and authentic channel is initialized based
on PAKE.
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𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖

Continuous
Authentication

• 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ← 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐺𝑒𝑛(𝐸𝑥𝑡(𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 ))

𝜎𝑗 , 𝑀𝑗 = ( 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ||𝑗)

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠
𝐴𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟
(C𝐴𝑆)

• AS sets t = 0, 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑟 = 0, and
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ = 0

• 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑟 += 1 for every valid
packet
• 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ += 1, if
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝(𝑡𝑖,𝑐𝑡𝑟0 , 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ) ≥ 𝑇𝑖

continue/halt
• If continue, then
𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ← 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐺𝑒𝑛(𝐸𝑥𝑡(𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 ))

• If 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑟 == 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑟 at time t
and 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒, then:
o If 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ ≥ 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ,
then continue
o If 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ < 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ,
then halt
• If 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑟 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑄𝑢𝑒𝑟 at time t
and 𝑡 = 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒, return halt

𝜎𝑗 , 𝑀𝑗 = ( 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 ||𝑗)

…

time

Figure 4.4: The continuous authentication phase of our continuous authentication
protocol.
Initialization: Useri and CAS execute the underlying PAKE protocol to authenticate each other mutually and generate a session key Ki , which then establishes a
secure and authentic channel. If the mutual authentication is successful, then
1. CAS sets the constants Time, MinQuer, and MinMatch.
2. CAS initiates a continuous session for Useri (granting access to Useri on the
server device, SerDev such as her computer.
Continuous Authentication: In this phase, a user generates her templates and
sends them to CAS through the secure and authentic channel established in the
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initialization phase. Assuming the mutual authentication in the initialization phase
is successful, the following steps are executed and are shown in Figure 4.4:
1. CAS sets its system time t = 0, NumQuer = 0, NumMatch = 0, and keeps
track of the system time t.
2. Useri continuously computes her secure biometric templates ti,j for j = 1, 2, ...,
and sends packages of the form (ti,j ||j)1 to CAS using the confidential and
authentic channel established through the shared session key Ki . For each
valid package that CAS receives, CAS increments NumQuer by one, and for
each ti,j with TempComp(ti,0 , ti,j ) ≥ Ti , CAS increments NumMatch by one.
3. If NumQuer == MinQuer at time t and t ≤ Time, then
• If NumMatch ≥ MinMatch, then return (1), indicating the continuity of
the session.
• If NumMatch < MinMatch, then CAS terminates the session and the
protocol halts.
4. If NumQuer < MinQuer in time t and t = Time, then CAS terminates the
session and the protocol halts.
5. If AS returns 1, the protocol continues from step (2), where the user computes
her new biometric template periodically.

4.4

Security & Privacy Analysis

In this section, we analyze the security requirements of the protocol and we show
how PACA is secure and robust against eight well-known malicious in against the
privacy-aware biometrics-based authentication protocols.
1 Here,

appending j plays the role of a counter to prevent some obvious replay attacks.
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4.4.1

Analysis of Security Requirements of the Protocol

In our protocol, the basic requirements are provided through the PAKE protocol executed during the initialization phase. A particular example of this PAKE protocol
could be OPAQUE [Kra18], which is a strong asymmetric PAKE protocol providing security against pre-computation attacks. In [Kra18], the different versions of
the PAKE protocol with different security features are proposed. We specifically
consider the version called ”the generic OPRF+AKE construction”. This version
is based on Oblivious Pseudo-Random Functions (OPRF) and Authenticated Key
Exchange (AKE). The full description of the OPAQUE protocol providing the full
forward secrecy and mutual authentication and generating the shared session key
between the parties with only three messages exchanged between the user and server
can be found in Figure 12 of [Kra18]. In the following sub-sections, we will show
how this specific version of OPAQUE provides the secure channel and satisfies the
perfect forward secrecy and mutual authentication in PACA.
Secure channel. The primary use case of PAKE protocols [Kra18, Wu07] is that
the user does not need to rely on any outside key other than his password. The
shared session key Ki is generated from the user’s low-entropy password during
the execution of the OPAQUE protocol. Then, throughout the entire session, the
secure channel is provided through this shared session key. This provides a confidential and authentic communication channel and protects the current session against
eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks. Particularly, in PACA, this shared
session key Ki is generated during the initialization phase of our protocol after
executing the PAKE protocol between the Useri and CAS.
Mutual authentication. TLS provides only server-side authentication through
the certificates, and the password provides the authentication for the user side. However, PAKE protocols achieve mutual authentication without the need for TLS or
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any PKI infrastructure. For example, the OPAQUE [Kra18] protocol uses HMQV [Kra05]
as a base AKE protocol to provide mutual authentication. HMQV extends the computational Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange with Exponential Challenge-Response
(XCR) signatures. These signatures are proven to be unforgeable in [Kra05], and
they are computed directly on the identity of parties. The ability of parties to
provide the signature shows the proof that exchange is carried by the claimed parties and since the messages on which the signatures are computed are directly the
identity of the user and server, it proves that the key they computed is uniquely
associated with the correct identities (i.e., mutually authenticated).
Forward secrecy. A protocol is said to have the forward secrecy [Kra05], if the
session keys of previous runs can not be recovered by the attacker after the keys are
established, used, and deleted from the memory even after the compromise of longterm keys. Similar to the mutual authentication, the forward secrecy in OPAQUE
is provided by the HMQV protocol. The perfect forward secrecy can be achieved
if one of the user messages depends on the user’s private key. This is achieved by
letting DH values by both parties for the session.

4.4.2

Attack Resistance.

In this section, we first present several known attacks against privacy-aware biometricsbased authentication systems [RCB01, PM17] and we also analyze if our protocol
is robust against these attacks. More specifically, we present the adversarial goals
(AGs); hence, the adversarial model, attack strategies, their analysis, and the countermeasures our protocol provides against the attacks.
In our proposed continuous authentication protocol, the underlying PAKE method
provides the basic security features given in 4.4.1; however, it does not guarantee
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that the user data will not be revealed to the CAS. This violates the privacy of
the user against the server, and to protect the user privacy, in the next section, we
propose the use of NTT-Sec-R for realizing the function T empGen() which is used
as a black-box function. The proposed template generation function and its benefits
are separately evaluated in Section 4.5.3 and 4.5.4.
AG-1: Password recovery attacks. In this attack, the adversary’s goal is to
recover the password of a user. An adversary who is capable of actively controlling
sessions or compromising a server can achieve this goal only if he succeeds in an
exhaustive offline dictionary attack.
Analysis of the attack: Such dictionary attacks cannot be prevented perpetually, but
strong passwords would increase the run time of the attack. More precisely, assuming that users choose their passwords uniformly at random from a password space
P assSpace, then the attack would require |P assSpace| trials. In OPAQUE [Kra18],
it has been shown that the cost can be increased by increasing the number of iterations in the hashing operation (i.e., replacing H with H n in the full protocol).
Moreover, we quantify the cost of this attack in Section 4.5.3 particularly for our
implementation.
AG-2: Impersonating the user (or the server) at the initial login phase. In
this attack, the adversary’s goal is to initiate a session and generate a valid session
key on behalf of a user, or impersonate a server to a user. These may be achieved
by the following two attacks:
1. Replay attack: Adversary may try to replay messages from the previous runs
of the protocol between the user and the server.
Analysis of the attack: Such an attempt would fail thanks to the fresh and
randomized session keys generated per session with PAKE.
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2. Password recovery attack through the user impersonation: If an adversary achieves
AG-1 above, she can clearly achieve AG-2.
Analysis of the attack: As in the analysis of AG-1, an offline dictionary attack
cannot be prevented perpetually, but strong passwords would increase the run
time of the attack.
AG-3: Session intervene. In this attack, the adversary’s goal is to intervene an
active session of a user, and to stay undetected as long as possible while behaving
maliciously (e.g. interacting with SerDev and impersonating Useri ). In the following,
we assume that Useri initiates a session with CAS and they both computes the shared
session key Ki . We also assume that UsrDevi stores a copy of Ki . The adversary
can achieve AG-3 as follows:
1. Package delay attack: In this first attack scenario, an adversary eavesdrops the
communication between Useri and CAS, and interrupts a sequence of legitimate packages (including templates and their counters (ti,j ||j), j = 1, 2, ..., k,
encrypted under Ki ) going from Useri to CAS. Now, suppose that Useri is out
for lunch after sending her last package and leaves the server device SerDev
unlocked 2 . Then, the adversary forwards the packages she already collected
to CAS while behaving maliciously on SerDev. Receiving sufficiently many
legitimate packages (e.g., at least MinQuer in time Time), CAS cannot distinguish the adversary from Useri , and therefore, the adversary stays undetected
and achieves her goal.
Analysis of the attack: This attack can be detected easily if the server device
SerDev (i.e., the user’s computer) acknowledges CAS immediately after an ac2 This

is a reasonable user behavior in a continuous biometric authentication scheme
as such systems assure that adversaries can successfully be detected when they try to
impersonate legitimate users.
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tion is received on SerDev because CAS can detect whether or not the adversary
is interrupting and delaying legitimate packages while Useri is legitimately interacting with SerDev.
2. Zero-effort and mimicking attacks: In this second attack scenario, we assume
that Useri is out for lunch after initiating a session with CAS and establishing
Ki . We also assume that Useri leaves her device UsrDevi behind, and leaves
the server device SerDev unlocked. Now, the adversary captures UsrDevi , and
presents her own biometric measurements to CAS (zero-effort attack), or tries
to reproduce the physiological or behavioral characteristics of Useri (i.e., imitation attack).
Analysis of the attack: The success rate of this attack would be strongly correlated to the FAR of the system, and the uniqueness of the underlying biometric
trait. See Section 4.6.1 for the FAR rates of our protocol and see [AAUA18]
for the robustness of WACA against the mimicking attacks.
3. Session key reveal attacks: The third attack scenario is similar to the second
one, but we consider a more powerful adversary. We assume that Useri is out
for lunch after initiating a session with CAS, establishing Ki , and sending some
packages to CAS (including templates and their counters (ti,j |j), j = 1, 2, ..., k,
encrypted under Ki ). We also assume that Useri leaves her device UsrDevi
behind and the server device SerDev unlocked. In addition, we assume that
the adversary recovers the session key Ki from UsrDevi . Having captured
some of the previously exchanged packages, the adversary can now recover ti,j
using the knowledge of the key Ki . Next, the adversary can form legitimate
packages with the appropriate counters and impersonate Useri during that
current session.
Analysis of the attack: We do not consider this cascaded third attack to be a
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practical attack because it requires an attacker to extract the session key from
the user device in a relatively short amount of time (i.e., before a new session
starts, and a new session key is generated).
4. Input device replacement attack: The fourth attack that we consider is rather
a physical attack. After a session is initiated between Useri and CAS, the
attacker replaces the legitimate input device of SerDev (e.g., a keyboard or
a smartwatch) by her own malicious input device. Useri may still think that
she is interacting with SerDev through the legitimate input device, and she
may keep sending valid packages to CAS. In the meantime, SerDev receives
the adversary’s malicious input through the legitimate input device, and CAS
keeps the session live based on the legitimate packages it receives from Useri .
Analysis of the attack: This attack may work in theory, but it may be challenging to deceive Useri that she is interacting with SerDev through the legitimate
input device while indeed she is providing her input through a malicious input
device. Therefore, we do not consider this fourth attack to be practical.
AG-4: Recovering biometrics. In this attack, the adversary tries to recover the
biometric information of a user.
1. Server compromise attack: The adversary may be able to capture some of the
biometric templates ti,j of Useri by compromising the server database, or by
capturing some of the packages from a previous session and the session key Ki
of that specific session. Then, the adversary can try to reverse the templates
back to the biometric information.
Analysis of the attack: The success rate of the adversary would depend on the
difficulty of reversing templates for the given template generation algorithm.
Therefore, this attack does not seem to be feasible if an irreversible and in-
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distinguishable template generation algorithm TempGen is deployed. We show
the proof of this in Section 4.5.3 more formally for our implementation.

4.4.3

Further notes on the attacks, their limitations, and
justification for multi-factors

1. If an adversary captures the secure template of a user ti,t and a particular
session key Ki , but not the password (Pwdi ), then the adversary can impersonate Useri only for that session, because in the next session a fresh session
key is generated by the underlying PAKE method and without the knowledge
of the new session key, the adversary cannot produce secure templates and
legitimate packages to send to CAS.
2. If an adversary captures the password of a user (Pwdi ), but not the template
of a user (ti,t ), then she can initiate a session, but her chances for avoiding
detection are limited by the success probability of the mimicking attack or the
zero-effort attack (or FAR attack).
3. Another interesting scenario is when an adversary steals the template (ti,t ) and
the password of a user (Pwdi ). In this case, the adversary can impersonate the
user forever unless the user becomes aware and resets the password and reenrolls in the system. Therefore, one may consider equipping the user device
UsrDev with a public key private key pair and involve UsrDev in the session key
generation at the beginning of the protocol. For example, a UsrDev signature
together with a timestamp can independently be used to confirm that Useri is
initiating a session with CAS. In this scenario, the adversary would need the
template, password, and also the user device to impersonate Useri . If the user
cannot locate her device at any time, she may acknowledge CAS, reset her
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password, and re-enroll. Moreover, even if the two-way TLS is affordable in
the system, a password would still provide an extra barrier for the adversary
in case she captures the user’s biometric information and device.
We note that even if UsrDev has a long-term private key and it becomes a part
of the protocol in the session key generation, one would still need a biometric factor
because otherwise, an adversary would successfully impersonate Useri in lunchtime
type attacks by temporarily accessing UsrDev.
The use of a password is also important in our case because PAKE eliminates the
need for TLS for mutually authenticating Useri and CAS. Moreover, passwords provide extra protection against an adversary who already captured the user’s biometric
information and device. In summary, combining all three factors what you know
(password), what you have (device), and who you are (biometrics) would provide
the most comprehensive secure and privacy-aware setup.

4.5

Full Implementation

In this section, we describe our hybrid (password and keystroke dynamics), continuous, and privacy-preserving biometric authentication system, which is illustrated
in Figure 4.5. Both for performance evaluation purposes and as a walk-through
proof-of-concept case study, we fully deployed Wearable-Assisted Continuous Authentication framework called WACA [AAUA18, AAUA20] as an example continuous biometric authentication system in this study. On the other hand, we utilized
NTT-Sec-R by improving NTT-Sec [KC16] as a template generation and comparison
algorithm, to address the aforementioned privacy issues in continuous biometric authentication settings. We applied a feature selection algorithm and selected the top
15 features from WACA. These features included the time and frequency domain
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Figure 4.5: The architecture of our concrete continuous authentication system used
as a case study.
statistics (e.g., mean, median, entropy) of the raw sensor values for a certain period. Moreover, we also improved NTT-Sec to handle the real-valued feature vectors
while moderately preserving accuracy. As both of these example methodologies are
generic, they can be applied to any biometric-based authentication algorithm, which
has a real-valued feature vector. For example, this could be sensor-based keystroke
dynamics, which can be used for the authentication of computer [AAUA18], smartphone [LL17], or wearable [FBM+ 13] users.
In the following sections, we first explain WACA’s design and our modifications.
Then, we explain NTT-Sec-R and show how to use it in the settings of continuous
authentication. Finally, we also show how NTT-Sec-R provides security properties
such as irreversibility and indistinguishability while protecting the user templates
from the third parties.
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4.5.1

Testing with a sample continuous authentication system

WACA is based on the idea of sensor-based keystroke dynamics, where the authentication data is collected and extracted from the accelerometer and gyroscope sensors
of a wearable device (e.g., smartwatch). In our protocol, the wearable device corresponds to the parameter UsrDev, while the user’s computer corresponds to SerDev
parameter. Since the continuous authentication is based on the sensor data traveling from the smartwatch to the computer, the security and privacy of the data
become very important. NTT-Sec-R ensures the security and privacy of the data
and also makes authentication possible over the noisy nature of the context. In this
subsection, before presenting the evaluation study, we first provide an overview of
WACA.
In WACA, the raw motion sensor data of the smartwatch is acquired through an
app installed on the watch, and the sensor data is transmitted to the computer. In
our concrete system, we encrypt this data with the shared session key Ki generated
by the underlying PAKE protocol.
In the enrollment phase of WACA, the created feature vector and the user’s id
are stored together as a profile in the AS, which is located in a trusted place. Then,
in the authentication phase of WACA, the decision of the authentication is made
by the decision module by computing a similarity score between the feature vector
dispatched from the AS and the incoming feature vector of the current user. In the
end, the decision module makes a binary authentication decision (match/no-match)
by comparing the similarity score with a predetermined threshold value. If the decision is a no-match, then the user’s access to computing terminal is suspended, and
the user is required to re-login using the initial authentication method (e.g., pass-
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word, or 2FA [LUB14b, ALB+ 19]). If the decision is a match, then the user’s access
is maintained without interrupting the user. This process is repeated periodically
with a predetermined period.
Moreover, in WACA, the raw accelerometer data is represented in the format of
acc
~ =< ta , xa , ya , za > and gyroscope data is represented as gyro
~ =< tg , xg , yg , zg >,
where t is timestamp information and x, y, z represent three axis values of the accelerometer and gyroscope sensors. In the preprocessing, to remove the effect of the
noise from data, M-point Moving Average Filter (MAF) is applied. After filtering,
to obtain a scale-invariant feature vector, the feature vector is normalized through
the linear normalization. In this chapter, we start with the original size of 84 statistical features, but to increase both the computational efficiency and accuracy, we
applied a feature selection algorithm, which is explained in the next subsection. In
the decision module of WACA, the user is classified as authorized or unauthorized
for the claimed credentials entered during the initial login. The final authentication
decision is given by comparing the samples of through the distance measures such
as Euclidean or Manhattan distance.

New feature extraction and optimization
As noted above, in WACA, the length of the feature vector is 84. However, we
observed that this both affects the security and performance of the system negatively.
To prevent this, we improved WACA by applying a feature selection algorithm.
Specifically, we applied different univariate feature selection algorithms. The reason
we chose univariate algorithms is that we did not want the final feature vector to be
dependent on the algorithms used in the decision module. Particularly, we tested
three different univariate feature selection algorithms: Chi2 [PVG+ 11a], Mutual
Information [KL87], and F-score [PVG+ 11b]. The results are plotted according to
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Figure 4.6: The result of feature selection algorithms.
a varying number of features in Figure 4.6. As can be seen in Figure 4.6, the result
of F-score algorithms with the feature vector length of 15 gives the least (average)
EER, 0.0208. The top 15 features selected by F-score are specified in Table 4.2.
For the rest of the chapter, we use these 15 features of WACA, instead of originally
proposed 84 features in WACA.

4.5.2

Testing with a secure template generation and comparison method: NTT-Sec-R

As mentioned earlier (Section 4.2.2) that our protocol description requires secure
template generation (TempGen) and comparison (TempComp) functions. Our implementation is based on the cryptographic primitive NTT-Sec [KC16]. We chose
NTT-Sec because (1) the NTT-Sec is solely based on publicly computable functions
(generalizing cryptographic hash functions in a setting with noisy measurements

93

Table 4.2: 15 features chosen by F-score algorithm and used in our experiments.
Feature
mean of accelerometer’ x-axis
cross-correlation between accelerometer’ x- and z-axis
median of accelerometer’ x-axis
median of accelerometer’ y-axis
mean of accelerometer’ y-axis
entropy of accelerometer’ y-axis
entropy of accelerometer’ x-axis
mean absolute deviation of gyroscope’ y-axis
cross-correlation between accelerometer’ y- and z-axis
range of gyroscope’ y-axis
covariance of gyroscope’ y-axis
spectral energy of gyroscope’s y-axis
spectral energy of accelerometer’s z-axis
mean absolute deviation of gyroscope’s z-axis
mean of accelerometer’s z-axis

Formula
mean(accx )
sum(abs(xcorr(accx , accz ))))
median(accx )
median(accy )
mean(accy )
entropy(accy )
entropy(accx )
mad(gyroy )
sum(abs(xcorr(accy , accz ))))
range(gyroy )
cov(gyroy )
sum(f f t(gyroy ). ∗ conj(f f t(gyroy )))
sum(f f t(accz ). ∗ conj(f f t(accz )))
mad(gyroz )
mean(accz )

F-scores
1289.51
989.89
626.99
497.72
466.377
377.96
285.51
205.32
175.16
171.11
151.62
144.86
136.50
131.15
122.00

of data), and (2) NTT-Sec offers formal security analysis with no known attacks
to date. Overall, NTT-Sec offers certain advantages over its alternatives. More
specifically, (1) homomorphic encryption-based methods [AAUC18] are not suitable
for the CA protocol due to the requirement of public key and private key on the
user side; (2) many of the previously known biometric cryptosystems (e.g., fuzzy
extractors [JW99]) are known to have security issues for their reusability [BA11]
and they are limited in their noise tolerance capability; (3) Cancelable biometrics
constructions [RU11], in general, lack formal security analysis, and many constructions have been shown to be vulnerable under false acceptance and stolen key attacks [AGKL19].
NTT-Sec consists of two algorithms called Proj (project) and Decomp (decompose). The Proj algorithm maps a length-n binary vector (considered as the feature
vector) to a finite field element (considered as its secure template) using a priori-fixed
set of public parameters and a factor basis. Given a pair of secure templates, the
Decomp algorithm can detect whether the templates originate from a pair of binary
feature vectors that differ in at most t indices for a priori-fixed error threshold value
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t. In Decomp, the detection is achieved by checking whether a particular finite field
element can be written (decomposed) as a product of the factor basis elements in
a certain form. Computations in NTT-Sec are performed in a cyclotomic subgroup
G of the multiplicative group of a finite field. We adapt the same group structure
in our modification. More specifically, let Fq be a finite field with q elements where
q = pm . Let c ∈ Fq be a non-quadratic residue with minimal polynomial of degree
m over Fp . Let Fq2 = Fq (σ) be a degree two extension of Fq where σ is a root of
x2 −c. Fq2 has a cyclotomic subgroup G of order q and every non-identity element in
a+σ
a−σ

for some a ∈ Fq . Moreover, we say an element a ∈ G is

Q 
for some
k-decomposable over Fp if it can be written as a product a = ki=1 aaii +σ
−σ

G can be represented as

Fp -elements a1 , a2 , . . . ak .
The original NTT-Sec is only limited working with binary feature vectors by its
design. On the other hand, biometric data [AAUA18] we deal with in this work
and in most cases such as physiological biometrics [RKBT07] or behavioral biometrics [FBM+ 13] is represented through real-valued feature vectors. Therefore, we
extend NTT-Sec to a new construction NTT-Sec-R, which comprises two algorithms
called NTT-Hash-R and NTT-Match-R. We use the scale-then-round transformation
in [AKK19] to transform the real-valued feature vectors to integer-valued vectors.
Moreover, we describe NTT-Param-R for the new parameters required in NTT-Sec-R.

NTT-Param-R
We assume that n and t are some fixed values that represent the length of feature
vectors and (original) system threshold, respectively. More specifically, a (noncryptographic) biometric authentication system would declare match for an input
pair of biometric data if and only if d(x, y) ≤ t, where d is the Manhattan distance
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function (`1 ), and x, y are the length-n feature vectors of the biometric data. The
parameters of NTT-Sec-R are defined as follows:
• a scaling factor s,
• a prime number p such that p > 2n,
• an integer m such that m ≥ bste,
• a set B = {g1 , g2 , . . . , gn } such that 1 ≤ gi ≤

p−1
2

for each i.

We pack all of these parameters under the set SP = {n, t, s, p, m, B}, and call this
as the system parameter set. Note that SP can be made public, and commonly
used in the NTT-Hash-R and NTT-Match-R algorithms. SP should be determined
in accordance with the desired security parameter λ in order to make NTT-Sec-R
resistant to adversarial attacks.
NTT-Hash-R
This algorithm maps a real-valued feature vector to a G-element called hash3 value
as follows: Assume a fixed-length real-valued feature vector x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) in
[0, 1]n is given. Using the scaling factor s and the basis B = {g1 , g2 , . . . , gn }, it is
mapped to a G-element, defined as
NTT-Hash-R(x) =

bsxi e
n 
Y
gi + σ
i=1

gi − σ

where b·e is the nearest integer function.
NTT-Match-R
For a given hash value h = NTT-Hash-R(x) for some x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) in [0, 1]n , a
real-valued vector y = (y1 , . . . , yn ) in [0, 1]n and a positive real number t, the goal
3 We

have chosen the name “hash” because the algorithm eventually satisfies randomness
and irreversibility similar to the hash functions.
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of NTT-Match-R is to decide whether

P

i=1

|xi − yi | ≤ t or not by using their hash

values. To achieve this goal, the following process is performed.
NTT-Hash-R computes hy = NTT-Hash-R(y), and then it decides whether the
G-element h/hy is bste-decomposable. Furthermore, if the retrieved Fp -elements
belong to the basis B, NTT-Match-R returns Match, otherwise No − Match.

4.5.3

A Security Analysis of NTT-Sec-R

The best strategy for an adversary to attack the new NTT-Sec-R method (with
respect to both irreversibility and indistinguisahbility notions) is to solve the discrete logarithm problem in the underlying cyclotomic group, which belongs to the
finite field Fp2m . Discrete logarithms in Fp2m can be computed in time bounded by
(max(p, m))O(log2 m) [BGJT14]. As analyzed in [KC16], an attacker needs to solve
(n + 1) discrete logarithms, and so we calculate the cost of this discrete logarithm
attack to be (n + 1)(max(p, m))log2 m .

Security Levels
In Section 4.6.1, we analyze the security level of our NTT-Sec-R implementations
using the scalars s = 100 and s = 400, and denoted by NTTSec100 and NTTSec400 ,
respectively. The prime number p = 31 is chosen for both implementations. Note
that the vector length is fixed as n = 15. Using these parameters, the security
levels λ, which correspond to the minimum cost of the DLP attack [BGJT14] and
considered as 2λ , are provided in Table 4.3.
Remark. We note that we are rather conservative in our security analysis, and
our estimated bit security levels can be increased in practice at almost no-cost.
For example, since a user is already equipped with a password in the protocol,
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Table 4.3: Security Levels of NTT-Sec-R for each user tested against the Discrete
Logarithm Problem (DLP) attack [BGJT14].
User
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

DLP
NTTSec100 NTTSec400
m
λ
m
λ
71
42
281
70
101
48
389
78
73
42
307
72
59
39
227
65
101
48
397
79
67
41
241
67
97
48
367
77
131
53
509
85
59
39
239
66
229
65
919
101

User
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

DLP
NTTSec100 NTTSec400
m
λ
m
λ
89
46
347
75
67
41
241
67
89
46
337
75
167
59
673
92
191
61
739
95
149
56
587
89
43
33
173
59
137
54
541
86
97
48
359
76
113
51
443
81

that password can be taken as part of the input in the feature extraction process,
while making attacker’s task harder in the template reversing attack. This would
also allow a legitimate user to revoke his template, and reissue a new template by
changing his password and re-enrolling to the system, and also to reuse his biometric
data over different systems by choosing different passwords.

4.5.4

Security benefits of NTT-Sec-R

In this section, we show the extra security benefits of NTT-Sec-R, in addition to the
security properties provided by the PAKE protocol.
User Data privacy. The user data is very sensitive as it contains the biometrics
information so it should be protected from any third party including the authentication server and as well as any kind of eavesdropping. In our protocol, the data is
transformed in an indistinguishable and irreversible way before transmitted to any
party from the users. Therefore, no party sees the sensitive user data in cleartext.
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No key required. The security of NTT-Sec-R is based on a discrete logarithm
problem, where it does not require to store any keys. Therefore, the security of
NTT-Sec-R is not based on a key.

4.6

Performance Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate our proposed system in terms of accuracy and resource
consumption.
Implementation Details. To evaluate the performance of our proposed concrete
privacy-aware continuous authentication system, we implemented it on a real system. Specifically, for the timing results of NTT-Sec-R algorithm’s implementation,
the codes were written in the C programming language using the GCC 5.4.0 compiler. The Core i7-7700 CPU @ 3.60GHz desktop computer was used with Ubuntu
16.04 LTS running. The CPU time of the match operation was measured using
the function clock() from the time.h library. All the timings were provided in milliseconds. For the linear algebra and finite field computations, we used the popular
FLINT C-library by William Hart et al. [HJP13]. In our implementation, for accuracy analysis, we used the scalars 40, 100, 400, and 1000 and denoted by NTTSec40 ,
NTTSec100 , NTTSec400 , and NTTSec1000 , respectively.
To measure the resource consumption of our proposed continuous authentication
system, we used an Apple smartwatch. The results of the resource consumption
experiments are given in Figure 4.9. The feature calculation was strictly done on
the device. The measurements were taken on a 38mm Apple Watch. The feature
calculation code was implemented in C. We used KissFFT library [Bor] for FFT
calculations in spectral entropy and cross-correlation features. It is worth noting
that we only implemented the most time-consuming parts and the computations
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on the relatively constrained devices (e.g., smartwatches). The implementation of
PAKE was already implemented and analyzed in many works and languages [Wu07,
Coc20] before.

4.6.1

Accuracy Analysis

A User-based evaluation model with training
We pick the first 10 feature vectors of the i’th user for training. Denote this set by
Traini = {[i, j] : j = 1, ..., 10}, and the remaining 10 feature vectors by Testi =
{[i, j] : j = 11, ..., 20}. We picked a subset of 5 feature vectors from Traini , and
computed the mean of these 5 feature vectors combinations. This is also called as

the gallery feature vector of a user. As a result, we generated 10
= 252 gallery
5
feature vectors per user (simulating 252 different enrollments of a user), and denoted
this set by Galleryi . In our EERi calculations, we paired each vector from Galleryi
and Testi . This yielded 252 · 10 = 2520 genuine comparisons for the i’th user. For
the i’th user, we also paired the first 10 vectors from Galleryi with all the vectors
from Testj for all j 6= i. This yielded 10 · 10 · 19 = 1900 imposter comparisons for
the i’th user.

Implementation Results
In this section, we discuss our implementation results. Using the same dataset, we
implemented two different techniques: Manhattan Distance (MD) (i.e., no secure
template generation) and NTT-Sec-R algorithm. Unlike the MD, the NTT-Sec-R
algorithm requires the feature vector elements to be an integer; therefore, using the
accuracy preserving transformation idea in [AKK19], we transformed real-valued
to the integer-valued feature vector. The selection of scalar for scaling purposes is
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important, and for that reason, we analyzed the experimental results of different
(suitable) scalars. Note that we are reporting the FRR and FAR values at the first
threshold point where FRR becomes less than or equal to FAR, implying EER.
For the FRR and FAR values, the MD was implemented using the Python Programming language, where the threshold value was incremented by 0.001 in each
step to obtain accurate results. Furthermore, the referenced vectors and query vectors were both taken as floating-point values. Hence, the error rates of the MD
can be used as a point of reference — in terms of the result accuracy — for the
NTT-Sec-R implementations. Using the EER threshold points from the MD results,
we determined the parameters for the NTT-Sec-R algorithm. Among the parameters, the threshold values were computed as T = bs · te where “s” is the (chosen)
scalar and “t” is the threshold value obtained from MD results. Considering accuracy and computational efficiency, we tested different scalars. Smaller scalar means
faster computation but more loss of error rate accuracy while larger scalar implies
slower computation and lesser loss of accuracy.
To show the change of error rate accuracy, we computed |MD − NTTSeci | using
the FRR and FAR values for each user where i ∈ {40, 100, 400, 1000}. The absolute FRR and FAR differences of the NTTSec implementations w.r.t. the MD are
presented in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8, respectively.
For the ease of our readers and to save space, the Figures 4.7 and 4.8 are the
summary of our extensive results. It is evident that scalar 40 results in more loss
of error rate accuracy than other selected scalars in both figures. One the other
hand, the accuracy is well preserved using the scalar 1000. 1000 is 25 times of 40,
which implies that the efficiency of the match function of NTT-Match-R algorithm
will be affected even by a higher factor due to the very large underlying algebraic
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Figure 4.7: The absolute FRR difference between the Manhattan distance (MD)
and NTT-Sec-R implementations using the scalars 40, 100, 400 and 1000 for all the
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20 users.
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structure. Hence, the scalars 100 and 400 seem to be good candidates for deciding
on efficiency and keeping security into consideration.

Timing Results
In this section, we report only the timing results of the matching function because
it is the bottleneck in the running time of NTT-Sec-R algorithm. The Match operation corresponds to TempComp function in Figure 4.5 and in our protocol. As
explained in Section 4.5.2, the NTT-Sec-R requires finite field and linear algebra operations over integers; therefore, the scalar is directly proportional to the efficiency
of the NTT-Sec-R. But one must also balance the loss of error rate accuracy and
computation efficiency. For example, for User-10, we find the average CPU timings of 4.494, 39.652 and 1408.454 milliseconds in the NTTSec40 , NTTSec100 , and
NTTSec400 , respectively. The loss of computational efficiency from scalar 100 to
400 is more significant than the loss of error rate accuracy. But the security of the
protected template should also be considered. Therefore, we are focusing on and
reporting the timing results of the NTTSec100 and NTTSec400 for all users.
The NTT-Match-R algorithm is comprised of Hash and Match functions, as also
explained in Section 4.5.2. The Hash function takes the feature vector and finite
field parameters as input. Then, the function computes a new field element by using
the elements of the feature vector as an exponent of the field element. Therefore,
the hash function corresponds to the secure template generation algorithm in PACA
(i.e., TempGen). Similarly, the Match function takes the same finite field parameters
and two field elements to perform the comparison. The function outputs Match or
No-Match according to the (fixed) threshold. Similar to the hash function, the
match function corresponds to the secure template comparison algorithm in PACA
(i.e., TempComp) Note that the Match function requires the hashed values of both
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Table 4.4: The average timing results of the Match functions of NTTSec100 and
NTTSec400 algorithms in milliseconds.
User
NTTSec100
NTTSec400
User
NTTSec100
NTTSec400

1
2.667
68.773
11
4.305
116.286

2
5.877
154.441
12
2.264
35.172

3
2.689
83.268
13
4.285
97.893

4
1.302
39.198
14
15.924
507.976

5
5.893
143.128
15
27.268
762.882

6
2.290
35.313
16
14.821
378.951

7
4.530
113.392
17
0.769
21.117

8
9.681
290.592
18
12.034
371.429

9
1.286
43.850
19
4.527
109.914

10
39.652
1408.454
20
6.740
225.091

the query and reference vectors. The reference vectors are stored as hashed values
while the query vector is required to be hashed first and then pass to the Match
function for comparison. We report the average CPU time of the Match function
only for each user in Table 4.4.
In Table 4.4, for NTTSec100 , the minimum and maximum average CPU time of
0.769 and 39.652 milliseconds, respectively. For NTTSec400 , the minimum and maximum average CPU time of 21.117 and 1408.454 milliseconds, respectively. These
minimum and maximum timing results are observed for the users 17 and 10, respectively.

4.6.2

Resource Consumption Analysis

To measure the resource consumption of our proposed continuous authentication
system, we implemented our proposed system on an Apple iWatch device. Figure 4.9 shows how the CPU was utilized throughout the feature calculation period
and a screenshot of the application used for the experiments. For 20 seconds, the
watch collects data from both the gyroscope and the accelerometer. The device
yields 50 measurements per second, giving us 1000 data points in one dimension.
For both gyroscope and accelerometer, we have three dimensions; hence the total
count of measurements amount to 6000. One CPU core is utilized in its complete
capacity for a brief amount of time when enough time is elapsed. The total time
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Figure 4.9: a) CPU profile of iOS implementation on an Apple iWatch. b) A
screenshot of the application used for the experiments on the Apple iWatch.
required for calculations, which is noted in Figure 4.9 by the peak, is 1.8 seconds;
the majority of this time (approximately 90%) is spent to calculate the hash. After,
the device begins to collect sensor measurements again, followed by a repeated feature calculation. This profile repeats as long as the framework is in operation. The
application cruises at 5% on the sensor measurement collection phase. After this,
the app calculates the features from sensor data and hashes it, which is illustrated
by the peak. The peak’s width is approximately 1.6 seconds, which corresponds to
the feature extraction (i.e., Ext) and template generation (i.e., TempGen) in total.
The measurement collection phase follows afterward. This profile repeats until the
application is stopped.
The memory footprint of the implementation is minuscule and constant, coasting
around 3.5 MB. Such a memory profile is expected because upon the completion of
the feature calculation period, the previous data is discarded, and since the period
and sampling rate is fixed, approximately the same amount of data is recorded anew.
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We measured the battery consumption by initiating the algorithm and sampling
the overall battery percentage every minute for more than 4 hours. We observed
that the application consumed 1% of the battery approximately every 4 minutes,
which yields us an operational time of 400 minutes, or 6.5 hours for PACA. Note
that this number is an absolute lower bound: during the measurements, a debugger
was attached to the device, the device’s screen was lit, and the maximum possible
values for s and t were selected, greatly increasing computational requirements and
the battery consumption. Hence, PACA is very promising in terms of resource
consumption.

4.7

Conclusion

Unlike the one-time authentication systems, the continuous authentication systems
are more suitable and better suited to the contemporary threats in cyberspace. Due
to its sensitivity and uniqueness, the biometric data requires proper security and
privacy mechanisms in place. Existing solutions like the password-hash-matching
systems do not work in noise-tolerant biometric authentication systems, while the
privacy-preserving homomorphic encryption constructs are not feasible for continuous authentication due to its performance limitations. In this chapter, we constructed a lightweight, privacy-aware, and secure continuous authentication protocol
and a comprehensive system under the protocol. Formally proving its security and
privacy guarantees against eight different attacks, we further deployed our system
with NTT-Sec-R and a continuous biometric authentication system using an Apple
smartwatch. We evaluated our protocol’s efficiency with data collected from real
users and validated that it incurs a minimal overhead. The proposed novel scheme
and results can be easily generalized to other biometric authentication mechanisms
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for both continuous and traditional noncontinuous settings with real-valued feature
vectors. Hence, the proposed protocol enables privacy-aware continuous biometric
authentication, which can fundamentally improve the security in cyberspace.
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CHAPTER 5
PINTA: A PRIVACY-PRESERVING MULTI-FACTOR
AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM

5.1

Introduction

Both for highly sensitive systems such as online retail and e-banking and relatively
less critical systems such as desktop machines in a corporate Intranet and social
networks, it is crucial to protect users’ accounts and assets from malicious third parties. Only password-based authentication systems suffer from many weaknesses, like
password cracking, susceptibility to phishing and cross-site password reuse. Once
the password is compromised, an adversary can easily misuse the victim’s account.
Thus, there is a great demand to establish a multi-factor authentication (MFA) system, which requires two or more authentication factors (i.e., knowledge, possession,
identity) to validate users during their login. Popular web services such as Amazon
Web Services [Que12], Google Accounts [Goo12], Microsoft Outlook [Mic19] have
already deployed MFA. However, in all of these techniques, an out-of-band channel
(e.g., an App, text message) and an additional action from the user is required. This
reduces usability significantly. Similarly, in the literature, there have been a number
of academic works proposing MFA systems [PMZ+ 11, Ver12, SP12, JY11, ZPW11].
The more practical (and therefore more likely to be widely-adopted) MFA solutions are based on users’ behavior; however, they do little to protect their privacy.
In particular, in an MFA system, users face the risk of exposing their personal
information to database servers or a malicious adversary. First, the owner of the
database server may use it for malicious purposes (e.g., selling user’s information for
economic interest) or if an adversary breaks into the database server and succeeds
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in obtaining the profile belonging to the targeted user, he/she can masquerade as a
legitimate user by crafting required authentication factors.
Nonetheless, there are several challenges in achieving a privacy-preserving MFA
system based on user profiles. First, a widely acknowledged challenge in the area
of user profiling is how to accurately model a user’s behavior while it constantly
changes [SKD+ 10]. Note that even for the same user, there may be a difference
between two profiles collected at different times. The second challenge is to identify
a unique user from others based on their own varying profiles. The third challenge
is to enable a server to verify the aforementioned profile, given that: (1) it cannot
be read by the server (to preserve user privacy), and (2) it will vary over time (so
standard cryptography cannot be used).
In this chapter, we designed a privacy-preserving method for multi-factor authentication systems, called PINTA, in which the privacy of the collected hybrid
user behavior profiles serving as a second authentication factor is protected from
the authentication server. Moreover, we also adopt fuzzy hashing [Kor06] and fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE) [Gen09] techniques to ensure that a user’s personal
information is not leaked to servers or a third party. Furthermore, PINTA uses a
large combination of host-based characteristics and network-based features to profile users. The combination of multiple features (26 configurable features in total)
enables a much simpler, distance metric-based user classification instead of expensive machine learning. Finally, while fuzzy hashing is used to match the strings
portion of the user profile, FHE is used to match integer numbers without knowing
the actual value. For the experiments, we used a user profile database derived from
several public datasets [BSPvdM12, She12, KM12] and a dataset we generate. Our
results show that the proposed scheme can well detect imposters from legitimate
users while protecting user privacy.
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5.2

Problem Formulation & Preliminaries

In this section, we first introduce our assumptions and the adversary model. Then,
we outline the design goals of our work. We also provide a brief introduction of
fuzzy hashing and homomorphic encryption.

5.2.1

Assumptions and Adversary Model

In our system, we make the following two assumptions:
1) Perfect knowledge assumption: We assume that the adversary has perfect
knowledge of the multi-factor authentication system including the strategy of user
profile acquisition, the mechanism of profile encryption/hashing, and the details of
the authentication protocol.
2) First-Factor knowledge assumption: We assume that the adversary knows the
victim’s first authentication factor, which is the user password.
In our adversary model, a malicious entity can attack the proposed multi-factor
authentication system via impersonating a legitimate user (victim) in order to gain
access to the victim’s account. We note that we do not consider any low-level communication adversary model such as man-in-the-middle and replay attacks because
those attacks can be prevented by the appropriate implementation of one or several
security protocols [IET08] and, hence, such attacks are not within the scope of our
work. We specifically consider the following two types of adversaries: brute-force
attacker and honest-but-curious server attacker.
1) Brute-force attacker : A computationally bounded third-party adversary may
attempt to authenticate with a spoofed second authentication factor by exhaustively
searching for the correct user profile. Such an attack consists of enumerating all
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possible user profiles until the correct one is found, which, in the worst case, would
involve traversing the entire message space.
2) Honest-but-curious server attacker : In our system, we assume the server that
processes the authentication requests is honest-but-curious that (1) stores incoming
cryptographic data without tampering with it; (2) honestly processes each authentication request and returns the corresponding outcome; (3) but tries to derive the
underlying sensitive information from the user’s cryptographic profile.

5.2.2

Design Goals

The design goals of our work are outlined below.
1) Privacy Preservation Assurance: The system should guarantee that the privacy of each user is well preserved. To be specific, never should anyone including
the honest-but-curious server and the malicious third-party obtain the user profiles
in plaintext. We analyze the security of our proposed system in Section 5.5. We
adopt fuzzy hashing and fully homomorphic encryption techniques to provide this
assurance.
2) Authentication Usability Assurance: The system should ensure a pleasant
user experience by satisfying the following three conditions. First, a login should not
need extra effort other than typing the username-password pair. Second, the system
overhead (i.e., authentication delay) of the entire authentication process should be
tolerable. Third, the program that runs on the client’s machine should not consume
a lot of computing resources. We evaluate system overhead and resource utilization
in Section 5.4.
3) Authentication Accuracy Assurance: The system should ensure that the authentication is accurate with acceptable recall and false positive rate (FPR), which
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poses two challenges. First, the system should be adaptive and flexible enough to
tolerate slight changes in the users’ profiles. Second, the system should be sensitive
enough to recognize a login request initiated by an adversary.

5.2.3

Fuzzy Hashing and Homomorphic Encryption

Fuzzy Hashing: The system proposed in this work uses fuzzy hashing, also called
Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing [Kor06], which is a hashing function that
can match data with similarities. Jesse Kornblum first proposed a generic fuzzy
hashing scheme in [Kor06] and implemented his algorithm as ssdeep [Kor18]. In
Rousseu’s approach, each similarity digest SD for a byte stream is generated by
employing a sequence of Bloom Filters, which are bit vectors used for space-efficient
set representation. Given two similarity digests SD1 and SD2 , the similarity digest
score is generated by the function SDscore (SD1 , SD2 ), which yields a score of
zero for a mismatch or a matching score ranging from 1 to 100. In industry, fuzzy
hashing has been applied in the realm of security forensics, especially in identifying
morphing malware and spam [BCH+ 09]. In our system, we adopt fuzzy hashing to
evaluate the similarity of two fuzzy hash values of user behavior features in the forms
of strings, without revealing the user’s sensitive information to the authentication
server.
We conducted a simple experiment to show the efficacy of fuzzy hashing and
how fuzzy hashed strings can be compared to gauge their level of similarity. The
procedure of the experiment is as follows: (1) We used a newly-installed (clean)
Windows 7 OS and ten different software installation packages, labeled as A, B,
... J. (2) We installed Software A on the clean OS and used the tree command to
output the file hierarchy in the folder path ’C:“Program Files’ as a string, denoted
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Table 5.1: Similarity score between fuzzy hashes. The element in the ith row and
jth column represents the value of SDScore (SDi , SDj )
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1
2
100 89
89 100
89 86
74 76
63 76
62 55
40 55
40 45
40 45
40 45

3
4
89 74
86 76
100 92
92 100
82 90
77 90
58 70
58 60
48 50
38 50

5
6
63 62
76 55
82 77
90 90
100 81
81 100
81 91
71 81
62 72
62 72

7
8
62 40
55 45
58 58
70 60
81 72
91 81
100 91
91 100
81 92
81 92

9
10
40 40
45 45
48 38
50 50
62 62
72 72
81 81
92 92
100 100
100 100

by Str1 . (3) We installed ten software packages one by one and obtained 10 strings,
denoted Str1 , Str2 ...Str1 0. Then, we generated the fuzzy hash for each string using
ssdeep, denoted by SD1 , SD2 ...SD1 0. We computed the similarity score (SDScore )
between every hash generated by ssdeep. Since we had ten fuzzy hashes, there
are 100 combinations in total. The SDScore for each combination is presented in
Table 5.1. From Table 5.1, we make several observations. First, all the similarity
scores are diagonally symmetric because SDScore (SD1 , SD2 ) and SDScore (SD2 ,
SD1 ) are the same. Second, the similarity score for the fuzzy hashes of the same
string is always 100. Third, with the installation of more software (i.e., more of a
change to the file hierarchy and corresponding string), the similarity score reduces.
Therefore, we can say that the similarity score of fuzzy hashes can roughly represent
how similar two fuzzy hashed strings are.
Homomorphic Encryption: The second technique, in this work, to achieve the
privacy of a user’s profile involves the application of fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE). After being an open problem for a long time, the first plausible FHE scheme
was introduced by Craig Gentry in his Ph.D. thesis [Gen09] in 2009. Homomorphic
encryption has an additional algorithm compared to the traditional encryption al-
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Figure 5.1: Fully Homomorphic Encryption
gorithms, which is called homomorphic evaluation algorithms and allows to be able
to perform operations on the encrypted data without decrypting it. Particularly, an
homomorphic encryption scheme ε has an algorithm Evaluateε that, given plaintext
π1 , π2 , ....πt , for any valid ε, private, public key pair (sk, pk), any circuit C, and any
ciphertext ψi ←− Encryptε (pk, πi ), yields

ψ ←− Evaluateε (pk, C, ψ1 ...ψt )
(5.1)
such that Decryptε (sk, ψ) = C(π1 , π2 ...πt )
A typical scenario of FHE is illustrated in Figure 5.1. In this scenario, the
user encrypts the data with public key pk and the function Encrypt and sends the
encrypted data to the server. The server in the cloud performs operations on the encrypted data by using the function Evaluate with public key pk and outputs ψ. The
server sends ψ back to the user. The user then decrypts ψ by function Decrypt with
his private key sk and obtains the result of C(π1 , π2 ...πt ). In this way, the server conducts the desired operation for the user without acquiring any plaintext. Van Dijk
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et al. later used Gentry’s technique to establish a fully homomorphic encryption system over integers [VDGHV10]. Coron and his colleagues further improved van Dijk’s
work by reducing the size of public keys and time complexity [CMNT11b]. Since
then many improvements have been proposed [BV11, Bra12, BGV14, BV14a] and
the research on FHE still an active research area [AAUC18]. In our experiments, we
used Microsoft’s open-source homomorphic encryption library called SEAL [MR18]
in our authentication system, which is a C++ implementation of homomorphic encryption. The current version of the SEAL implements two different encryption
schemes: BFV and CKKS. We used the BFV version, which is originally proposed
in [FV12a] and we chose the parameters to provide 128 bits security.

5.3

Proposed System

In this section, we introduce the design of PINTA. Our proposed system collects
the user behavior to serve as a second authentication factor along with the user’s
password. However, unlike conventional user behavior profiling, the user information acquisition, transmission, and storage all occur in a privacy-preserving fashion.
Furthermore, to prove that none of these stages in the system violates user privacy,
the proposed system is assumed to be open to the public, which corresponds to our
Perfect Knowledge Assumption as stated in Section 3.1.

5.3.1

System Overview

The architecture of the developed system has four primary components and is shown
in Figure 5.2: (1) an open-source profile acquisition program (PAP) that runs on
the user’s local host; (2) a user profile database (UPDB) that stores the user’s
information in a privacy-preserving fashion; (3) an authentication server (AS) that
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Figure 5.2: Overview of the Privacy-Preserving MFA System
processes and validates user’s login request; and (4) a content server. We assume
UPDB, AS and the server are owned by the same organization, but this is not a
strict requirement.
The first time a user uses PINTA with a specific site, he/she must go through
the process of enrollment. During the enrollment, the user information acquisition
program collects a user profile, denoted by P and then hashes or encrypts P with
Table 5.2: Operations in PINTA.
Function
F uzzyHash(a)

Operation
Obtain the fuzzy hash of bytestream a, denoted by a˙F
Compare the distance between two fuzzy hash a˙F and b˙F ,
F uzzyCmp(a˙F b˙F )
return a value ranging from 0 to 100.
F HE KeyGen()
Generate a key pair (pk, sk) for fully homomorphic encryption.
F HE Encrypt(a, pk) Encrypt a with public key pk via FHE, outputting a˙H
F HE Decrypt(a˙H , sk) Decrypt a˙H with public key sk via FHE, output a
˙ , pk) Subtract a˙H with bH
˙ via FHE under public key pk
F HE Sub(a˙H bH
˙ , pk) Divide a˙H by bH
˙ via FHE under public key pk
F HE Div(a˙H bH
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the FHE public key pk. Then, the user ID and user-assigned password, denoted by
uid and P sw, along with the cryptographic user profile, denoted by Ṗ , are passed to
the AS. The AS will interact with the UPDB and thus insert Ṗ into the user profile
database. For each login attempt afterward, the individual will pass his uid, typed
password, denoted by P sw0 as well as the newly captured user profile in ciphertext,
denoted by Ṗ 0 . The AS is responsible for evaluating how much Ṗ 0 is different from Ṗ
(hereinafter referred to as distance) and returning the corresponding authentication
result denoted as AuthResult, a boolean value indicating authentication as success
or failure. If AuthResult is a success, the AS will send a content service ticket
along with AuthResult to the user, which contains a session ID and a timestamp.
Any user holding a valid service ticket may initiate a service request to the content
server.
The major challenge of the privacy-preserving multi-factor authentication system
is how to preserve the privacy of the user profile from servers and any third party
while enabling the server to determine the distance between user profiles. To achieve
this, we use fuzzy hashing and fully homomorphic encryption techniques. The seven
operation primitives used in PINTA are summarized in Table 5.2.
From Equation 5.1, we can derive operations (Circuit C in Figure 5.1) that
are used by the server on ciphertext values (ψ1 ..ψk ) sent by the user when generating the ψ. Specifically, we implemented two simple arithmetic operations, substraction and division using the underlying And/Xor gates that were proven to
be secure [CMNT11b]. Assuming that we have FHE key pair (pk, sk), a˙H ←
F HE Encrypt (a, pk), b˙H ← F HE Encrypt(b, pk), ψ1 ← F HE Sub(a˙H , b˙H , pk),
and ψ2 ← F HE Div (a˙H , b˙H , pk), we can show the existence of Equations 5.2 and
5.3 as follows:
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5.3.2

F HE Decrypt(ψ1 , sk) = a − b

(5.2)

F HE Decrypt(ψ2 , sk) = a/b

(5.3)

User Profile Acquisition

To collect user profiles, we developed two user profile acquisition programs in C#
and Python for Windows and Linux OSs, respectively.

Hybrid User Profiling Model
The program has three main steps as illustrated by the cascading blocks in Figure
5.3: data summation, feature derivation, and hashing-encryption.
1) Data Summation: The Data Summation block is responsible for collecting
the user information in a sliding window - collection for some user information
occurs continuously, and at the end of each sliding window period, the collected
information is handed over to the Feature Derivation block, and Data Summation
starts again. To minimize the development effort, we use several third-party tools
(i.e., TSTAT [dT12]) to assist with data collection.
2) Feature Derivation: The Feature Derivation block receives the raw data from
the previous block and extracts the required features. The derivation of some features might demand further calculation, like the packet interval and the keystroke
press interval. After each feature is ready for processing, the Feature Derivation
block passes the data to the next block.
3) Hashing-Encryption: The Hashing-Encryption block is responsible for generating a cryptographic profile based on all of the available features via fuzzy hashing
and fully homomorphic encryption. The fuzzy-hashed user profile is denoted by P˙F
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Figure 5.3: The Pipeline of User Profile Acquisition Program
Table 5.3: Features Used for User Profile Modeling
Category
HostBased
NetworkBased
1

Section
1 File System and Registry
2 Mouse Dynamics
3 Keystroke Activity
4 System Process
5 Browser Information
6 Flow-Based Features

Number1
2
3
2
4
3
19

Type
string
number
number
string
string
number

Number of features in the section.

while the homomorphically encrypted user profile is denoted by P˙H . Thus, the block
outputs a hybrid cryptographic user profile Ṗ ←− {P˙F , P˙H }. In addition, the Feature Derivation Block continues to produce feature information at the end of every
window period; therefore, the Hashing-Encryption block generates a new cryptographic profile based on the latest incoming feature information and overwrites the
former one.
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Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 5.3, the features are divided into two categories: host-based and network-based, which are further classified into several subcategories as follows.
1) File System and Registry: This sub-category consists of fuzzy hashes of the
file hierarchy at a critical path and a portion of the registry contents (for Windows
systems). In particular, we target the information pertaining to the installed software since, for most users, the installed software is relatively stable and is a good
representation of user habits compared to other attributes. For the Windows OS, the
folder path for installed software is typically ’C:\Program Files’ and ’D:\Program
Files’ while for the Linux OS, it is ’/usr/bin/’. Besides, the Windows Registry
is a hierarchical database which stores configuration settings and options for both
low-level OS components and high-level running applications, which reflects users’
utilization of software well. In our case, we only retrieve the part of the registry
which contains the information of the installed software.
2) Mouse Dynamics: User’s mouse movements can be characterized via three
fine-grained metrics: direction, curvature distance, and curvature angle. Nan Zheng
et al. [ZPW11] proved that these three angle-based features are relatively unique
from person to person and independent of the computing platforms and can, therefore, be used to distinguish legitimate users from intruders. To obtain a stable and
representative sample, we use the average values of these three metrics in a time
window as several features in the user’s profile. According to [ZPW11], a reasonable
choice of the window size is 20 mouse clicks, which takes up to approximately 3.03
minutes.
3) Keystroke Activity: User’s keystroke activity is modeled via two features: the
average key press-down time and the average time interval between key presses.
Kevin Killourhy and Roy Maxion described in [KM09b] a method by which timing
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Table 5.4: Notations Used
Ṗ
Ṗ 0
n
m
pk
sk

Cryptographic user profile stored
Newly captured cryptographic user profile
Number of string characteristics
Number of number characteristics
User’s public key
User’s private key

PF ← {pF1 , ...pFi ...pFn }
PH ← {pH1 , ...pHi ...pHm }
WF ← {wF1 , ...wFi ...wFn }
WH ← {wH1 , ...wHi ...wHm }
kj ← {0, 1...kj }
Vj ← {0, 1...vj }

User’s string features
User’s number features
Weight for each string feature
Weight for each number feature
Threshold for the jth number feature
ADV for jth number feature (j ∈ [1, m])

data for keystroke activity of typing a password is collected and used to classify
impostors from legitimate users.Their experimental results show that these twotime metrics are sufficient to represent different users. In our proposed system, the
timing metrics of keystroke activity are captured and derived while a user is typing
his password in order to log into the operating system.
4) System Processes: This sub-category is composed of fuzzy hashes of four
clusters of system process names. The clustering strategy is alphabetically and then
divide the names into four blocks.
5) Browser Information: In this sub-category, we utilize the auto-fill information
in browsers. We derive the fuzzy hash of personal information with attributes of
”Email”, ”Username” and ”Address”. The significance of auto-fill information is
that one tends to have the same auto-fill value for those frequently-used attributes,
in different browsers or hosts.
6) Flow-Based Features: We model users’ general network behavior via 19 flowbased features. Note that it is commonly known that flow-based features indicate
the category of network traffic (e.g., stream video, online chat) and thus serve a
good reflection of user’s network usage patterns. In our system, we use the average
values of each feature, given a specific window of time.
We profiled users’ network behavior via the network flow-based features listed in
Table 5.5. Note that except ’flowDuration’, each feature is measured on both clientto-server direction and server-to-client direction. Also, the value of each feature is
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Table 5.5: Network flow-based features
No
1,2
3,4
5,6
7,8
9,10
11,12
13,14
15,16
17,18
19

Identifier
noPacket
maxSegment
maxWindow
minWindow
avgRTT
stddevRTT
minTTL
maxTTL
avgInterPkt
flowDuration

Definition
Number of packets
Maximum TCP segment
Maximum TCP Window
Minimum TCP Window
Average Round-Trip Time
Stddev of Round-Trip Time
Minimum Time-To-Live
Maximum Time-To-Live
Average Packet Arrival
Flow Completion Time

Weight
0.012, 0.007
0, 0.001
0.001, 0
0, 0
0.045, 0.032
0.003, 0
0, 0.005
0, 0.005
0.134, 0.119
0.087

based on one flow. A flow is defined as a sequence of packets sent from a particular
source to a particular destination. Taking feature ’stddevRTT’ as an example, it
represents the standard deviation of all the round-trip times in that flow.

Algorithm for User Profile Generation
From Table 5.3, we observe that the user characteristics can be classified as two
types: string (Sections 1, 4, 5) and numerical (Sections 2, 3, 6) values. Due to the
respective working mechanisms of fuzzy hashing and homomorphic encryption, we
apply the former on string characteristics and the latter on numerical ones. Suppose
each user has n string characteristics as well as m number characteristics where each
string feature is denoted by pFi (i ∈ [1, n]) and each numerical feature is denoted by
pHj (j ∈ [1, m]). Also suppose that the user has already generated one pair of
homomorphic encryption keys denoted by (pk, sk). The process of generating a
cryptographic user profile is given in Algorithm 1. The notations used in Algorithm
1 are presented in Table 3. Note that the user profiling approach we propose is an
extensible and configurable framework, which means that one can always edit the
user profile by deleting or inserting new user behavioral features.
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Figure 5.4: Sequence Diagram for User Enrollment

5.3.3

Enrollment of First-Time User and Profile Update

The sequence diagram of a first-time user’s enrollment is shown in Figure 5.4. To
initiate the enrollment, a user shares his public key pk with the authentication
server (message 1). After receiving the server’s acknowledgement (message 2), the
user passes his uid, P sw along with his cryptographic user profile Ṗ . Now, the server
has the user’s cryptographic profile stored in the database. As mentioned earlier,
the user profiles change constantly. Thus, the cumulative change of user profiles
makes it harder to recognize the distance between the newly captured profile and
the original one stored in the database. To address this issue, the UPDB should
update the cryptographic user profile for each user once every time period T . When
updating a user’s profile, the AS first authenticates the user as discussed in Section
4.4. After the user is validated, the profile update proceeds similar to the process of
enrollment, which is shown in Figure 5.4. The system administrator is responsible
for setting a reasonable T when deploying PINTA.

distancej =

|ṖHj − PHj |
× 100
PH i
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(5.4)

Figure 5.5: Sequence Diagram for Authentication

5.3.4

Server Authentication

The sequence diagram of the server handling each authentication request is presented in Figure 5.5. To initiate an authentication attempt, the user passes the
uid, P sw0 for the first-factor authentication (message 1). The failure of first-factor
authentication terminates the conversation. If the user passes the first step of the
authentication, he then passes his newly generated user profile, denoted by Ṗ 0 (message 3), to the server. After evaluating the distance between Ṗ 0 and Ṗ , the server
returns a boolean value AuthResult (message 4), indicating the success or failure
of the second-factor authentication. In order to yield AuthResult, we introduce a
new concept, the Accepted Distance Value (ADV). To define ADV , we first define
distance value. Assuming PHj and ṖHj denote the values of the j th feature in profile
P and profile Ṗ , the distance value between PHj and ṖHj is defined in Equation 5.4:
ADV is used as the array of all accepted distance values, which is assigned by
the server for every numerical characteristic. In our system, for the j th numerical
feature, we propose a threshold kj of the distance value. We define ADV Vj as the
array of all integers ranging from 0 to kj (i.e., Vj ←− {0, 1...kj }). In addition, we
place different weights on each string feature and each numerical feature, denoted by
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WF and WH , respectively. We will address the problem of how to reasonably set the
threshold and weight for each feature in Section 5.3. The process of estimating profile
distance and calculating AuthResult is given in Algorithm 2 and the notations used
are presented in Table 3.

5.4

Experimentation and Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the feasibility of our proposed system through a series of
experiments. We specifically conducted experiments with a combination of several
public datasets and a dataset which we generated. Particularly, we evaluate PINTA
in terms of authentication performance, the overhead caused on the system, and
computational performance.

5.4.1

Datasets and User Profile Generation

The names of the public datasets used in our experiments are shown in Table 5.6.
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Table 5.6: Data Source for Experiments
Section
Mouse Dynamic
Keystroke Activity
General Network
1

Data Set
NSKEYLAB Dataset [She12]
CMU Dataset [KM12]
DACS Dataset [BSPvdM12]

Subjects1
10
51
132

number of subjects involved in the data set

A description of the datasets, along with a description of the necessary preprocessing approach for each dataset are as follows. 1) NSKEYLAB Dataset [She12] is
a dataset containing mouse dynamics information from 10 subjects, each of who accomplishes at least 30 data sessions. Each session consists of about 30 minutes of a
user’s mouse activity in a free environment [SCG12, She12]. We derived three anglebased metrics using the approach proposed in [ZPW11], thus, generating three data
points that represent the user’s mouse movement profile. 2) CMU Dataset [KM12]
is a dataset consisting of keystroke-timing information from 51 subjects (typists),
each typing a password 400 times [KM09b, KM12]. 3) DACS Dataset [BSPvdM12]
is a dataset consisting of the network trace for an educational organization. A 100
Mbit/s Ethernet link connecting the organization to the Internet was monitored to
generate the trace. Each user at this site is assigned a fixed IP address [BSPvdM12].
We used SplitPcap [AB12] to obtain separate pcap files for each IP address inside
the organization’s network and further partition each pcap file into smaller pcap
files with a period of 30 minutes. For each small pcap file, we ran TSTAT [dT12] to
derive the flow-based features, thus, generating the user’s network behavior profile.
This data set spans two months.
In addition to these three datasets, we generated the dataset that contains file
system and registry information as follows. First, we generated two Software Pools,
A and B, which are two lists of software names with 30 and 100 types of software.
Software Pool A represents the OS pre-installed software and common software,

126

while Pool B represents personalized software. For 15 users, we randomly chose 20
software names from Pool A and five from Pool B for each user. We fuzzy-hashed
the list of the software names, thereby obtaining the first piece of the profile for
each individual. Then, for each user, we randomly chose two uninstalled software
packages from Pool B and inserted them into the user’s original software list, thus
generating a new piece of the user profile. We conducted this procedure iteratively
for 30 times in order to generate a data set representing the ”file system” with 15
individuals, each of which, has 30 profiles. We generated two software pools for
two reasons: First, in the initial stage, users have similar software environments,
in which most installed software is pre-installed with the OS by default and some
are commonly used software. Second, the software environment for users tends to
diverge afterward according to users’ habits, interests, and occupations. In our
approach, Software Pool A represents OS pre-installed and common software while
Software Pool B represents personalized software.
Based on these four datasets, we generated hybrid user profiles for each user. As
shown in Table 5.6, the NSKEYLAB Dataset only contains data from 10 participants. Therefore, we can at most generate user profiles for 10 distinctive subjects.
To generate one piece of the hybrid user profile for a certain user, we first randomly
chose four profiles, each from one dataset. Then, we combined 30-minute chunks
from each of the four datasets to create 30 hybrid profiles belonging to one user.
Hence, in our experiments, thirty 30-minute hybrid profile samples are created per
user. The users are labeled as User A, User B, and so on. Finally, we eliminated
the previously used profiles from the four datasets. By repeating this procedure,
we generated 30 hybrid user profile samples for each of the ten users, yielding 300
different hybrid profile samples, as illustrated in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: The Generation of Hybrid User Profile Samples

5.4.2

Experimental Setup

For each user, we registered his/her first piece of the cryptographic hybrid user
profile in the database (the enrollment of that user). Then, we appended a label
to each profile, indicating the owner of that profile. We randomly chose half of all
the hybrid user profile samples and intentionally mislabeled them making the actual
owner of that profile appears as an intruder. For the other half of the hybrid user
profile samples, we correctly labeled them, treating the owner as a legitimate user.
Finally, we randomly split all the labeled user profiles into two equal sized parts:
the training set and the testing set. We encrypted each profile in the testing set
via Algorithm 1 and left the profiles in the training set as plaintext (the data from
this training set can result from a bank’s focus group). The training set serves as a
priori knowledge for threshold setting and weight adjustment while the testing set
was the input of the system during experiments for performance evaluation. We first
performed a threshold setting and weight adjustment based on the training set, as
explained in Section 5.3. Then, we conducted a series of experiments by iteratively
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comparing the result generated by Algorithm 2 with the actual situation for each
piece of the user profiles. We conducted all the experiments on a standard laptop
computer with Intel CPU i5-M430 (2.27GHz) and RAM of 4 GB.

5.4.3

Decision Process

To decide whether a hybrid user profile is legitimate, we must first determine appropriate thresholds for individual characteristics that comprise the profiles. Next,
we used a majority vote to make the final decision on the legitimacy of a profile
sample. A training set containing 150 labeled hybrid user profile samples served as
a priori knowledge in this section.

Threshold Setting
We used the following approach to find an optimal threshold for each feature based
on the a priori knowledge we had. Assume there are p features in each hybrid user
profile and altogether q hybrid profile samples as prior knowledge. dij denotes the
change percentage of the j th feature in the ith profile compared to the enrollment
profile stored in the database. li denotes the identity of the owner of the ith profile.
li = 1 if the owner is legitimate and lj = 0 if the owner is an intruder. thj denotes
the threshold for the jth feature. Thus, for the j th feature, we design a function F
of thj :

F (thj ) = l1 ∗ Sgn(thj − d1j ) + ...li ∗ Sgn(thj − dij )
+ ....ln ∗ Sgn(thj − dnj )
=

q
X

li ∗ Sgn(thj − dij )

i=1
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(5.5)

where F (thj ) represents the total number of correctly classified cases for the j th
feature and Sgn denotes the sign operation. Thus, the optimal thj is the one that
makes F (thj ) reach a relatively maximum value. In this way, the threshold setting
problem is transformed to a simple linear function maxima problem, which can be
easily solved by Matlab.

Weight Adjustment
After having a vector of optimal thresholds for all the features, each feature is used
as a voter, either voting for or against the user. The weight placed on each vote
is adjusted via linear programming as described in Equation 5.6, where vj ∈ {1, 0}
denotes the vote of the jth feature and rst ∈ {1, 0} denotes the actual result.
min

p
X

wj ∗ vj − rst, s.t.

j=1

p
X

wj = 1

(5.6)

j=1

After the implementation of linear programming with Matlab, we identified the features that were assigned far more weight than others, which indicates that those
features better represent user behavior. See Appendix C for the weight adjustment
results. Note that in the deployment of our system, the system administrator can
always modify the weight adjustment based on his knowledge/experience. Additionally, he can eliminate the feature with little or zero weight and add new features to
the system, which makes PINTA highly configurable and robust.
The result for weight adjustment is as follows: (1) For the mouse movement subcategory, the weights for direction, curvature distance, and curvature angle were
0.106, 0.035 and 0.004, respectively. (2) For the keystroke activity sub-category,
the weights for key press-down time and average key-press interval were 0.048 and
0.023. (3) For the general network section, the weight for each feature is shown in
Table 5.5. (4) For the file system and registry, the weights for the file system feature
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and registry feature are 0.132 and 0.129. We have 26 features in total and the sum
of the weights equals to 1.

5.4.4

Results

In this section, we evaluate PINTA in terms of authentication performance, system
overhead, computational performance, and present our results.
Authentication Performance
In order to evaluate the PINTA’s authentication performance, we used recall, false
positive rate as a metric. We define recall and false positive rate as follows:
• Recall: Recall is the proportion of positive cases that are correctly identified
and was calculated using

TP
.
T P +F N

TP denotes True Positive, and FN denotes

False Negative while in our authentication system, an intruder is labeled as
Positive and a legitimate user as Negative. Thus, recall indicates the authentication system’s ability to identify intruders.
• False Positive Rate (FPR): FPR is the proportion of negatives cases that are
incorrectly classified as positive and was calculated using

TN
.
F P +T N

TN denotes

True Negative while FP denotes False Positive. FPR refers to the probability
of the system’s falsely rejecting a legitimate user.
We conducted a series of experiments on the testing set containing 150 labeled
hybrid user profile samples within different time window sizes for data collection
and with or without weight adjustment. The experimental results in terms of recall
and false positive rate (FPR) are presented in Table 5.7.
From the table, it can be seen that the longer the time window for the data
collection, the better the system performance is in terms of recall and FPR. When
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Table 5.7: Experiment Results: Recall and FPR
Time For
Data Collection
5 min
10
min
20
min
30
min

Weight
Adjustment

Recall (%)

FPR (%)

Without

74.2

26.9

With

75.1

24.3

Without

75.4

19.7

With

77.1

19.3

Without

78.8

16.2

With

79.9

15.1

Without

80.8

14.7

With

82.7

13.2

Table 5.8: Average timing results
F HE KeyGen
1449 microsecs

GenerateCryptographicU serP rof ile
F uzzyHash
F HE Encrcypt
677 microsecs 47784 microsecs
Subtotal = 0.05 seconds

F uzzyCmp
57 microsecs

CalculateAuthenticationResult
F HE Sub
F HE Div
1392 microsecs 370728 microsecs
Subtotal = 0.37 seconds

F HE Decrypt
29040 microsecs

the time window is as long as 30 minutes (initial bootstrap latency - this drops
to 0 for every attempt after 30 minutes), we achieve an optimal result with recall
of 82.7% and FPR of 13.2%. Nevertheless, a longer data collection time tends to
reduce the usability of the system. Therefore, there is a trade off between system
accuracy and efficiency. Also, it can be observed that weight adjustment makes
a positive impact on the system performance via a relatively higher recall and a
relatively lower FPR.

System Overhead & Utilization
In order to evaluate the overhead caused by PINTA on the system and the utilization
of PINTA, we computed packet size, system overhead, and resource utilization like
CPU and RAM utilization. We define and calculate them as follows:
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• Size of Authentication Packets (hereafter referred to as packet size): Packet
size is the size of all the authentication information transmitted from client to
the server.
• System Overhead: System Overhead is the initial latency during the entire
multi-factor authentication process. Measuring total system overhead is a
complex task. In Section 5.4, we evaluated the overhead introduced by user
profile acquisition, cryptography, data transmission, and server processing.
• Resource Utilization: Resource Utilization is defined as how much system resources it takes for a user information acquisition program to retrieve information and derive features continuously. We evaluated it in terms of CPU and
RAM utilization.
In terms of packet size, for the first-time user enrollment, the packet size is the
sum of the size of the user’s public key pk, uid, Password P sw, and cryptographic
user profile Ṗ . Since the size of uid and P sw are far less than the size of the rest,
we can neglect uid and P sw in the calculations. Packet size, Size, was calculated
using Equation 5.7, in which pkSize denotes the size of public key pk, n denotes
the number of string features, α denotes the size of each fuzzy hash, m denotes the
number of number features, and β denotes the size of each FHE ciphertext.

Size = pkSize + n ∗ α + m ∗ β

(5.7)

In PINTA, with pkSize = 128KB, n = 9, α = 0.125KB, m = 24, and β =
128KB, the packet size for the enrollment is approximately 3201 KB (message 1
and message 3 in Figure 5.4). In the authentication procedure, the user is not
expected to transmit their pk again; so, the packet size is around 3201 KB after
enrollment (message 3 in Figure 5.5).
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System overhead, T , is comprised of the time spent on authentication data transmission, Tt and the server process, Ts . We can derive T using Equation 5.8. Tt largely
depends on the network environment. In a high-speed Internet environment, Tt is
normally under 30 seconds. Ts was less than 5 seconds in our experiments. In total,
the system latency after users initiate a login request is around 35 seconds. It is
worth mentioning that system overhead may vary because it is dependent on the
computing ability of both the client and the server sides and also to the specific
network conditions.
Taf ter = Tt + Ts

(5.8)

In terms of resource utilization, in our experiments, the running of the user
profile acquisition program takes less than 3% of CPU resources and about 15MB
of RAM. The most significant proportion of computing resource consumption stems
from the capturing of network packets. Because we only capture packet headers,
the resource demanded for network monitoring is still in an acceptable range. Note
that the statistic for resource utilization is based on a laptop computer with Intel
CPU i5-M430 (2.27GHz) and a RAM of 4 GB. The CPU utilization percentage will
decrease with a more powerful machine.

Computational Performance
Finally, we measure PINTA’s computational performance. For this purpose, we used
the timing results of two main algorithms: GenerateCryptographicU serP rof ile()
and Calcu lateAuthenticationResult(). Moreover, we also computed the timing
results of operations in Table 5.2.
CalculateAuthenticationResult includes subtraction and division operations.
While performing the subtraction, while we used the built-in subtraction function
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in the homomorphic library, the division is implemented by multiplying the reverse
of the second multiplier. Therefore each division is indeed the combination of encryption and multiplication.
The results are given in Table 5.8. According to the results, while the generation
of cryptographic profiles takes around 0.05 seconds, the calculation of authentication
result takes about 0.37 seconds. When we look at the operations performed in these
algorithms, we see that the division operation dominates the authentication result
calculation algorithm. That’s because the division operation is a multiplication
operation and the homomorphic multiplication operations are computationally much
more expensive than the addition. However, still, the results show that PINTA is
feasible in terms of computational feasibility.

5.4.5

Security Analysis

In this subsection, we demonstrate how the authentication system thwarts the adversaries discussed in Section 5.2.1.
1) Security Against Brute-Force Attacker : In this case, an adversary attempts to
log in by guessing a user’s profile, which, in the worst case, would involve traversing
the entire message space. For each fuzzy hash, the message space is 2128 . For
5

each FHE, the message space is 21.5·10 . Since the message space for the fuzzy
hash is arbitrarily small compared to that of FHE ciphertext, we only consider the
computational cost to brute force the FHE ciphertext. First, denoting the length
of ciphertext by l, the probability of a malicious code correctly forging one correct
feature is:
Pf orge =
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1
2l

(5.9)

In our system, we realize l = 1.5 · 105 , so Pf orge is

1
.
21.5·105

Second, an adversary

that is brute-forcing the FHE ciphertext for each feature will have to put an overall
effort of
Ψ=

γ
κ

(5.10)
5

where γ is the average number of possible ciphertext values (e.g., 21.5·10 ) and κ is
the frequency of the attacker’s computer at 1 attack/sec. Assuming an attacker
with computational resources such as Intel Core i7-3960 at 3.9GHz, approximately
5

21.499·10 years of Ψ would be needed to generate the correct ciphertext. Therefore,
it is safe to conclude that it is impossible for a computationally bounded adversary
to match a user’s profile by brute-force.
2) Security Against Honest-But-Curious Server Attacker : In this scenario, the
honest-but-curious server tries to reverse engineer a user’s cryptographic profile Ṗ 0 .
The capability of resisting reverse engineering is also referred to as semantic security in cryptology [GM84]. Informally, a traditional definition of semantic security
is that a system is semantically secure if any computationally bounded adversary is
not able to compute the plaintext even with the knowledge of both ciphertext and
the corresponding public key. Note that in our work, we also treat fuzzy hashing as
a special form of encryption. Because each Ṗ 0 comprises a piece of fuzzy-hashed user
0
0
profile P˙H and a piece of homomorphically encrypted user profile P˙F , we demon-

strate the semantic security of fuzzy hashing and FHE, respectively. For fuzzy
hashing, the only available information available to the honest-but-curious [AMN18]
server or any third-party adversary are the two fuzzy hashed values (after the initial
authentication attempt) and the only answer the server can obtain is the similarity between two fuzzy hashes, which is just as intended. No further information
can be derived from the hash values due to the one-way property of fuzzy hash-
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ing [Kor06]. For FHE, Gentry and Coron showed that an FHE system is semantically secure [Gen09, CMNT11b], which means it is infeasible for a computationally
bounded adversary to derive significant information about a message (plaintext)
when given only its ciphertext and the corresponding public key.

5.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, we designed a privacy-preserving multi-factor authentication system,
called PINTA. In PINTA, while the first authentication factor is a password and
the second one is a hybrid behavioral user profile. PINTA focuses on the privacy
preservation of the second factor, which has two advantages over previously proposed
systems. First, user privacy is not leaked to the authentication server. We have
proven that the system is secure against both a brute-force matching attacker and an
honest-but-curious attacker. Second, the hybrid user profiling model is highly usable
and configurable. One can always modify the feature list for user profiling in PINTA
according to the actual circumstances. We evaluated the system performance via
a series of experiments, resulting in an optimal recall of 82.7% and FPR of 13.2%.
In addition, we also show that PINTA’s system overhead is within the acceptable
range.

137

PART II - SMART HOME USER PRIVACY
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CHAPTER 6
PEEK-A-BOO: REVEALING THE USER ACTIVITIES VIA
MULTI-STAGE PRIVACY ATTACKS

6.1

Introduction

Previously, the Internet was mainly used for accessing and displaying content of
web pages (i.e., web browsing). However, with the emergence of IoT devices in
smart homes, users have now the ability to control their home’s electronic systems
(e.g., smart bulbs, smart locks, sensors, etc.) using appropriate smartphone apps
and also from remote locations [SAA+ 18, BSAU18, BSAU19, SBC+ 19]. To realize
smart home automation, the devices are mostly equipped with embedded sensors.
These sensors collect data from the environment and help users to control them.
Moreover, smart home devices are also continuously communicating with associated
back-end system servers or other devices (e.g., smart hubs) to transmit the sensor
data in a real-time manner. On the other hand, as IoT devices usually are singlepurpose devices, the capabilities of individual smart home devices are relatively
limited, comprising only a few states or actions. For example, a motion sensor
allows a user to detect any movement in a physical space, but the sensor has only
two states: motion and no-motion. If an attacker can reveal the current state of the
sensor, the attacker will also reveal the presence of the user at home.
In this chapter, we demonstrate how machine learning methods based on traffic
profiling of smart home IoT device communications can be used by an adversary to
automatically identify actions and activities of the IoT devices and its users in a victim’s smart home with very high accuracy, even if only encrypted data are available.
Indeed, device types, daily mundane activities of the users (e.g., left home, walking
from kitchen to bedroom), or states of the devices (e.g., door locked, unlocked) can
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all be easily identified even if the traffic is encrypted, thus posing a threat to user
privacy. We refer to this novel attack to user privacy as multi-stage privacy attack, which is achieved in a cascading style by only observing passively the wireless
traffic from smart home devices. In this, a passive attacker can easily realize the
multi-stage privacy attack to extract meaningful data from any smart environment
equipped with smart devices including personal homes, residences, hotel rooms, offices of corporations or government agencies. Here, unlike earlier approaches, the
presented attack is device-type and protocol-agnostic, making it easily applicable to
a wide variety of different IoT device types without the need for tedious harvesting
of device-type or protocol-specific knowledge about specifications for supporting the
activity identification task.
We evaluate the effectiveness of the novel multi-stage privacy attack with 22
different off-the-shelf IoT devices utilizing the most popular wireless protocols for
IoT. Our experimental results show that an attacker can achieve very high accuracy
(above 90 %) in identification of the types, actions, states, activities of the devices
and sensors. Moreover, to counter the identified privacy threats posed by the multistage privacy attack, we also designed a new effective countermeasure solution based
on generating spoofed traffic to hide the real states of targeted IoT devices and
thereby the real activities of the users. Our solution does not require modifications
in targeted IoT devices and is, therefore, easier to deploy than previously proposed
solutions for IoT devices, for which it is very difficult to implement client-based
countermeasures due to the vast heterogeneity of smart devices and limited resources
available on the IoT devices. Also, even if the user is not at home, a fake trafficbased solution for the user’s presence will mask the user’s absence, further improving
privacy.
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Smart Home
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Analyzing Inferring

BLE

Figure 6.1: Local adversary model considered in this work.

6.2

Adversary Model

One of the unique challenges in the domain of IoT, and particularly smart home, is
that the attack surface is naturally extended and comprises a diverse set of devices
and sensors deployed at the user’s home. Figure 6.1 shows some of the data capturing
points that an attacker can take advantage of when inferring user activities. In this
work, we consider a local adversary located physically within the wireless range
of the targeted user’s smart home devices similar to [Fea16a, Fea16b, HCS+ 18].
For this, the attacker can install the sniffers only once and even manage them
remotely. Or, it could compromise a device inside the smart home, remotely, and
turn it into a sniffer. In this way, the attacker may never need to be present.
In all these cases, the adversary can eavesdrop on various wireless IoT network
communications transmitted by the user’s smart home devices. For example, as
presented in Figure 6.1, the attacker can sniff all the network traffic transmitted
over WiFi, BLE, and ZigBee protocols. The attacker only needs to passively sniff
the network traffic and does not need to interrupt. Therefore, the attacker may stay
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active long enough without being detected by the victim. An alternative adversary
would be an adversary who can launch the attack remotely, i.e., intercepting the
network traffic over the Internet such as a malicious ISP. We further discuss the
advantages and limitations of such an adversary in Section 6.7.
Assumptions. We further make the following assumptions:
• The attacker has access to the same kind of smart home devices and sensors
as the targeted user, s/he can analyze the devices by collecting the traffic of
these devices, and use the collected data to train its algorithms.
• The attacker has access to protocol headers data on all layers that are not
protected by encryption. The attacker does not need to know the specifications of analyzed protocols, instead it only needs to know how to run the
already publicly available scripts, which does not require an extensive knowledge about the specifications of the protocol itself. Moreover , it can also use
Layer 2 information like MAC addresses, or BLE advertisement packets, to
automatically identify additional information, the brand of individual devices,
thereby reducing the search space of devices to guess the set of smart home
devices that the targeted user is using. Moreover, it is also worth noting that
the attacker does not need exactly same devices to train its algorithm, but it
needs exact brand and device type to get the results presented in this work as
we use the < brand, device − type > pair to uniquely identify devices.
Attacker’s goals. We model the attacker’s goals under four different categories:
• Goal-1: The attacker aims to infer the devices used in a smart home. (Section 6.5.5)
• Goal-2: The attacker aims to infer the daily routine of the user. (Section 6.5.6)
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• Goal-3: The attacker aims to infer the state of a specific smart home device.
(Section 6.5.7)
• Goal-4: The attacker aims to infer specific user activities from the states of
multiple devices. (Section 6.5.8)

6.3

Smart Home Devices

In this section, we describe the typical characteristics of smart home devices relevant
to this chapter. First, we classify the smart devices according to their capabilities.
This capability-based classification can also be used to classify the device actions.
Second, we present required background information about the communication protocols used by these devices.

6.3.1

Capabilities of Smart Devices

We categorize smart devices in our study into three categories in terms of their
capabilities. The first category is the Hub-like devices. They are central communication hubs that connect other devices to both each other and to the Internet. They
mostly do not provide a functionality of their own to users as their main purpose is
to act as gateways connecting devices using other protocols than WiFi to the smart
home network. In some cases, like the Samsung ST Hub, they serve as a centralized
platform to install and run smart home apps for different smart devices. The second
category of devices is User-controlled devices. These devices can be controlled by
their users either manually or via a controller device like a smartphone or tablet.
Examples of such devices include Smart Lights, Smart Switches or Smart Locks.
These devices can be controlled both remotely and locally by the user. The third
category is Sensor-like devices. These devices are the most primitive ones and have
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Table 6.1: The communication protocols and capabilities of the smart home devices
used.

ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Communication
Device
WiFi ZigBee BLE
ApexisCam
●
○
○
AirRouter
●
○
○
AugustSmartlock
○
○
●
BelkinWemoLink
○
○
○
DLinkCam
●
○
○
DLinkDoorSensor
●
○
○
DLinkMotionSensor
●
○
○
DLinkSiren
●
○
○
EdimaxCam
●
○
○
EdimaxSPlug1101
●
○
○
EdinetCam1
●
○
○
EdinetGateway
●
○
○
FitbitAria
●
○
○
Lightify2
●
○
○
PhilipsHueBridge
●
○
○
SMCRouter
●
○
○
STMotionSensor
○
●
○
STOutlet
○
●
○
STMultiSensor
○
●
○
TPLinkHS110
●
○
○
WansviewCam
●
○
○
WemoInsightSwitch
●
○
○

Capabilities
a Type-I Type-II Type-III
○
○
●
●
○
○
○
●
●
○
●
○
○
○
●
○
○
●
○
○
●
○
○
●
○
○
●
○
●
○
○
○
●
●
○
○
○
●
○
○
●
○
●
○
○
●
○
○
○
○
●
●
●
○
○
○
●
○
●
○
○
○
●
○
●
○

Type-I: Hub-like devices, Type-II: User-controlled devices, Type-III: Sensor-like devices
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only the capability of sensing the environment via their built-in sensors. An example of this type of device is the Samsung ST Motion Sensor, which can detect
persons moving in its proximity. These devices send notification messages to their
associated services either when an event takes place, or periodically. All the devices
studied in this chapter are shown in Table 6.1.
Apart from these devices, a typical smart home environment uses a smartphone
or tablet as a controller device to control smart home devices. The smartphone or
tablet can also be used as an interface to connect smart devices and smart home
hubs and install different apps on the devices. We consider the smartphone or tablet
as the controller device in the user activity inference.

6.3.2

Communication Features

Both the smart home vendors and users mostly prefer wireless communication over
wired communication as it is more convenient. However, compared to wired communication, the wireless network traffic from smart home devices is open to the
eavesdropping attacks.
In this work, we target three wireless protocols: WiFi, ZigBee, and Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE). Among these, WiFi is used in the wired or plugged-in devices,
while other protocols, ZigBee and BLE, are implemented for short range communication tasks of battery-powered devices as they consume less power than WiFi.

WiFi-enabled devices
WiFi-enabled devices are connected to the Internet either through a Hub-like device
or directly connected to an access point. In both cases, the adversary can track
and capture the traffic through a specific device via MAC address. Even though
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MAC addresses may help the attacker to narrow down the device type, it can not
precisely decide the device type from MAC address. It may want to use IP addresses
of servers. However, the adversary can only see the traffic that is encrypted by both
the network protocols (SSL/TLS) and WiFi encryption (WPA). Therefore, it cannot
see the IP or transport layer headers encrypted by the WPA protocol. This prevents
the attacker from using header-based features for the device identification. However,
the traffic rates of the devices still cannot be hidden from the attacker.

ZigBee-enabled devices
ZigBee devices have two addresses: MAC address and Network Address (NwkAddr).
The MAC address is exactly the same as the MAC used in WiFi-enabled devices,
which is unique for every device in the world and never changes. On the other hand,
NwkAddr is created and assigned when the device joins a network and changes when
it leaves and re-joins another network. It is similar to IP, however, it is not encrypted
and source and destination NwkAddr of the packets can be seen by the attacker.
In addition, the network coordinator (i.e., hub) has the 0x0000 address and each
network has a unique identifier, called the Personal Area Network Identifier (PAN
ID). This information may additionally help the attacker.

BLE-enabled devices
In a BLE network, a device can be either a master or a slave. A slave can connect
to only one master node while a master can connect to multiple slave nodes. In
all the smart home devices that we used, while the smartphone acts as a master,
targeted smart device acted as a slave. Before establishing the connection, a slave
device broadcasts advertising packets (ADV IND) randomly on channel 37, 38, and
39. Once a connection starts, they agree on a channel map, where they follow in the
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ON->OFF

ON->OFF

OFF>ON

(a) Wemo Insight Switch (WiFi)

OFF->ON

ON->OFF

OFF->ON

(b) Samsung SmartThings Outlet (ZigBee)

LOCKED->UNLOCKED

UNLOCKED->LOCKED

(c) August Smart Lock (BLE)

Figure 6.2: The traffic rates of (a) Wemo Insight Switch, (b) Samsung ST outlet,
and (c) August Smart Lock. Here, a number of actions are illustrated, with many
signals easily discerned by the naked eye. For instance, when the lock is turned on,
the significant amount of packets are transmitted and received, which creates a peak
in the traffic rate for a certain duration.
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rest of the communication. If an attacker wants to follow the BLE traffic through
a smart device, it needs to capture the first packet so that it can learn the channel
mapping. Once the attacker captures the access address, it can follow the rest of
the communication.

6.4

Case Studies

In this section, we show the feasibility and possibility of privacy leaks from encrypted
network traffic of smart home devices. We show that an attacker who can sniff the
network traffic of the devices can easily infer some simple information without using
any advanced techniques. We consider one device for each protocol: Wemo Insight
Switch (WiFi), Samsung ST Outlet (ZigBee), and August Smart Lock (BLE). We
analyze the raw network traffic of each device and see if it is really possible to extract
information from the network traffic, specifically from data rate.

Wemo Insight Switch (WiFi)
Wemo Insight Switch is a Wifi-enabled device and used to monitor and control other
appliances (e.g., smart light) from a smartphone. It has only two capabilities: ON
and OFF. Figure 6.2a shows the data rate of the sample traffic collected from Wemo
Insight Switch, where we illustrated a number of actions of the user to change the
state of the device. As can be seen from the figure, the data rate shows a significant
increase when the device state is changing. Therefore, the data rate clearly reveals
the device state changes. In the first peak, the device’s state is changed by the user,
i.e., the device is turned on and in the second peak, the user turned off the device
and so on.

148

Samsung ST Outlet (ZigBee)
Samsung SmartThings (ST) Outlet uses ZigBee protocol to communicate with Samsung ST Hub. It can also act as a repeater and repeats the broadcast packet of Hub
for the smart devices, which is not in the range of Hub. This increase the range of
Hub. Other than repeating Hub’s broadcasting packets, it has only two capabilities:
ON and OFF. The traffic rate of a sample network capture of Samsung ST Outlet is
plotted in Figure 6.2b. In the given sample network traffic, the device’s activity has
been changed by the user three times, which clearly corresponds to the three large
peaks. On the other hand, small peaks correspond to the repeating of the broadcast
packets of the hub, which is periodic with 15 seconds.

August Smart Lock (BLE)
The August Smart Lock communicates with the user’s smartphone via BLE. In
addition to locking and unlocking from the app on the smartphone, the owner (main
user) can also give access to guest users through the web servers. The user can
also enable the auto-unlock, where the lock is unlocked when the user is in range.
However, the lock itself does not have the remote control capability. For remote
access, it needs other accessories (e.g., WiFi bridge). Here, we only consider the
BLE communication between the lock and smartphone. Figure 6.2c shows the plot
of the sample packet capture of August Smart Lock. As in the previous case studies,
the transition between the device’s actions can be clearly identified by the attacker.
The small increase in the traffic rate in the first part of the capture is because of
the advertising packets.
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Figure 6.3: Overview of our multi-stage privacy attack.

6.5

Multi-stage Privacy Attack

As shown in Figure 6.3, our novel multi-stage privacy attack consists of four stages
connected in a cascaded manner. While the goal of the attack is to infer user
activities at the final stage, every stage also leaks partial information about devices
and their actions and can be independently used by the attacker for various purposes.
In the following, we first outline the high-level overview of the attack and then
present details of individual stages and related results.

6.5.1

Attack Stages

Stage-1: In the first stage, the attacker’s goal is to identify the type of each smart
home device. Even though used protocols use unique identifiers for each device (e.g.,
MAC address, NwkAddr), the attacker does not know the device type a specific
address corresponds to. By sniffing packets of individual protocols, the attacker
will obtain network traffic profiles of all devices using that protocol. Identifying
individual devices’ types becomes then a multi-class classification task based on the
traffic profiles of individual devices.
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Stage-2: After discovering the types of individual devices, the attacker’s goal is
to infer the state of individual devices. As shown in Figure 6.2, a state change
typically results in a significant increase in network traffic related to the device,
causing an increase in the data rate and decrease in the inter-arrival time of the
packets. Therefore, the attacker can in most cases detect state changes of devices by
observing changes in these metrics. At the end of this stage, as shown in Figure 6.3,
the attacker converts the network packets into 1s and 0s, where the 1s show where
the transition occurred.
Stage-3: After detecting transitions between device states, the attacker splits the
network trace of a device into segments corresponding to different device states (e.g.,
ON, OFF). Identifying these states is then reduced to a multi-class classification
problem, where classes represent possible device states.
Stage-4: In this stage, by using the results of the state classification in Stage-3,
the attacker knows the inferred states of all devices. For example, at a particular
moment, the attacker may know the smart lock is in the LOCKED state, no motion
is detected in the motion sensor placed in the kitchen and so on. Using the state
information of the devices, the attacker can guess that the user is sleeping. Any
user activity in a smart home can be inferred by observing the inferred states of
devices and sensors and using a Hidden Markov Model to infer the corresponding
user activity.
In the next sections, we evaluate the efficiency of our multi-stage privacy attack
on network traffic data collected from 22 different off-the-shelf IoT devices used in
smart homes.
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Table 6.2: Characteristics of network traces used in experiments.
Device
ApexisCam
AirRouter
AugustSmartLock
BelkinWemoLink
DLinkCam
DLinkDoorSensor
DLinkMotionSensor
DLinkSiren
EdimaxCam
EdimaxSPlug1101
EdinetCam1
EdinetGateway
FitbitAria
Lightify2
PhilipsHueBridge
SMCRouter
STOutlet
STMotionSensor
STMultiPurpose
TPLinkHS110
WansviewCam
WemoInsightSwitch

Period (mins)
133
85
25.8
71
225
74
74
71
225
74
117
225
213
74
53
124
6
11
12
71
193
117
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Size (MB)
80
49
0.66
0.66
1.15
0.48
0.47
0.41
0.27
0.5
0.3
0.34
0.043
0.25
0.8
47
0.04
0.05
0.22
0.14
11
0.8

Packets
152220
115192
8129
2039
5389
3519
2849
3073
1798
2823
2779
3240
257
1022
2680
150768
1061
1291
5255
473
73759
1675

6.5.2

Dataset and Evaluation Metrics

In order to evaluate the attacks in the stages above, we collected the network data
from 22 different smart home devices. Data collection was performed in two stages:
In the first stage, controlled experiments were performed in which detailed instructions were followed to initiate specific actions on the tested device. These instructions were compiled based on the on-line or hardcopy manual of each tested device
(specs and data sheets). The controlled experiments were performed in order to ensure that all relevant actions for each device were represented in the usage dataset
sufficiently many times. Each experiment was therefore repeated n = 20 times for
each device. In addition to the controlled experiments, also uncontrolled testing was
performed in order to capture background traffic of relevant devices. In this set-up,
several devices were configured to be used simultaneously and device actions were
occasionally triggered during a test period of ca. 1-2 hours.
The duration and the total size of the captures and the number of the packets
are given in Table 6.2. The devices used include a representative cross-section of
IoT device types, typically available in the European and North American markets
during the study. The devices were also selected based on the market share of
different device categories. The most popular device categories are smart security
systems such as smart cameras and smart locks (22.2%), lighting (3.03%), outlets
and switches (1%), gateways including hubs and routers (24.5%), and smart speakers
(22.39%) [Ana17]. In addition to these categories, we also included several smart
sensors as these devices hold significant smart home market share (approximately
23.9%) [Int18]. We installed all the devices in a laboratory network and emulated
user inputs triggering device state changes. We captured all the network traffic from
a device and performed the analysis offline.
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For evaluating the efficiency of our attacks, we use different metrics. First, we
use accuracy, which is the ratio of correctly inferred observations to total observations. In some cases, as in real deployments, the collected network data may
have imbalanced data, where the duration of the active state is much less than the
inactive one. In those cases, we use additional metrics such as Precision, Recall,
F1 score, and Support. In the cases that the dataset includes a lot more label 0
(no activity) rows than label 1 (activity) rows, we observed that F1 score is a better performance measurement than accuracy although accuracy is a more intuitive
performance measurement, in general.

6.5.3

Performance Metrics

To evaluate our proposed novel attack, we used seven different performance metrics: True Positive Rate (TPR), False Negative Rate (FNR), True Negative Rate
(TNR), False Positive Rate (FPR), Precision, Accuracy, and F1-score. These can
be calculated using following equations:
TP
TP + FN
FN
F NR =
TP + FN
TN
T NR =
TN + FP
FP
FPR =
TN + FP

T P R (Recall) =

P recision = T P/(T P + F P )
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
2 ∗ TP ∗ TN
F 1 − score =
TP + TN

Accuracy =

(6.1)
(6.2)
(6.3)
(6.4)
(6.5)
(6.6)
(6.7)

where T P = T rue P ositive, F P = F alse P ositive, T N = T rue N egative and
F N = F alse N egative.
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6.5.4

Calculating Features from Network traffic

In this sub-section, we explain how we use the traffic flow for the classification
task. Particularly, we take advantage of the fact that while the encryption layer
in the protocol protects the payload of a packet, it fails to hide other information
revealed by network traffic patterns, for instance, sequence of packet lengths (SPL)
and direction (incoming/outgoing). We consider each network traffic flow as a time
ordered sequence of packets exchanged between two peers during a session. Before
processing the network traffic for classification, we converted packet in traffic flow
into a Sequence of Packet Lengths and Times (SPLT) as in following format:
pkt = [timestamp, direction, packet length],

(6.8)

where the direction is 1(0) if it is an incoming (outgoing) packet. This transformation is done for each packet in the captured trace, where each result is written to a
new row. In the end, we obtained a matrix with three columns. Then, in the feature
extraction of each attack, we calculated the features from this matrix.

6.5.5

Stage-1: Device Identification

Several different identification approaches for IoT devices have been proposed in
literature. Numerous works have shown that IoT devices can be identified with high
accuracy for both WiFi-enabled [MMH+ 17, DJ17, BBP+ 18, MBS+ 17, NMM+ 19]
and BLE-enabled [DPCM16] devices. Therefore, in this section (e.g., Stage-1),
we implemented already existing device identification algorithm for ZigBee-enabled
smart home devices using our features to see whether we can identify the ZigBeeenabled smart home devices from their network traffic.
In our dataset, each device can be uniquely identified by the < brand, device −
type > pair. We did not consider the different models of devices as different devices.
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On the other hand, a hub in ZigBee always uses the network address 0x0000, so
it can be easily recognized by the attacker. Therefore, we did not include the hub
in the identification of ZigBee devices. After collecting ZigBee network traffic, the
second step involves extracting the features to identify the devices. In this step, the
features we used include mean packet length, mean inter-arrival time, and standard
deviation in packet lengths. We split each individual network traffic trace of a device
into equal time intervals (e.g., 5 sec, 10 sec). Then, we calculated these features for
each interval.
For the classification, we used the kNN classification algorithm. The classifier
could correctly identify devices with an overall accuracy of 93% for ZigBee devices.
This shows that as for WiFi and BLE, also devices using ZigBee can be identified
with high accuracy.

6.5.6

Stage-2: Device State Detection

When an interaction between the device and the user occurs, a significant amount of
data is transmitted, which leads to a significant increase in the traffic rate. After this
data exchange, the data transmission drops to the minimum until a new interaction
starts. When there is no activity, only the minimum amount of continuation packets
like heartbeat messages are sent to minimize the device’s power and bandwidth
consumption. We also observed that almost the same amount of data transfer
occurs for the same activities. All this information allows us to detect transitions
between the activities or states of the device. For further validation, we do the
following experiments.
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Table 6.3: Evaluation results of device activity detection stage.
Device
ApexisCam
AirRouter
AugustSmartLock
BelkinWemoLink
DLinkCam
DLinkDoorSensor
DlinkMotionSensor
DlinkSiren
EdimaxCam
EdimaxSPlug1101
EdinetCam1
EdinetGateway
FitbitAria
Lightify2
PhilipsHueBridge
SMCRouter
STOutlet
STMotionSensor
STMultiSensor
TPLinkPlug1101
WansviewCam
WemoInsightSwitch
Avg

Random Forest
F1 Score Accuracy
93
97
98
97
100
100
80
79
85
80
94
98
74
96
89
99
84
82
91
97
76
96
80
99
100
100
86
99
74
98
94
91
83
99
91
97
86
99
98
99
91
87
86
98
88
99
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kNN
F1 Score Accuracy
94
98
98
97
100
100
85
83
85
80
92
97
69
95
91
99
82
81
92
97
76
96
66
99
100
100
81
98
76
98
100
100
92
99
92
97
92
99
92
99
91
86
88
98
91
95

Feature Extraction
Our goal is to transform a sequence of packets into a supervised learning dataset. To
achieve this, we divided the sequence of packets into windows of size W . For a given
time interval length W , we extracted a feature vector comprised of three variables:
mean packet length, mean inter-arrival time and median absolute deviation of packet
size. Based on timestamped labels telling whether an activity was ongoing or not, we
labeled the given vector with 1 for an ongoing activity or 0 for no activity. We found
that the window size has significant influence on the performance of our model. The
window size for the best performance depends on adjusting the size according to
the duration of the activity. In general, selecting a smaller window size improves
the performance until some level, but any further reduction results in decline of
the performance. From our observation, better performance was observed when the
window size is about a quarter of the duration of an activity.

Results
After obtaining feature vectors with labels from the sequence of packets, any supervised learning algorithm can be applied on the dataset. We have evaluated
two supervised learning algorithms, namely Random Forest classifier (RF) and kNearest Neighbors classifier (kNN). As shown in Table 6.3 both RF and kNN have
similar performance with RF averaging 88% and kNN with 91% average of correctly
detecting activities. F1 Score of each device in Table 6.3 differs slightly. DlinkMotionSensor has the worst F1 score 74% using RF and 69% using kNN and the best
F1 score is 100% for the Aria Fitbit and AugustSmartLock.
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6.5.7

Stage-3: Device State Classification

In the device state classification experiments, the attacker’s goal is to decide the
state of the device (e.g., deciding if it is ON or OFF). When looking at the device’s
exchanged network packets, unlike previous steps, this is more difficult to determine.
However, each state has a unique pattern which helps us to differentiate them from
each other. In order to see if it is possible to differentiate the states, we did the
following experiments:

Feature extraction
To conduct device state classification, informative and distinctive features must
be extracted from time-series generated in the preprocessing steps. We used the
tsfresh [CBN18] tool that automatically calculates a large number of time series
characteristics and features and then constructed our feature vector. Examples of
the features extracted from time-series are as follows: Absolute Energy of timeseries, Length of time-series, Mean of time-series, Median of time-series, Skewness
of time-series, Entropy of time-series, Standard deviation of time-series, Variance
of time-series, Continuous wavelet transform coefficients, Fast Fourier Transform
Coefficients, Coefficients of polynomial fitted to time-series.

Feature selection
The output of the feature extraction phase is a set of feature vectors including
795 binary features. A large number of features, some of which redundant or irrelevant might present several problems such as misleading the learning algorithm,
and increasing model complexity. A feature selection technique was therefore used
to mitigate these problems and also to reduce over-fitting, training time and improve accuracy. We used a technique leveraging ensembles of randomized decision
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trees (i.e., Extra Trees-Classifier) for determining the importance of individual features. We exploited Extra-Trees Classifier to compute the relative importance of
each attribute to inform feature selection. The features considered unimportant
were discarded. The feature selection phase effectively reduced the feature vector
size from 795 binary features to 197 features.

Results
Our objective was to build a performant model to correctly classify IoT devices’
states even if their traffic is encrypted. To this end, we employed several machine
learning algorithms for the classification such as XGBoost, Adaboost, Random Forest,
SVM with RBF kernel, kNN, Logistic Regression, Naı̈ve Bayes, and Decision Tree.
In order to ensure that our machine learning model got the most of the patterns from
the training data correctly, and it was not picking up too much noise, we shuffled
and split the data-points to conduct the following experiments: (i) we performed
5-fold Cross Validation (CV) on a training set of 377 samples (75% of data) for
assessing the effectiveness of the machine learning model and (ii) we carried out
Hold-out Validation on 126 samples (25% of data) to test the machine learning
model performance against unseen data.
5-fold Cross Validation: To avoid the risk of missing important patterns or
trends in the dataset, we applied cross validation, as it provides ample data for
training the model and also leaves ample data for validation. Thus, we conducted a
5-fold cross validation experiment. In 5-fold CV, the data are randomly partitioned
into 5 equal-sized sub-samples. Of the 5 sub-samples, a single sub-sample is retained
as the validation data for testing the model, and the remaining 4 sub-samples are
used as training data. The process is then repeated 5 times with each of the 5
sub-samples used exactly once as the validation data. The 5 results from the folds
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Table 6.4: Cross-validation and hold-out validation results for device state classification.
Classifier
SVC RBF Kernel
Logistic Reg.
Random Forest
Naive Bayes
Decision Tree
K-NN
Adaboost
XGBoost

5-fold CV
(75% of data)
86
87
92
87
66
84
86
85

Held-out data (25% of data)
Precision Recall F1 Score
89
87
87
90
89
88
96
94
94
92
87
88
62
63
61
91
87
87
89
87
87
91
87
87

can then be averaged to produce a single estimation. We obtained 92% accuracy in
terms of F1 Score in the detection of devices’ states using Random Forest classifier,
as shown in Table 6.4.
Hold-out Validation: To make sure that our classifier can generalize well and
is not over-fitted, we tested the classifiers’ performance in terms of Precision, Recall,
and F1 Score against unseen data (the data was removed from the training set and
is only used for this purpose). Table 6.5 shows the detailed results obtained by
Random Forest classification algorithm when conducting the device state classification over 126 unseen samples. As can be seen, the F1 Score of each device used in
the experiment differs slightly. We obtained an average performance measurement
of 0.94 (94%) of correctly classifying activities. This shows that an attacker can
easily differentiate the devices’ states.

6.5.8

Stage-4: User Activity Inference

Modern smart home environments comprise several sensors and devices that are connected with each other and share information. These devices and sensors are configured as independent entities, but work co-dependently to provide an autonomous
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Table 6.5: Hold-out validation results of RF classifier for all IoT devices.
Device name
ApexisCamera
AirRouter
AugustSmartLock
AugustSmartLock
BelkinWemoLink
BelkinWemoLink
DLinkCamera
DLinkDoorSensor
DLinkSensor
DLinkSiren
EdimaxCam
EdimaxSPlug1101
EdinetCam1
EdinetGateway
FitbitAria
Lightify2
PhilipsHueBridge
PhilipsHueBridge
SMCRouter
STOutlet
STMotion
STMotion
STMultiSensor
STMultiSensor
TPLinkPlugHS110
WansviewCam
WemoInsightSwitch
Avg./Total

Action
live view
surfing on amazon
off
on
off
on
live view
open
motion detection
turn on
live view
on
live view
on
measure weight
change light type
turn scene off
turn scene on
surfing on amazon
on
active
inactive
acceleration active
acceleration inactive
turn off
reboot
on
———–
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Pre.
100
80
100
67
80
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
88
100
100
71
100
100
100
96

Recall
100
100
67
100
100
50
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
80
89
100
71
100
100
100
100
100
94

F1
100
89
80
80
89
67
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
89
94
93
83
100
83
100
100
100
94

Supp.
4
4
3
2
8
4
3
5
6
1
1
5
2
3
4
6
3
5
5
9
7
7
8
5
5
9
2
126

Figure 6.4: User walking scenario in a smart home environment.
system. Any user activity in a smart home can be inferred by observing the states
of the devices and sensors.

Modelling User Activities via Hidden Markov Model
In Figure 6.4, we demonstrate a simple walking scenario of a user. Here, a user is
entering the smart home from outside to the bedroom through the hallway. The
scenario consists of five different devices with lights both inside and outside the
home controlled by the motion sensor (M) and light sensor (L). This simple activity
can be illustrated as a sequential pattern: Sub-activity 1- moving towards the door
from outside (L1 is active), Sub-activity 2- user opens the front door (L1, D1, Lo1
are active), Sub-activity 3- user enters the hallway (L2, M1, Li1 are active), Subactivity 4- user enters the room (Li2, L2, M2, D1, Lo1 are active), Sub-activity 5user inside the home (L2, M2, Li2 are active). To complete the activity, a user must
follow the same sequence of sub-activities and complete each step. As discussed
earlier, the devices’ states (active/inactive) for a specific time can be determined
from the network traffic captured from the devices. These device states can be used
to infer an on-going activity in a smart home setting.
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Feature Extraction
To infer user activities, different device features must be extracted from network
traffic data. Network traffic data contain several features including timing information, sensor information, device states, location, etc. Based on the data-type,
the extracted features from the network traffic for user activity inference can be
represented as follows:
Data array, ET = {S, D, M, L},

(6.9)

where T is the set of timing features extracted from the network traffic, S is the
set of sensors’ features, D is the set of device features, M is the features extracted
from the controlling device (smartphone/tablet), and L is the set of location features
extracted from the network traffic. We describe the characteristics of these features
below.
• Timing features (T): Smart home devices change their state according to user
activities and commands. Some devices perform time-independent tasks (e.g.,
switching lights with motion), while some devices perform a task in a certain
pattern with different user activities (e.g., walking from one point to another)
based on smart home settings. We extract the time of an event from the
network traffic captured from different devices to build the overall state of the
smart home at the time of the user activity.
• Sensor State features (S): Smart home environment consists of different sensors (e.g., motion sensor, light sensor, door sensor, etc.) which act as a bridge
between devices and the peripheral. Sensors in a smart home can sense different environment parameters which can trigger different pre-defined tasks in
multiple devices. Moreover, sensors can sense any change occurred because of
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a user interaction and forward this information as an input to the associated
devices. These sensor data can be both logical (motion sensor) and numerical
(temperature sensor) depending on the nature of the sensor. We observe the
changes in both logical and numerical value of a sensor from the captured
network traffic and use as a feature to infer user activities. We represent the
changes in sensor data as binary output: 1 for active state and 0 for inactive
state.
• Device State features (D): In a smart home environment, multiple devices such
as smart light, smart thermostat, etc. can be connected with each other and
with a central hub to perform different tasks. These devices can be configured
to change their states (active/inactive) to perform a pre-defined task or to
perform a task based on user activities. We consider the state information
of all the connected devices as features and extract this information from
captured network traffic to infer the on-going user activity. The active and
inactive states of the devices are illustrated as 1 and 0 respectively in the data
array.
• Controller State features (M): Smart home devices can be controlled in an
autonomous way and also by using a controller device (smartphone/tablet).
To understand the changes in states of the sensors and devices, one should
consider the control commands generated by the controller devices. We consider the state of controller device as active (represented as 1 in data array)
when a user interacts with smart home devices via controller device and inactive otherwise (represented as 0 in data array). This state information of the
controller devices can be extracted from the captured network traffic to build
the data array.
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• Controller Location features (L): The devices connected in a smart environment can be controlled from a different location and this location information
can be collected from the captured network traffic. We consider the location of
the controller device as a feature to understand any activities on smart home.
We consider the home location of the controller device as 1 and the away location of the controller as 0 to represent the location feature as a binary number
in the data array.
For Stage 4, we captured the network traffic from a smart home environment
and create the feature array explained in Equation 6.9. We captured the network
traffic for a specific time to correctly portray user activities from the network data.
Each element of the data array represents the operating conditions of different smart
devices, sensors, and controller devices. These data were then used to train a Hidden
Markov Model (HMM) to detect user activities in a smart home environment.
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a statistical Markov model, where each state
of the model contains unobserved states. In traditional Markov model, all the states
of an ongoing process are observable while in Hidden Markov model the states are
not directly visible. Here, only the output depending on the states is visible. The
main assumptions of HMM are similar to the Markov Chain model which are as
follows: (1) The probability of occurring a particular state depends only on the
previous state. (2) The transition between two consecutive states is independent of
time. (3) Hidden states are not visible, but each hidden state randomly generates
one of the defined observations or visible states. We use these properties of HMM
to detect different user activities from the captured network traffic in a smart home
environment. The probabilistic condition of HMM is shown in Equation 6.10, where
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Xt denotes the state at time t for a user activity in a smart home [SAU17].
P (Xt+1 = x|X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 ..., Xt = xt ) =
P (Xt+1 = x|Xt = xt ),

(6.10)

when, P (X1 = x1 , X2 = x2 ..., Xt = xt ) > 0
For each activity in the smart home environment, multiple feature arrays were created and these arrays maintain different, but specific sequences for different user
activities. For a specific time, t, the state of the smart home can be represented by
the data array ET where each element of this data array illustrates the conditions of
smart home devices’ and sensors’ as binary output (1 for active status of an entity
and 0 for inactive status). Thus, each state can be represented as an n-bit binary
number, where n is the total number of devices in the smart home. Let assume
the smart home environment is in state i at time t and changing to state j at time
t + 1. The transition probability from state i to state j can be noted as Pij . If the
smart home environment comprises of n number of devices and m = 2n states in
the system, the transition matrix

P
 11

 P21


P =
 ...


 ...

Pm1

of HMM is given as follows:

P12 P13 . . . . . . P1m


P22 P23 . . . . . . P2m 


... ... ... ... ... 



... ... ... ... ... 

Pm2 Pm3 . . . . . . Pmm

(6.11)

If the smart home environment has Xt number of states where t = 0, 1, . . . , T , the
elements of the transition matrix can be shown as follows [NPVB05]:

Pij =

Nij
,
Ni

(6.12)

where Nij denotes the number of transition from Xt to Xt+1 , where Xt is the state
at time t and Xt+1 is the state at time t + 1.
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To build the observation probability matrix, we consider different user activities
as hidden states of the smart home environment and correlates with the system’s
states build from the data arrays. Let assume the smart home environment has
k number hidden states (H) in the system. The observation probability matrix of
HMM is given as follows:

X (H ) X2 (H1 ) X3 (H1 )
 1 1

X1 (H2 ) X2 (X2 ) P3 (X2 )


B=
...
...
 ...


...
...
 ...

X1 (Hk ) X2 (Hk ) X3 (Hk )

. . . . . . Xm (H1 )
... ...
... ...
... ...
... ...





Xm (H2 )


... 



... 

Xm (Hk )

(6.13)

where Xm (Hk ) is the probability of observing Hk from state Xm . Xm (Hk ) can be
represented by Equation :
Xm (Hk ) = P (Hk |Xm ),

(6.14)

For our work, we want to detect the hidden state (user activity) from a given state
sequence. To calculate the probability of user activity, we use the Forward-Backward
(FB) algorithm to decode HMM. The FB algorithm can be expressed by the following
equations.

F orward recursion, Pm (t + 1) = BmHt+1

m
X

Pa (t)Pam

(6.15)

a=0

Backward recursion, Bi (t) =

k
X

Pij BjHt+1 Bj(t+1) ,

(6.16)

b=1

where, t= 0,1, ..., T-1. The probability of occurring a hidden state (user activity)
from the sequence of observable states (device states) can be calculated from the
following equation.
P (H1 , H2 , . . . , Hk ) =

K
X
l=1
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Pk (t)Bk (t).

(6.17)

Table 6.6: Typical activities of users in a smart home environment.
Task Category
Time-independent

Time-dependent

Task Name
1. Controlling device within smart home.
2. Controlling device from outside of the home.
3. Presence in a specific point at home.
4. Walking in the smart home.
5. Opening/ closing doors/windows.
6. Entering/ exiting from smart home

To train this HMM, we collected data from a smart home environment with
real smart devices. We consider common smart home devices to build our training
environment [dL17]. Our test smart home environment included Samsung SmartThings hub, Samsung multipurpose sensor, Samsung motion sensor, Netgear Arlo
security camera, Philips Hue smart light, Ecobee Smart Thermostat, and August
Smart Lock. We collected network traffic data from 10 different users for different
user activities.

Activity Types
User activities in a smart home environment can be instantaneous (e.g., switching
on a device) or sequential over time (e.g., walking from one place to another). We
categorized user activities in a smart home environment in two categories - timeindependent and time-dependent user activities.
• Time-independent Activities: These user activities are instantaneous, nonsequential activities which do not depend on time. For example, a user can
switch on/off a device in the smart home environment at a specific time instance. This activity will show changes in different features for only one time.
• Time-dependent Activities: These user activities are time-dependent, sequential activities. For example, a user can move from one point to another point.
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This activity will show changes in different features over time in a specific
sequence.
We tested our HMM model with data collected from six different user activities.
Our user activity model is explained below.
• User Activity- 1. A user is controlling a device from inside of the smart home
environment.
• User Activity- 2. A user is controlling a device from outside of the smart home
environment.
• User Activity- 3. A user is performing tasks from a specific point of a smart
home environment.
• User Activity- 4. A user is walking from one point to another inside the smart
home environment.
• User Activity- 5. A user is entering/ exiting from the smart home environment.
• User Activity- 6. A user is opening/ closing a window/ door in smart home
environment.

Results
To train our proposed HMM for user activity inference, we collected user activity
data for a week from 15 different people (total 30 datasets) in an emulated smart
home environment. We asked the users to perform their daily activities in a timely
manner (from morning to night) and performed the same activities in defined sequences in a real-life smart home setting. We considered single authorized smart
home user interacting with smart devices at a time for data collection. We trained
our HMM model with these data. We also collected data for this activity model to
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Table 6.7: User activity inference from network traffic data in a smart home environment.
Smart Home
User Activity
Activity-1
Activity-2
Activity-3
Activity-4
Activity-5
Activity-6

TPR

FNR

TNR

FPR

Accuracy

F-score

1
1
1
0.96
0.95
0.97

0
0
0
0.03
0.04
0.02

1
1
1
0.94
0.87
0.91

0
0
0
0.05
0.12
0.08

1
1
1
0.95
0.93
0.94

1
1
1
0.95
0.91
0.94

test our proposed method. We collected two datasets for each activity (12 in total)
to test the efficacy of the activity inference model.
In Table 6.7, the evaluation results of our activity inference model are shown.
For time-independent activities (Activity-1, Activity-2, and Activity-3), one can
infer with 100% accuracy and F-score from the captured network traffic data in a
smart home environment. On the contrary, accuracy and F-score decreases slightly
for time-dependent activities as these activities introduce FP and FN instances in
the activity inference model. For Activity-4, our proposed stage 4 activity inference
HMM can achieve both accuracy and F-score over 95%. The false positive rate
(FPR) and false negative rate (FNR) are over 5% and 3% respectively for Activity-4.
For Activity-4 and Activity-5, the accuracy of user activity inference decreases (93%
and 94% respectively) while FPR and FNR increases. The reason for the increment
of FPR and FNR is that different time-dependent user activities can have similar
patterns over time with small changes in specific time instances. This affects the
probability of occurring an activity calculated from HMM. In summary, an attacker
can infer time-independent activities more accurately (with 100% accuracy and Fscore) than the time-dependent activities (with over 95% accuracy and F-score).
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Finally, note that an accurate user activity inference means that all the stages
in the multi-stage attack have to be correctly guessed, which may lower the endto-end successful inference rate of the attacker. For example, if the stage 1, 2, 3,
and 4 are X, Y , Z, and T , respectively, for an attacker, the probability of correctly
guessing the Activity-4 of the user is X × Y × Z × T . However, we also note that
independently inferred information in every stage is also valuable as it may also
include sensitive information (e.g., inferring the device type of a connected medical
device may reveal the health status of the subject [Sø17]).

6.6

Mitigating the Privacy Leaks

Despite the security vulnerabilities exploited before, as these privacy concerns are
inherent and insidious, it is too hard to detect and avoid these types of threats
associated with smart home devices. An attacker can passively listen to the wireless
medium and record all the network traffic from a smart home environment without
interrupting the normal activities of devices and their users.

6.6.1

Straightforward Solutions

Using VPN or Tor-like Tools
The use of VPN will prevent an attacker from recording the victim’s outgoing traffic
after the gateway as it is going to be encrypted by the VPN provider. An ISP cannot
record the network traffic of the user anymore. On the other hand, Tor will make
the source and destination IPs impossible to determine for the ISP. Both methods
will protect the communication between the home AP and the server of the hub.
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However, they provide no protection against an attacker within range (e.g., outside,
near home) and sniffing the internal traffic.

Signal Attenuation
A signal attenuator can be used in theory to protect from an attacker sniffing the
internal network traffic of the smart home. This can be realized via a wired connection or using Faraday cages [SSW08]. Nonetheless, forcing all the devices to such a
modification in the hardware level and a Faraday cage could be too unrealistic and
very expensive to set up for the smart home users.

Traffic Shaping
The traffic shaping solutions have been widely studied in the literature of website classifiers. Padding to proper MTU, exponential padding, or random padding
are some of the countermeasures with the traffic shaping methods. Indeed, not only
padding, but also constant or random delays can be applied to the packets transmitted to protect from inference attacks. In all these solutions, the underlying protocol,
which needs to provide a real-time accurate values from the devices, is modified in
a way that unfortunately lowers the efficiency and accuracy of the devices.

6.6.2

Proposed Approach

In this sub-section, we introduce a solution based on generating spoofed traffic. In
this way, even if the user is not at home, generating false activity for the user’s
presence traffic will mask the user’s absence.
In order to measure the efficacy of our proposed spoofed traffic, we investigated
the injection of false packets by modifying the feature vectors and evaluated how
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the performance measurements would change. Then, we applied it to the device
state detection and device activity classification attacks. Since the user activity
inference is based on the results of the device state detection and device activity
classification attacks, if we can falsify their results, the attacker will not able to
infer the activities correctly. Particularly, we conducted a set of experiments where
we injected falsified data into the training set to observe how the previously shown
detection and classification algorithms would behave in such a situation. The results
are shown in Figure 6.5.
Impact of False Data Injection on Device State Detection. Figure 6.5a
shows the average of the accuracy measures for the kNN algorithm after increasingly
injecting false packets. When there is no injected false packet, all of the devices
have 91% F1 score, then it linearly decreases with the increase of false packets. For
example, injecting false data equivalent to 10% of packets exchanged during the
observation time resulted in a decrease by 13%. For 90% false traffic addition, the
accuracy of device state detection declined by about 57%. This shows that traffic
injection can be efficiently used for hiding the state of devices from the adversary.
Impact of False Data Injection on Device State Classification. We injected
the falsified data into the training data and computed the accuracy metrics in terms
of F1 Score, Precision, and Recall. We injected 10% falsified data and continued
injecting until 90% of the dataset contained false data. As can be seen in Figure 6.5b,
the F1 Score plunges dramatically when injecting 90% false data and reaches 15%.
This is due to the fact that randomly falsified features deteriorate traffic patterns
used for classifying the devices’ states. Also here, we can see that by injecting
increasing amounts of fabricated traffic, the adversary can effectively be prevented
from making inferences about the types of device events occurring.
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Figure 6.5: Impact of false data injection experiments on the attack accuracy. Its
impact on device state detection and device state classification attacks are shown in
a) and b), respectively.
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Internet Service
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Figure 6.6: Remote adversary model (e.g., a malicious ISP).

6.7

Discussion

ISP as an adversary: Note that so far, our adversary model included only local
adversary, where the adversary is within the range of radio frequency. An extension to this adversary model can be a remote adversary that can monitor outgoing
network traffic of the smart home. A concrete example of such an adversary is an
ISP. Compared to the local adversary model considered in this work, an ISP-like
adversary has both advantages and disadvantages. It does not have to be within
a range and it can see the source and destination IPs of the packets, which a local adversary can not see if the WPA encryption is enabled. However, it can only
collect the outgoing network traffic, not the internal two-way (upstream and downstream) network traffic as all the traffic is merged by the gateway (i.e., access point).
Figure 6.6 shows the complete topology of the network from device to cloud.
As can be seen in Figure 6.6, an ISP will only see the router’s (i.e., gateway/access
point) MAC address. Therefore, it can not use the MAC addresses of the smart home
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devices for the device identification. However, it can still try to use IPs in order to
identify the devices and infer activities. Though there are number of challenges that
attacker needs to solve in order to able use IP as a device identifier. First of all, if
Network Address Translation (NAT) is deployed by the AP1 , the ISP can not find
out the topology of the smart home and the number of devices. Even though NAT
is not enabled, ZigBee and BLE devices have never been assigned an IP as they
communicate with the AP through a hub, where only the hub they are connected
to gets an IP. Moreover, devices do not communicate with only one server. Instead,
sometimes multiple devices use one server (i.e., destination IP) as in the Samsung
ST Hub, or sometimes one device can use multiple servers [CLBR16, ARS+ 17].
Therefore, even though the ISP-like attacker has some advantages (i.e., seeing IPs)
over the local adversary, there are several additional challenges that it needs to solve
to get the same attack working. We leave this kind of adversary out of scope for
now and will be studied in a future work.
Multi-user vs. single user: Smart home devices support multiple authorized
users. In a multi-user smart home scenario, more than one user can control and
change the settings of smart devices. Additionally, different users can perform different activities within the smart environment at a time. This can create some
false positive and false negative cases in user activity inference using our proposed
method. Nonetheless, an attacker can still infer the device type and devices states
from the network traffic. Additionally, the attacker can also infer the presence of
multiple users and the specific point of ongoing activities in multi-user smart home
environment using the network traffic. Compared to a multi-user scenario, a single
user smart home environment is more vulnerable to our proposed threat as it is
easier to infer a single on-going user activity in the smart home.
1 Assuming

IPv4 is still in use.
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Local vs. remote control: To improve the user control over smart devices and
increase convenience, smart homes offer remote access control in addition to traditional local access. Our proposed threat model can guess both local and remote
access from location feature of the captured network traffic. This is a serious threat
to user privacy as attackers can detect when a user is changing the state of a specific
device remotely and perform malicious activities. For example, an attacker can infer
when a user is accessing the smart lock remotely, which may result in physical access
to the home environment.
Smart device diversity: Smart devices have no common network protocols. Indeed, some of them such as WiFi, ZigBee, and BLE are more popular than others.
This makes it harder to sniff all the devices that the smart home user is using. In
addition to the diversity of network protocols, smart home devices come with different computational resources, hardware types, capabilities, exchanged data format
etc. All of these differences in smart devices make it very challenging to build a
generic solution as well as an attack. However, with our automated multi-stage
privacy-attack, we showed the feasibility of the attack with the most popular network protocols, which covers the most of the commercial devices.
Limitations of defense: As our results show, injecting false data to the communication clearly decreases the accuracy of the attacks. However, even though it is
an effective method and it has the advantage of not affecting the efficiency of real
traffic on the devices, but it requires an extension to the protocols to put a flag
on the fake activities, which will be known by both devices and server. Here, we
propose two different ways to implement this solution with trade-offs on the power
consumption and security.
1. Only on the Hub: This countermeasure can be implemented only on the smart
hub devices and does not require relatively-constrained smart home devices to
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be part of the countermeasure. Even though this type of solution is effective
and better for battery-powered devices, it can be discovered by the attacker;
after a while, an attacker can use the network traffic from the device(s) to hub
only, but the attacker’s success and accuracy will decrease in that case. ’
2. On the Hub and Device: This countermeasure requires to modify the communication protocol both on the smart home device and the hub. This will
generate a more realistic interaction between the device and the hub, but this
may cause slightly more power consumption (depending on the size of the extra field for the flag) in the device and requires a modification on the devices
to send the false data.
Depending on the devices, where the solution to be implemented on, the required
modification in the current system and the implementer can change. For example,
if our solution is preferred to be implemented only on the hub, then it can be
implemented by the manufacturer of the hub only. However, if it is going to be
implemented on the devices and the hub together, it requires either the collaboration
of both sides or a protocol-level modification.
Generalizability of the attack: As we noted in the assumptions, the attacker we
considered in this work does not need exactly the same devices to train its attack
model, but it needs exact brand and device type to get the results presented in this
work as we use the < brand, device − type > pair to uniquely identify devices. In
other words, we assume at the end of the device identification stage of our attack, the
attacker knows < brand, device − type > pair. However, this assumption weakens
the attack model. An attacker who can infer the device type and does not need the
same device with the same brand would be more realistic. In order to remove this
assumption, the same device type with different brands should be used to train the
models and to attack (i.e., testing). It would be interesting to train and test the
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attack models on the same device type with different brands, or the same brand
with different device types. Moreover, it would be also interesting to test the affects
of model numbers, device configurations, or firmware updates etc.

6.8

Conclusion

In this chapter, we explored how encrypted traffic from a smart home environment can be used to infer sensitive information about smart devices and sensors.
Specifically, we introduced a novel multi-stage privacy attack, which an attacker can
exploit to automatically detect and identify particular types of devices, their actions,
states, and related user activities by passively monitoring the traffic of smart home
devices and sensors. Our evaluation on an extensive list of off-the-shelf smart home
devices, sensors, and real users showed that an attacker can achieve very high accuracy (above %90) in all the attack types. As opposed to to earlier straightforward
activity identification approaches, the novel multi-stage privacy attack can perform
detection and identification automatically, is device-type and protocol-agnostic, and
does not require extensive background knowledge or specifications of analyzed protocols. Finally, we proposed a new yet effective mitigation mechanism to hide the
real activities of the users. The effectiveness of the multi-stage privacy attack raises
serious privacy concerns for any smart environment equipped with smart devices and
sensors including personal homes, residences, hotel rooms, offices of corporations or
government agencies.
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CHAPTER 7
HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
In the next two chapters, in order to provide user privacy, we use homomorphic
encryption (HE). In this section, we first give an overview of HE schemes in the
literature.

7.1

Introduction

In ancient Greeks, the term ”ὁμός” (homos) was used in the meaning of ”same”
while ”μορφή” (morphe) was used for ”shape” [LS96]. Then, the term homomorphism is coined and used in different areas. In abstract algebra, homomorphism is
defined as a map preserving all the algebraic structures between the domain and
range of an algebraic set. The map is simply a function, i.e., an operation, which
takes the inputs from the set of domain and outputs an element in the range, (e.g.,
addition, multiplication). In the cryptography field, the homomorphism is used as
an encryption type. The Homomorphic Encryption (HE) is a kind of encryption
scheme which allows a third party (e.g., cloud, service provider) to perform certain
computable functions on the encrypted data while preserving the features of the
function and format of the encrypted data. Indeed, this homomorphic encryption
corresponds to a mapping in the abstract algebra. As an example for an additively
HE scheme, for sample messages m1 and m2 , one can obtain E(m1 + m2 ) by using E(m1 ) and E(m2 ) without knowing m1 and m2 explicitly, where E denotes the
encryption function.
Normally, encryption is a crucial mechanism to preserve the privacy of any sensitive information. However, the conventional encryption schemes can not work on
the encrypted data without decrypting it first. In other words, the users have to
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sacrifice their privacy to make use of cloud services such as file storing, sharing and
collaboration. Moreover, untrusted servers, providers, popular cloud operators can
keep physically identifying elements of users long after users end the relationship
with the services [McM13]. This is a major privacy concern for users. In fact, it
would be perfect if there existed a scheme which would not restrict the operations
to be computed on the encrypted data while it would be still encrypted. From a
historical perspective in cryptology, the term homomorphism is used for the first
time by Rivest, Adleman, and Dertouzous [RAD78] in 1978 as a possible solution
to the computing without decrypting problem. This given basis in [RAD78] has led
to numerous attempts by researchers around the world to design such a homomorphic scheme with a large set of operations. In this work, the primary motivation is
to survey the HE schemes focusing on the most recent improvements in this field,
including partially, somewhat, and fully HE schemes.
A simple motivational HE example for a sample cloud application is illustrated
in Figure 7.1. In this scenario, the client, C, first encrypts her private data (Step
1), then sends the encrypted data to the cloud servers, S, (Step 2). When the client
wants to perform a function (i.e., query), f (), over her own data, she sends the
function to the server (Step 3). The server performs a homomorphic operation over
the encrypted data using the Eval function, i.e., computes f () blindfolded (Step 4)
and returns the encrypted result to the client (Step 5). Finally, the client recovers
the data with her own secret key and obtains f (m) (Step 6). As seen in this simple
example, the homomorphic operation, Eval(), at the server side does not require
the private key of the client and allows various operations such as addition and
multiplication on the encrypted client data.
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An early attempt to compute functions/operations on encrypted data is Yao’s
garbled circuit 1 study [Yao82]. Yao proposed two party communication protocol
as a solution to the Millionaires’ problem, which compares the wealth of two rich
people without revealing the exact amount to each other. However, in Yao’s garbled
circuit solution, ciphertext size grows at least linearly with the computation of every
gate in the circuit. This yields a very poor efficiency in terms of computational
overhead and too much complexity in its communication protocol. Until Gentry’s
breakthrough in [Gen09], all the attempts [RSA78, GM82, ElG85, Ben94, NS98,
OU98, Pai99a, DJ01, KTX07, Yao82, BGN05, SYY99, IP07] have allowed either one
type of operation or limited number of operations on the encrypted data. Moreover,
some of the attempts are even limited over a specific type of set (e.g., branching
programs). In fact, all these different HE attempts can neatly be categorized under
three types of schemes with respect to the number of allowed operations on the
encrypted data as follows: (1) Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) allows
only one type of operation with an unlimited number of times (i.e., no bound on
the number of usages). (2) Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SWHE) allows
some types of operations with a limited number of times. (3) Fully Homomorphic
Encryption (FHE) allows an unlimited number of operations with unlimited number
of times.
PHE schemes are deployed in some applications like e-voting [Ben87] or Private
Information Retrieval (PIR) [KO97]. However, these applications were restricted
in terms of the types of homomorphic evaluation operations. In other words, PHE
schemes can only be used for particular applications, whose algorithms include only
addition or multiplication operation. On the other hand, the SWHE schemes sup1A

circuit is the set of connected gates (e.g., AND and XOR gates in boolean circuits),
where the evaluation is completed by calculating the output of each gate in turn.
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C: m, Enc, Dec, f ()
1 C encrypts his
message m, Enc(m)
6 C computes
Dec(Enc(f (m))) =
f (m), and recovers f (m)

S: Eval

2 C sends Enc(m) to store
3 C queries, f ()

5 S returns Enc(f (m))

4 S evalutes f ()
homomorphically

Figure 7.1: A simple client-server HE scenario, where C is Client and S is Server
port both addition and multiplication. Nonetheless, in SWHE schemes that are
proposed before the first FHE scheme, the size of the ciphertexts grows with each
homomorphic operation and hence the maximum number of allowed homomorphic
operations is limited. These issues put a limit on the use of PHE and SWHE schemes
in real-life applications. Eventually, the increasing popularity of cloud-based services
accelerated the design of HE schemes which can support an arbitrary number of homomorphic operations with random functions, i.e. FHE. Gentry’s FHE scheme is
the first plausible and achievable FHE scheme [Gen09]. It is based on ideal-lattices
in math and it is not only a description of the scheme, but also a powerful framework
for achieving FHE. However, it is conceptually and practically not a realistic scheme.
Especially, the bootstrapping part, which is the intermediate refreshing procedure of
a processed ciphertext, is too costly in terms of computation. Therefore, a lot of
follow-up improvements and new schemes were proposed in the following years.

7.2

Homomorphic Encryption Schemes

In this section, we explain the basics of HE theory. Then, we present notable PHE,
SWHE and FHE schemes. For each scheme, we also give a brief description of the
scheme.
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Definition 1. An encryption scheme is called homomorphic over an operation ’?’
if it supports the following equation:
E(m1 ) ? E(m2 ) = E(m1 ? m2 ), ∀m1 , m2 ∈ M,

(7.1)

where E is the encryption algorithm and M is the set of all possible messages.
In order to create an encryption scheme allowing the homomorphic evaluation of
arbitrary function, it is sufficient to allow only addition and multiplication operations
because addition and multiplication are functionally complete sets over finite sets.
Particularly, any boolean circuit can be represented using only XOR (addition)
and AND (multiplication) gates. While an HE scheme can use the same key for
both encryption and decryption (symmetric), it can also be designed to use the
different keys to encrypt and decrypt (asymmetric). A generic method to transform
symmetric and asymmetric HE schemes to each other is demonstrated in [Rot11].
An HE scheme is primarily characterized by four operations: KeyGen, Enc,
Dec, and Eval. KeyGen is the operation, which generates a secret and public key
pair for the asymmetric version of HE or a single key for the symmetric version.
Actually, KeyGen, Enc and Dec are not different from their classical tasks in conventional encryption schemes. However, Eval is an HE-specific operation, which
takes ciphertexts as input and outputs a ciphertext corresponding to a functioned
plaintext. Eval performs the function f () over the ciphertexts (c1 , c2 ) without seeing the messages (m1 , m2 ). Eval takes ciphertexts as input and outputs evaluated
ciphertexts. The most crucial point in this homomorphic encryption is that the format of the ciphertexts after an evaluation process must be preserved in order to be
decrypted correctly. In addition, the size of the ciphertext should also be constant to
support unlimited number of operations. Otherwise, the increase in the ciphertext
size will require more resources and this will limit the number of operations.
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Of all HE schemes in the literature, PHE schemes support Eval function for only
either addition or multiplication, SWHE schemes support for only limited number
of operations or some limited circuits (e.g., branching programs) while FHE schemes
supports the evaluation of arbitrary functions (e.g., searching, sorting, max, min,
etc.) with unlimited number of times over ciphertexts. The well-known PHE,
SWHE, and FHE schemes are summarized in the timeline in Figure 7.2 and are
explained in the following sections with a greater detail. The interest in the area of
HE significantly increased after the work of Gentry [Gen09] in 2009. Therefore, we
articulate the HE schemes, FHE anymore, after Gentry’s work in a greater detail
and we also discuss their implementations and recent techniques to make it faster
in Section 7.3. Here, we start with the PHE schemes, which are the first stepping
stones for FHE schemes.

7.2.1

Partially Homomorphic Encryption Schemes

There are several useful PHE examples [RSA78, GM82, ElG85, Ben94, NS98, OU98,
Pai99a, DJ01, KTX07] in the literature. Each has improved the PHE in some way.
However, in this section, we primarily focus on major PHE schemes that are the
basis for many other PHE schemes.

RSA
RSA is an early example of PHE and introduced by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [RSA78] shortly after the invention of public key cryptography by Diffie Helman [DH76]. RSA is the first feasible achievement of the public key cryptosystem.
Moreover, the homomorphic property of RSA was shown by Rivest, Adleman, and
Dertouzous [RAD78] just after the seminal work of RSA. Indeed, the first attested
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use of the term ”privacy homomorphism” is introduced in [RAD78]. The security of
the RSA cryptosystem is based on the hardness of factoring problem of the product
of two large prime numbers [Mon94]2 RSA is defined as follows:
• KeyGen Algorithm: First, for large primes p and q, n = pq and φ = (p−1)(q −
1) are computed. Then, e is chosen such that gcd(e, φ) and d is calculated by
computing the multiplicative inverse of e (i.e, ed ≡ 1 mod φ). Finally, (e, n)
is released as the public key pair while (d, n) is kept as the secret key pair.
• Encryption Algorithm: First, the message is converted into a plaintext m such
that 0 ≤ m < n, then the RSA encryption algorithm is as follows:
c = E(m) = me

(mod n),

∀m ∈ M,

(7.2)

where c is the ciphertext.
• Decryption Algorithm: The message m can be recovered from the ciphertext
c using the secret key pair (d, n) as follows:
m = D(c) = cd

(mod n)

(7.3)

• Homomorphic Property: For m1 , m2 ∈ M ,
E(m1 )∗E(m2 ) = (me1

(mod n))∗(me2

(mod n)) = (m1 ∗m2 )e

(mod n) = E(m1 ∗m2 ).
(7.4)

The homomorphic property of RSA shows that E(m1 ∗ m2 ) can be directly
evaluated by using E(m1 ) and E(m2 ) without decrypting them. In other words, RSA
2 Here,

we do not mean that RSA is secure. We mean the most basic attack on RSA
(e.g., key recovering attack) has to solve the problem of factoring of two large primes.
For example, plain RSA is not secure against Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA) as its
encryption algorithm is deterministic. We use the same idea for the rest of the paper as
well. Because of the limited space, we do not discuss the details of the security of each
encryption scheme.
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The Invention of Public Key Encryption
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Figure 7.2: Timeline of HE schemes until Gentry’s first FHE scheme
is only homomorphic over multiplication. Hence, it does not allow the homomorphic
addition of ciphertexts.

Goldwasser-Micali
GM proposed the first probabilistic public key encryption scheme proposed in [GM82].
The GM cryptosystem is based on the hardness of quadratic residuosity problem [Pai99b].
Number a is called quadratic residue modulo n if there exists an integer x such that
x2 ≡ a (mod n). Quadratic residuosity problem decides whether a given number q
is quadratic modulo n or not. GM cryptosystem is described as follows:
• KeyGen Algorithm: Similar to RSA, n = pq is computed where p and q are
distinct large primes and then, x is chosen as one of the quadratic nonresidue
modulo n values with ( nx ) = 1. Finally, (x, n) is published as the public key
while (p, q) is kept as the secret key.
• Encryption Algorithm: Firstly, the message (m) is converted into a string of
bits. Then, for every bit of the message mi , a quadratic nonresidue value yi is
produced such that gcd(yi , n) = 1. Then, each bit is encrypted to ci as follows:
ci = E(mi ) = yi2 xmi

(mod n),
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∀mi = {0, 1},

(7.5)

where m = m0 m1 ...mr , c = c0 c1 ...cr and r is the block size used for the message
space and x is picked from Zn ∗ at random for every encryption, where Zn ∗ is the
multiplicative subgroup of integers modulo n which includes all the numbers
smaller than r and relatively prime to r.
• Decryption Algorithm: Since x is picked from the set Zn ∗ (1 < x ≤ n − 1), x is
quadratic residue modulo n for only mi = 0. Hence, to decrypt the ciphertext
ci , one decides whether ci is a quadratic residue modulo n or not; if so, mi
returns 0, else mi returns 1.
• Homomorphic Property: For each bit mi ∈ {0, 1},
E(m1 ) ∗ E(m2 ) = (y12 xm1

(mod n)) ∗ (y22 xm2
2 m1 +m2

= (y1 ∗ y2 ) x

(mod n))
(7.6)

(mod n) = E(m1 + m2 ).

The homomorphic property of the GM cryptosystem shows that encryption of
the sum E(m1 ⊕ m2 ) can be directly calculated from the separately encrypted bits,
E(m1 ) and E(m2 ). Since the message and ciphertext are the elements of the set
{0, 1}, the operation is the same with exclusive-OR (XOR)3 Hence, GM is homomorphic over only addition for binary numbers.

El-Gamal
In 1985, Taher Elgamal proposed a new public key encryption scheme [ElG85]
which is the improved version of the original Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange [DH76]
algorithm, which is based on the hardness of certain problems in discrete logarithm [Kev90]. It is mostly used in hybrid encryption systems to encrypt the secret
key of a symmetric encryption system. The El-Gamal cryptosystem is defined as
follows:
3 XOR

can be thought as binary addition.
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• KeyGen Algorithm: A cyclic group G with order n using generator g is produced. In a cyclic group, it is possible to generate all the elements of the
group using the powers of one of its own element. Then, h = g y computed for
randomly chosen y ∈ Zn ∗ . Finally, the public key is (G, n, g, h) and x is the
secret key of the scheme.
• Encryption Algorithm: The message m is encrypted using g and x, where x is
randomly chosen from the set {1, 2, ..., n − 1} and the output of the encryption
algorithm is a ciphertext pair (c = (c1 , c2 )):
c = E(m) = (g x , mhx ) = (g x , mg xy ) = (c1 , c2 ),

(7.7)

• Decryption Algorithm: To decrypt the ciphertext c, first, s = c1 y is computed
where y is the secret key. Then, decryption algorithm works as follows:
c2 · s−1 = mg xy · g −xy = m.

(7.8)

• Homomorphic Property:
E(m1 ) ∗ E(m2 ) = (g x1 , m1 hx1 ) ∗ (g x2 , m2 hx2 ) = (g x1 +x2 , m1 ∗ m2 hx1 +x2 ) = E(m1 ∗ m2 ).
(7.9)
As seen from this derivation, the El-Gamal cryptosystem is multiplicatively homomorphic. It does not support addition operation over ciphertexts.
Benaloh
Benaloh proposed an extension of the GM Cryptosystem by improving it to encrypt
the message as a block instead of bit by bit [Ben94]. Benaloh’s proposal was based
on the higher residuosity problem. Higher residuosity problem (xn ) [Pai99b] is
the generalization of quadratic residuosity problems (x2 ) that is used for the GM
cryptosystem.
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• KeyGen Algorithm: Block size r and large primes p and q are chosen such
that r divides p − 1 and r is relatively prime to (p − 1)/r and q − 1 (i.e.,
gcd(r, (p − 1)/r) = 1 and gcd(r, (q − 1)) = 1). Then, n = pq and φ =
(p − 1)(q − 1) are computed. Lastly, y ∈ Zn ∗ is chosen such that y φ 6≡ 1
mod n, where Zn ∗ is the multiplicative subgroup of integers modulo n which
includes all the numbers smaller than r and relatively prime to r. Finally,
(y, n) is published as the public key, and (p, q) is kept as the secret key.
• Encryption Algorithm: For the message m ∈ Zr , where Zr = {0, 1, ..., r − 1},
choose a random u such that u ∈ Zn ∗ . Then, to encrypt the message m:
c = E(m) = y m ur

(mod n),

(7.10)

where the public key is the modulus n and base y with the block size of r.
• Decryption Algorithm: The message m is recovered by an exhaustive search
for i ∈ Zr such that
(y −i c)φ/r ≡ 1,

(7.11)

where the message m is returned as the value of i, i.e., m = i.
• Homomorphic Property:
E(m1 ) ∗ E(m2 ) = (y m1 u1 r

(mod n)) ∗ (y m2 u2 r

= y m1 +m2 (u1 ∗ u2 )r

(mod n))

(mod n) = E(m1 + m2

(mod n)).
(7.12)

Homomorphic property of Benaloh shows that any multiplication operation on
encrypted data corresponds to the addition on plaintext. As the encryption of the
addition of the messages can directly be calculated from encrypted messages E(m1 )
and E(m2 ), the Benaloh cryptosystem is additively homomorphic.
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Paillier
In 1999, Paillier [Pai99a] introduced another novel probabilistic encryption scheme
based on composite residuosity problem [Jag12]. Composite residuosity problem is
very similar to quadratic and higher residuosity problems that are used in GM and
Benaloh cryptosystems. It questions whether there exists an integer x such that
xn ≡ a (mod n2 ) for a given integer a.
• KeyGen Algorithm: For large primes p and q such that gcd(pq, (p−1)(q−1)) =
1, compute n = pq and λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). Then, select a random integer
g ∈ Z∗ n2 by checking whether gcd(n, L(g λ

mod n2

)) = 1, where the function L

is defined as L(u) = (u − 1)/n for every u from the subgroup Zn∗2 which is a
multiplicative subgroup of integers modulo n2 instead of n like in the Benaloh
cryptosystem. Finally, the public key is (n, g) and the secret key is (p, q) pair.
• Encryption Algorithm:
For each message m, the number r is randomly chosen and the encryption
works as follows:
c = E(m) = g m rn

(mod n2 ),

(7.13)

• Decryption Algorithm: For a proper ciphertext c < n2 , the decryption is done
by:
D(c) =

L(cλ (mod n2 ))
L(g λ (mod n2 ))

mod n = m,

(7.14)

where private key pair is (p, q).
• Homomorphic Property:
E(m1 ) ∗ E(m2 ) = (g m1 r1 n

(mod n2 ))

∗ (g m2 r2 n

(mod n2 ))
(7.15)

= g m1 +m2 (r1 ∗ r2 )n

193

(mod n2 ) = E(m1 + m2 ).

This derivation shows that Pailliler’s encryption scheme is homomorphic over
addition. In addition to homomorphism over the addition operation, Pailliler’s
encryption scheme has some additional homomorphic properties, which allow extra basic operations on plaintexts m1 , m2 ∈ Zn∗2 by using the encrypted plaintexts
E(m1 ), E(m2 ) and public key pair (n, g):
E(m1 ) ∗ E(m2 )
E(m1 ) ∗ g m2

E(m1 )m2

(mod n2 ) = E(m1 + m2
(mod n2 ) = E(m1 + m2

(mod n2 ) = E(m1 m2

(mod n)),
(mod n)),

(mod n)).

(7.16)
(7.17)

(7.18)

These additional homomorphic properties describe different cross-relation between various operations on the encrypted data and the plaintexts. In other words,
Equations (7.16), (7.17), and (7.18) show how the operations computed on encrypted
data affects the plaintexts.
Others
Moreover, Okamoto-Uchiyama (OU) [OU98] proposed a new PHE scheme to improve the computational performance by changing the set, where the encryptions of
previous HE schemes work. The domain of the scheme is the same as the previous
public key encryption schemes, Zn∗ , however, Okamoto-Uchiyama sets n = p2 q for
large primes p and q. Furthermore, Naccache-Stern (NS) [NS98] presented another
PHE scheme as a generalization of Benaloh cryptosystem to increase its computational efficiency. The proposed work changed only the decryption algorithm of the
scheme. Likewise, Damgard-Jurik (DJ) [DJ01] introduced another PHE scheme as
a generalization of Paillier. These three cryptosystems preserve the homomorphic
property while improving the original homomorphic schemes.
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Table 7.1: Homomorphic properties of well-known PHE schemes

Homomorphic Operation

Scheme
RSA [RSA78]
GM [GM82]
El-Gamal [ElG85]4
Benaloh [Ben94]
NS [NS98]
OU [OU98]
Paillier [Pai99a]
DJ [DJ01]
KTX [KTX07]
Galbraith [Gal02]

Add

Mult
3

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

Similarly, Kawachi (KTX) et al. [KTX07] suggested an additively homomorphic
encryption scheme over a large cyclic group, which is based on the hardness of underlying lattice problems. They named the homomorphic property of their proposed
scheme as pseudohomomorphic. Pseudohomomorphism is an algebraic property and
still allows homomorphic operations on ciphertext, however, the decryption of the
homomorphically operated ciphertext works with a small decryption error. Finally,
Galbraith [Gal02] introduced a more natural generalization of Paillier’s cryptosystem applying it on elliptic curves while still preserving the homomorphic property of
the Paillier’s cryptosystem. Homomorphic properties of well-known PHE schemes
are briefly summarized in Table 7.1.
4 The

method to convert El-Gamal into an additively homomorphic encryption scheme
is shown in [CGS97]. However, it is still PHE as it still supports only addition operation,
not both at the same time.
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7.2.2

Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Schemes

There are useful SWHE examples [Yao82, SYY99, BGN05, IP07] in the literature
before 2009. After the first plausible FHE published in 2009 [Gen09], some SWHE
versions of FHE schemes were also proposed because of the performance issues
associated with FHE schemes. We cover these SWHE schemes under the FHE
section. In this section, we primarily focus on major SWHE schemes, which were
used as a stepping stone to the first plausible FHE scheme.

BGN
Before 2005, all proposed cryptosystems’ homomorphism properties were restricted
to only either addition or multiplication operation i.e., SWHE schemes. One of
the most significant steps toward an FHE scheme was introduced by Boneh-GohNissim (BGN) in [BGN05]. BGN evaluates 2-DNF5 formulas on ciphertext and it
supports an arbitrary number of additions and one multiplication by keeping the
ciphertext size constant. The hardness of the scheme is based on the subgroup
decision problem [Gjø04]. Subgroup decision problem simply decides whether an
element is a member of a subgroup Gp of group G of composite order n = pq, where
p and q are distinct primes.
• KeyGen Algorithm: The public key is released as (n, G, G1 , e, g, h). In the
public key, e is a bilinear map such that e : G × G → G1 , where G, G1 are
groups of order n = q1 q2 . g and u are the generators of G and set h = uq2 and
h is the generator of G with order q1 , which is kept hidden as the secret key.
• Encryption Algorithm: To encrypt a message m, a random number r from the
set {0, 1, ..., n − 1} is picked and encrypted using the precomputed g and h as
5 Disjunctive

Normal Form with at most 2 literals in each clause.
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follows:
c = E(m) = g m hr

mod n

(7.19)

• Decryption Algorithm: To decrypt the ciphertext c, one firstly computes c0 =
cq1 = (g m hr )q1 = (g q1 )m (Note that hq1 ≡ 1 mod n) and g 0 = g q1 using the
secret key q1 and decryption is completed as follows:
m = D(c) = logg0 c0

(7.20)

In order to decrypt efficiently, the message space should be kept small because
of the fact that discrete logarithm can not be computed quickly.
• Homomorphism over Addition: Homomorphic addition of plaintexts m1 and
m2 using ciphertexts E(m1 ) = c1 and E(m2 ) = c2 are performed as follows:
0

c = c1 c2 hr = (g m1 hr1 )(g m2 hr2 )hr = g m1 +m2 hr ,

(7.21)

where r = r1 + r2 + r and it can be seen that m1 + m2 can be easily recovered
from the resulting ciphertext c.
• Homomorphism over Multiplication: To perform homomorphic multiplication,
use g1 with order n and h1 with order q1 and set g1 = e(g, g), h1 = e(g, h),
and h = g αq2 . Then, the homomorphic multiplication of messages m1 and m2
using the ciphertexts c1 = E(m1 ) and c2 = E(m2 ) are computed as follows:
c = e(c1 , c2 )h1 r = e(g m1 hr1 , g m2 hr2 )h1 r
(7.22)
= g1 m1 m2 h1 m1 r2 +r2 m1 +αq2 r1 r2 +r = g1 m1 m2 h1 r

0

It is seen that r0 is uniformly distributed like r and so m1 m2 can be correctly
recovered from resulting ciphertext c. However, c is now in the group G1 instead
of G. Therefore, another homomorphic multiplication operation is not allowed in

197

Table 7.2: Comparison of some well-known SWHE schemes before Gentry’s work
Yao [Yao82]
SYY [SYY99]
BGN [BGN05]
IP [IP07]

Evaluation Size
arbitrary
polly-many AND & one OR/NOT
unlimited add & 1 mult
arbitrary

Evaluation Circuit
garbled circuit
N C 1 circuit
2-DNF formulas
branching programs

Ciphertext Size
grows at least linearly
grows exponentially
constant
doesn’t depend on the size of function

G1 because there is no pairing from the set G1 . However, resulting ciphertext in
G1 still allows an unlimited number of homomorphic additions. Moreover, Boneh et
al. also showed the evaluation of 2-DNF formulas using the basic 2-DNF protocol.
Their protocol gives a quadratic improvement in terms of the protocol complexity
over Yao’s well-known garbled circuit protocol in [Yao82].

Others
In the literature of HE schemes, one of the first SWHE schemes is Polly Cracker
scheme [FK94]. It allows both multiplication and addition operation over the ciphertexts. However, the size of the ciphertext grows exponentially with the homomorphic
operation, especially multiplication operation is extremely expensive. Later more
efficient variants [LdVP04, VL06] are proposed, but almost all of them are later
shown vulnerable to attacks [Ste10, LdVMPT09]. Therefore, they are either insecure or impractical [Le03]. Recently, [AFFP11] introduced a Polly Cracker with
Noise cryptosystem, where the homomorphic addition operations do not increase
the ciphertext size while the multiplications square it.
Another idea of evaluating operations on encrypted data is realized over different sets. Sander, Young, and Yung (SYY) described first SWHE scheme over
a semi-group, N C 1 ,6 [SYY99], which requires less properties than a group. N C 1
is a complexity class which includes the circuits with poly-logarithmic depth and
polynomial size. The proposed scheme supported polynomially many ANDing of
6 NC

stands for ”Nick’s Class” for the honor of Nick Pippenger
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ciphertexts with one OR/NOT gate. However, the ciphertext size increased by a
constant multiplication with each OR/NOT gate evaluation. This increase limits
the evaluation of circuit depth. Yuval Ishai and Anat Paskin (IP) expanded the
set to branching programs (aka Binary Decision Diagrams), which are the directed
acyclic graphs where every node have two outgoing edges with labeled binary 0
and 1 [IP07]. In other words, they proposed a public key encryption scheme by
evaluating the branching programs on the encrypted data. Moreover, Melchor et
al. [MGH10] proposed a generic construction method to obtain a chained encryption scheme allowing the homomorphic evaluation of constant depth circuit over
ciphertext. The chained encryption scheme is obtained from well-known encryption
schemes with some homomorphic properties. For example, they showed how to obtain a combination of BGN [BGN05] and Kawachi et al. [KTX07]. As mentioned
before, BGN allows an arbitrary number of additions and one multiplication while
Kawachi’s scheme is only additively homomorphic. Hence, the resulting combined
scheme allows arbitrary additions and two multiplications. They also showed how
this procedure is applied to the scheme in [MCG08] allowing a predefined number
of homomorphic additions, to obtain a scheme which allows an arbitrary number
of multiplications as well. However, in multiplication, ciphertext size grows exponentially while it is constant in a homomorphic addition. The summary of some
well-known SWHE schemes is given in Table 7.2. As shown in Table 7.2, while in
Yao, SYY, and IP cryptosystems, the size of the ciphertext grows with each homomorphic operation, in BGN it stays constant. This property of BGN is a significant
improvement to obtain an FHE scheme. Accordingly, Gentry, Halevi, and Vaikuntanathan later simplified the BGN cryptosystem [GHV10]. In their version, the
underlying security assumption is changed to hardness of the LWE problem. The
BGN cryptosystem chooses input from a small set to decrypt correctly. In contrast,
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FHE

Ideal Lattice-based

Over Integers

(R)LWE-based

NTRU-like

[Gen09]

[VDGHV10]

[BV11]

[LATV12]

Figure 7.3: Main FHE families after Gentry’s breakthrough
a recent scheme introduced in [GHV10] have much larger message space. Moreover,
some of the attempts to obtain an FHE scheme based on SWHE schemes are reported as broken. For instance, vulnerabilities for [iF96, GP06, DF02] were reported
in [CBW07, Wag03, CKN06], respectively.

7.2.3

Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes

An encryption scheme is called Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme if
it allows an unlimited number of evaluation operations on the encrypted data and
resulting output is within the ciphertext space. After almost 30 years from the
introduction of privacy homomorphism concept [RAD78], Gentry presented the first
feasible proposal in his seminal PhD thesis to a long term open problem, which is
obtaining an FHE scheme [Gen09]. Gentry’s proposed scheme gives not only an
FHE scheme, but also a general framework to obtain an FHE scheme. Hence, a lot
of researchers have attempted to design a secure and practical FHE scheme after
Gentry’s work.
Although Gentry’s proposed ideal lattice-based FHE scheme [Gen09] is very
promising, it also had a lot of bottlenecks such as its computational cost in terms
of applicability in real life and some of its advanced mathematical concepts make it
complex and hard to implement. Therefore, many new schemes and optimization
have followed his work in order to address aforementioned bottlenecks. The security

200

of new approaches to obtain a new FHE scheme is mostly based on the hard problems
on lattices.
A lattice is the linear combinations of independent vectors (basis vectors), b1 , b2 , ..., bn .
A lattice L is formulated as follows:
L=

n
X

b~i ∗ vi

, vi ∈ Z,

(7.23)

i=1

where each vectors b1 , b2 , ..., bi is called a basis of the lattice L. The basis of a
lattice is not unique. There are infinitely many bases for a given lattice. A basis is
called ”good” if the basis vectors are almost orthogonal and, otherwise it is called
”bad” basis of the lattice [MR09]. Roughly, while good bases are typically long,
bad bases are relatively shorter. Indeed, the lattice theory is firstly presented by
Minkowski [Min68]. Then as a seminal work, Ajtai mentioned a class of random
worst-case lattice problem in [Ajt96]. Two well-known modern problems suggested
in [Ajt96] for lattice-based cryptosystems are Closest Vector Problem (CVP) and
Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) [Pei16]. A year after, Goldreich, Goldwasser, and
Halevi (GGH) [GGH97] proposed an important type of PKE scheme, whose hardness
is based on the lattice reduction problems [Pei16]. Lattice reduction tries to find a
good basis, which is relatively short and orthogonal, for a given lattice. In GGH
cryptosystem, the public key and the secret key is chosen from ”bad” and ”good”
basis of the lattice, respectively. The idea behind this choice is that CVP and SVP
problems can easily be solved in polynomial time for the lattices with the known
good bases. However, best known algorithms (for example LLL in [LLL82]) solve
these problems in exponential time without knowing the good bases of the lattice.
Hence, recovering the message from a given ciphertext is equal to solving the CVP
and SVP problems. In GGH cryptosystem, the message is embedded to the noise to
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obtain the ciphertext. In order to recover the message from ciphertext, the secret
key (good basis) is used to find the closest lattice point.
Before Gentry’s work, in [Reg06], cryptographers’ attention is drawn to latticebased cryptology and especially its great promising properties for post-quantum
cryptology. Its promising properties are listed as its security proofs, efficient implementations, and simplicity. Moreover, another lattice-related problem, which gains
popularity in last few years, especially after being used as a base to built an FHE
scheme is LWE [Zha14]. One of the most significant works for lattice-based cryptosystems was studied in [HPS98], which presented a new PKE scheme and whose
security is based on SVP on the lattice. In the SVP problem, given a basis of a
lattice, the goal is to find the shortest nonzero vector in the lattice.
After Gentry’s work, the lattices have become more popular among cryptography
researchers. First, some works like [SV10] focused on just improving Gentry’s ideal
lattice-based FHE scheme in [Gen09]. Then, an FHE scheme over integers based
on the Approximate-GCD problems is introduced [VDGHV10]. The main motivation behind the scheme is the conceptual simplicity. Afterwards, another FHE
scheme whose hardness based on Ring Learning with Error (RLWE) problems is
suggested [BV11]. The proposed scheme promises some efficiency features. Lastly,
an NTRU-like FHE is presented for its promising efficiency and standardization
properties [LATV12]. NTRUEncrypt is an old and strongly standardized latticebased encryption scheme whose homomorphic properties are realized recently. So,
these and similar attempts can be categorized into under four main FHE families as
shown in Figure 7.3: (1) Ideal lattice-based [Gen09], (2) Over integers [VDGHV10],
(3) (R)LWE-based [BV11], and (4) NTRU-like [LATV12]. In the following sections,
we will articulate these four main FHE families in greater detail. And, we will also
explore other follow-up works after these.
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Ideal Lattice-based FHE schemes
Gentry’s first FHE scheme in his PhD thesis [Gen09] is a GGH-type of encryption
scheme, where GGH is proposed originally by Goldreich et al. [GGH97]. However,
Gentry encrypted the message by embedding noise using double layer instead of one
layer idea in GGH cryptosystem. Indeed, Gentry started his breakthrough work
from SWHE scheme based on ideal lattices.
As mentioned earlier, an SWHE scheme can evaluate the ciphertext homomorphically for only a limited number of operations. After a certain threshold, the
decryption function fails to recover the message from the ciphertext correctly. The
amount of noise in the ciphertext must be decreased to transform the noisy ciphertext into a proper ciphertext. Gentry used genius blueprint methods called
squashing and bootstrapping to obtain a ciphertext which allows a number of homomorphic operations to be performed on it. This processes can be repeated again
and again. In other words, one can evaluate unlimited operations on the ciphertexts
which make the scheme fully homomorphic.
As an initial construction, Gentry used ideals and rings without lattices to design the homomorphic encryption scheme, where an ideal is a property preserving
subset of the rings such as even numbers. Then, each ideal used in his scheme was
represented by the lattices. For example, an ideal I in Z[x]/(f (x)) with f (x) of
degree n in an ideal lattice can easily be represented by a column of lattice with
basis BI of length n. Since the bases BI will produce an n × n matrix. Gentry’s
SWHE scheme using ideals and rings is described below:
• KeyGen Algorithm: For the given ring R and the basis BI of ideal I, IdealGen(R, BI )
algorithm generates the pair of (BJsk , BJpk ), where IdealGen() is an algorithm
outputting the relatively prime public and the secret key bases of the ideal
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lattice with basis BI such that I + J = R. A Samp() algorithm is also used
in key generation to sample from the given coset of the ideal, where a coset
is obtained by shifting an ideal by a certain amount. Finally, the public key
consists of (R, BI , BJpk , Samp()) and the secret key only includes BJsk .
• Encryption Algorithm:
For randomly chosen vectors ~r and ~g , using the public key (basis) Bpk chosen
from one of the ”bad” bases of the ideal lattice L, the message m
~ ∈ {0, 1}n is
encrypted by:

~c = E(m)
~ =m
~ + ~r · BI + ~g · BJpk ,

(7.24)

where BI is basis of the ideal lattice L. Here, m
~ + ~r · BI is called ”noise”
parameter.
• Decryption Algorithm:
By using the secret key (basis) BJsk , the ciphertext is decrypted as follows:
m
~ = ~c − BJsk · b(BJsk )−1 · ~ce mod BI ,

(7.25)

where b·e is the nearest integer function which returns the nearest integers for
the coefficients of the vector.
• Homomorphism over Addition: For the plaintext vectors m
~ 1, m
~ 2 ∈ {0, 1}n ,
additive and multiplicative homomorphisms can be verified easily as follows:
c~1 + c~2 = E(m
~ 1 ) + E(m
~ 2) = m
~1 + m
~ 2 + (~
r1 + r~2 ) · BI + (g~1 + g~2 ) · BJpk (7.26)
It is clear that c~1 + c~2 still preserves the format and is within the ciphertext
space. And, to decrypt the sum of the ciphertext, one computes (~
c1 + c~2 )
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mod BJpk which is equal to m
~1 + m
~ 2 + (~
r1 + r~2 ) · BI for the ciphertexts whose
noise amount is smaller than BJpk /2. Then the decryption algorithm works
properly and recovers the sum of the message m1 + m2 correctly by taking the
modulo BI of the noise.
• Homomorphism over Multiplication: Similarly for the multiplication, after
setting ~e = m
~ + ~r · BI , the homomorphic property can be expressed as follows:
c~1 × c~2 = E(m
~ 1 ) × E(m
~ 2 ) = e~1 × e~2 + (e~1 × g~2 + e~2 × g~1 + g~1 × g~2 ) · BJpk (7.27)
where e~1 × e~2 = m
~1 × m
~ 2 + (m
~ 1 × r~2 + m
~ 2 × r~1 + r~1 × r~2 ) · BI . It can be easily
verified that the multiplication operation on ciphertexts yields the output still
within the ciphertext space. It is said that if the noise |e~1 × e~1 | is enough small
enough the multiplication of plaintexts m
~1 × m
~ 2 can be correctly recovered
from the multiplication of ciphertexts c~1 × c~2 .
To have a better understanding of the ”noise” concept, let us consider the
encryption scheme over integers7 . The encryption of the bit b is the ciphertext
c = b + 2r + kp, where the key p > 2N is an odd integer and r is a random number
from the range (−n/2, n/2) and k is an integer. The decryption works as follows:
b ← (c mod p) mod 2, where (c mod p) is called as noise parameter. If the noise
parameter exceeds |p/2|, the decryption fails since (c mod p) is not equal to b + 2r
anymore. And, the noise parameter grows linearly with each addition and exponentially with each multiplication operation. If the noise parameter is very close to a
lattice point (i.e., (c mod p) << |p/2|), further addition and multiplication operations are still allowed. This is why Gentry’s ideal lattice based scheme is called
Somewhat Homomorphic ”for now” allowing only limited number of operations.
Since the noise grows much faster with the multiplication operations, the number of
7 Further

details about FHE over integers will be explained in Section 7.2.3.
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multiplication operations before exceeding the threshold is more limited. In order to
make the scheme fully homomorphic, the bootstrapping technique was introduced
by Gentry. However, the bootstrapping process can be applied to the bootstrappable
ciphertexts, which are noisy and have small circuit depth. The depth of the circuit
is related to the maximum number of operations. Hence, first the circuit depth is
reduced with squashing to the degree that the decryption can handle properly.

Squashing: Gentry’s bootstrapping technique is allowed only for the decryption algorithms with small depth. Therefore, he used some ”tweaks” to reduce the
decryption algorithm’s complexity. This method is called squashing and works as
follows:
First, choose a set of vectors, whose sum equals to the multiplicative inverse
of the secret key ((BJsk )−1 ). If the ciphertext is multiplied by the elements of this
set, the polynomial degree of the circuit is reduced to the level that the scheme
can handle. The ciphertext is now ”bootstrappable”. Nonetheless, the hardness of
the recovering the secret key is now based on the assumption of Sparse Subset Sum
Problem (SSSP) [HPSS08]. This basically adds another assumption to the provable
security of the scheme.

Bootstrapping: Bootstrapping is basically ”recrypting” procedure to get a
”fresh” ciphertext from the noisy ciphertext corresponding to the same plaintext.
A scheme is called bootstrappable if it can evaluate its own decryption algorithm circuit [Gen09]. First, the ciphertext is transformed into a bootstrappable ciphertext
using squashing. Then, by applying bootstrapping procedure, one gets a ”fresh” ciphertext. The bootstrapping works as follows: First, it is assumed that two different
public and secret key pairs are generated, (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2) and while the
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secret keys are kept by the client, the public keys are shared with the server. Then,
the encryption of the secret key, Encpk1 (sk1), is also transmitted to the server,
which already has c = Encpk1 (m). Since the above obtained SWHE scheme can
evaluate its own decryption algorithm homomorphically, the noisy ciphertext is decrypted homomorphically using Encpk1 (sk1). Then, the result is encrypted using a
different public key pk2, i.e., Encpk2 (Decsk1 (c)) = Encpk2 (m). Since the scheme is
assumed semantically secure, an adversary can not distinguish the encryption of the
secret key from the encryption of 0. The last ciphertext can be decrypted using sk2,
which is kept secret by the client, i.e., Decsk2 (Encpk2 (m)) = m. In brief, first the
homomorphic decryption of the noisy ciphertext removes the noise, and then the
new homomorphic encryption introduces new small noise to the ciphertext. Now,
the ciphertext is like just encrypted. Further homomorphic operations can be computed on this ”fresh” ciphertext until reaching again to a threshold point. Note
that Gentry’s bootstrapping method increases the computational cost noticeably
and becomes a major drawback for the practicality of FHE. In a nutshell, starting
from constructing a SWHE scheme and then squashing method to reduce the circuit depth of decryption algorithm and the bootstrapping to obtain fresh ciphertext
completes the creation of an FHE scheme. Hence, one can apply bootstrapping
repetitively to compute an unlimited number of operations on the ciphertexts to
successfully have an FHE scheme.
After Gentry’s original scheme, some of the follow-up works tried to generally
improve Gentry’s original work. In [Gen09], Gentry’s key generation algorithm is
used for a particular purpose only and the generation of an ideal lattice with a
”good” basis is left without a solution. Gentry introduced a new KeyGen algorithm in [Gen10] and improved the security of the hardness assumption of SSSP by
presenting a quantum worst case/average case reduction. However, a more aggres-
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sive analysis of the security of SSSP was completed by Stehle and Steinfeld [SS10].
They also suggested a new probabilistic decryption algorithm with lower multiplicative degree, which is square root of previous decryption circuit degree. Moreover,
a new FHE scheme, which was a variant of Gentry’s scheme was introduced in
[SV10]. The scheme uses smaller ciphertext and key sizes than Gentry’s scheme
without sacrificing the security. Some later works [GH11, SS11a, OYKU10] focused
on the optimizations in the key generation algorithm in order to implement the FHE
efficiently. Moreover, Mikuš proposed a new SWHE scheme with bigger plaintext
space to improve the number of homomorphic operations with a slight increase in
complexity of the key generation algorithm [Mik12].

FHE schemes Over Integers
In 2010, one year after Gentry’s original scheme, another SWHE scheme is presented
in [VDGHV10] which suggests Gentry’s ingenious bootstrapping method in order
to obtain an FHE scheme. The proposed scheme is over integers and the hardness
of the scheme is based on the Approximate-Greatest Common Divisor (AGCD)
problems [GGM16]. AGCD problems try to recover p from the given set of xi =
pqi + ri . The primary motivation behind the scheme is its conceptual simplicity.
A symmetric version of the scheme is probably one of the simplest schemes. The
proposed symmetric SWHE scheme is described as follows:
• KeyGen Algorithm: For the given security parameter λ, a random odd integer
p of bit length η is generated.
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• Encryption Algorithm: For a random large prime numbers p and q, choose a
small number r << p. Then, the message m ∈ {0, 1} is encrypted by:
c = E(m) = m + 2r + pq,

(7.28)

where p is kept hidden as private key and c is the ciphertext.
• Decryption Algorithm: The ciphertext can be decrypted as follows:
m = D(c) = (c mod p)

mod 2.

(7.29)

Decryption works properly only if m + 2r < p/2. This actually restricts the
depth of the homomorphic operations performed on the ciphertext. Then,
Dijk et al. used Gentry’s squashing and bootstrapping techniques to make the
scheme fully homomorphic. The homomorphic properties of the scheme can
be shown easily as follows:
• Homomorphism over addition:
E(m1 )+E(m2 ) = m1 +2r1 +pq1 +m2 +2r2 +pq2 = (m1 +m2 )+2(r1 +r2 )+(q1 +q2 )q.
(7.30)
The output clearly falls within the ciphertext space and can be decrypted if
the noise |m1 + 2r1 + m2 + 2r2 | < p/2, where p is the private key. Since
r1 , r2 << p, various number of additions can still be performed on ciphertext
before noise exceeds p/2.
• Homomorphism over Multiplication:
E(m1 )E(m2 ) = (m1 +2r1 +pq1 )(m2 +2r2 +pq2 = m1 m2 +2(m1 r2 +m2 r1 +2r1 r2 )+kp.
(7.31)
The output preserves the format of original ciphertexts and holds the homomorphic property. The encrypted data can be decrypted if the noise is smaller
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than half of the private key, i.e., |m1 m2 + 2(m1 r2 + m2 r1 + 2r1 r2 )| < p/2. The
noise grows exponentially with the multiplication operation. This puts more
restriction over homomorphic multiplication operation than addition.
In fact, the scheme presented so far [VDGHV10] was the symmetric version of
the homomorphic encryption. Transforming the underlying symmetric HE scheme
into an asymmetric HE scheme is also presented in [VDGHV10]. It is enough to
compute many ”encryptions of zero” xi = pqi + 2ri , where p is private key. Then,
many xi s are shared as the public key. To encrypt the message with the public key,
it is enough to add the message to a subset sum of xi s. Same decryption is used
to decrypt the ciphertext. As there is no efficient algorithm to recover p from the
given xi s in polynomial time, the scheme is considered as secure. The scheme is now
basically a public key encryption scheme, since it uses different keys to encrypt and
decrypt.
The FHE scheme proposed in [VDGHV10] is conceptually very simple. However,
this simplicity comes at a cost in computations. So, the scheme is not very efficient.
Hence, some early attempts directly tried to improve the efficiency. For example,
some follow-up optimizations focused on reducing the size of public keys [CMNT11a]
(O(λ10 ) → O(λ7 )), [CNT12] (O(λ7 ) → O(λ5 ), [YXWT12] (O(λ5 ) → O(λ3 ). A
more efficient public key generation [RK12b] and re-encryption [CBH14] are other
suggested works without reducing the security of the scheme. Later, an important
variant, which is batch FHE over integers, was proposed [CCK+ 13] (merged version
of [CLT13] and [KLYC13]). Batch FHE has the ability to pack multiple ciphertexts
into a single ciphertext. Moreover, the proposed scheme provides two options for
the hardness of the base problem: Decisional AGCD and Error-free AGCD. In
[CCK+ 13], it is also shown how to achieve recryption operation in parallel l-slots.
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Some further approaches for FHE schemes over integers are also proposed: a new
scale invariant FHE over integers [CLT14], a new scheme with integer plaintexts
[RK12a], a new SWHE scheme for computing arithmetic operations on large integer
numbers without converting them into bits [PAD12], a new symmetric FHE without
bootstrapping [AGS14], and a new FHE for non-binary message spaces [NK15]. All
these schemes improved FHEs over integers in the way that their names imply.

LWE-based FHE schemes
Learning with Error (LWE) is considered as one of the hardest problems to solve in
practical time for even post-quantum algorithms. First, it was introduced by Oded
Regev as an extension of ”learning from parity with error” problem [Reg09]. Regev
reduced the hardness of worst-case lattice problems like SVP to LWE problems,
which means that if one can find an algorithm that can solve LWE problem in an
efficient time, the same algorithm will also solve the SVP problem in an efficient
time. Since then, it is one of the most attractive and promising topics for postquantum cryptology with its relatively small ciphertext size. Lyubashevsky et al.
suggested another significant improvement on the LWE problem which may lead
to a new applications by introducing ring-LWE (RLWE) problem [LPR13]. The
RLWE problem is an algebraic variant of LWE, which is more efficient for practical
applications with strong security proofs. They proved that the RLWE problems are
reducible to worst-case problems on ideal lattices, which is hard for polynomial-time
quantum algorithms.
In the LWE-based FHE schemes, an important step towards to a practical
FHE scheme is made in [BV11]. Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan established a new
SWHE scheme based on Ring-Learning with Error (RLWE) to take advantage of
the efficiency feature of RLWE [BV11]. In other words, although both LWE and
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RLWE problems can be used as the hardness assumption of an FHE scheme, RLWE
shows better performance. Then, the scheme uses Gentry’s blueprint squashing and
bootstrapping techniques to obtain an FHE scheme. They used polynomial-LWE
(PLWE), which is simplified version of RLWE. PLWE is also reducible to worst-case
problems such as SVP on ideal lattices. The schemes proposed after [BV11] is also
called second generation FHE schemes.
Below, for the sake of simplicity, as we did in the previous part, we first show
symmetric version.
Notation: A very common notation is that ha, bi is used to denote the inner
$

product of vectors a and b. Moreover, d ←
− D denotes that d is randomly assigned
by an element from the distribution D and Z[x]/(f (x)) denotes the ring of all polynomials modulo f (x). The ring of polynomials modulo f (x) with coefficients in Zq
is denoted with Rq ≡ Zq [x]/(f (x)). Finally, χ denotes an error distribution over the
ring Rq .
The symmetric version of the underlying scheme is given as follows:
• KeyGen Algorithm: An element of the ring is chosen as a secret key from the
$

error distribution, i.e., s ←
− χ. Then, the secret key vector is described as
~s = (1, s, s2 , ..., sD ) for an integer D.
$

• Encryption Algorithm: After choosing a random vector a ←
− Rq n and the noise
$

e←
− χ, the message m is encrypted by:

~c = (c0 , c1 ) = (as + te + m, −a)
where ~c ∈ Rq2 .
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(7.32)

• Decryption Algorithm: In order to decrypt the ciphertext to recover the message, it can be easily computed that:
m = h~c, ~si

(mod t).

(7.33)

Decryption works properly if h~c, ~si is smaller than q/2. Furthermore, in order
to make the scheme asymmetric, it is sufficient to generate a random set of
pairs (a, as+te). Also, the homomorphic property of the scheme is very similar
to those in [Gen09] and [VDGHV10].
• Homomorphism over Addition:
E(m) + E(m0 ) = (c0 + c00 , c1 + c01 ) = ((a + a0 )s + t(e + e0 ) + (m + m0 ), −(a + a0 )),
(7.34)
Similar to previous schemes, decryption works if the noise is small. And, it is
clear that homomorpically added ciphertexts keep the format of the original
ciphertexts and stay within the ciphertext space.
• Homomorphism over Multiplication:
E(m)+E(m0 ) = (c0 c00 , c1 c01 ) = (−a0 s2 +(c00 a+c0 a0 )s+t(2ee0 +em0 +e0 m)+mm0 ).
(7.35)
The output seems almost like a ciphertext, but it still can be decrypted correctly with the expense of a new cost by adding a new term to ciphertext.
Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan made their scheme fully homomorphic using Gentry’s blueprint squashing and bootstrapping. They also showed their SWHE scheme
is circular secure (aka Key-Dependent message (KDM) security) with respect to linear functions of the secret key, i.e., the encryption can successfully keep secure linear
functions of its own secret key.
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After the proposed BGN-type cryptosystem based on LWE, which is additively
homomorphic and allowing only one multiplication operation in [GHV10], Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan proposed another SWHE scheme based on standard LWE
problems using re-linearization technique [BV14a]. Re-linearization makes the long
ciphertexts, which are the output of the homomorphic evaluation, regular size. Another important contribution in this work is the dimension-modulus reduction, which
does not require an SSSP assumption and squashing method used in Gentry’s original framework.
As discussed earlier, Gentry’s bootstrapping method is a creative method to obtain an FHE scheme, however, it comes with a huge cost. A leveled -FHE scheme
without using the bootstrapping technique was introduced by [BGV14]. Levelled
FHE can evaluate homomorphic operations for only a predetermined circuit depth
level. Brakerski et al. [BGV14] also showed that their scheme with bootstrapping
still provides better performance than the one without bootstrapping and also suggested the batching as an optimization. To achieve batching, ”modulus switching”
technique is used iteratively to keep the noise size constant. Then, Brakerski removed the necessity of modulus switching in [Bra12]. In Brakerski’s new scale
invariant FHE scheme [Bra12], contrary to the existing FHE schemes, the noise
grows linearly with the evaluation of homomorphic operations instead of exponentially and the scheme is based on the hardness of GapSVP problem [Pei16]. GapSVP
problem is roughly deciding the existence of a shorter vector than the vector with
length d for a given lattice basis B. The result returns simply yes or no. Then,
Fan and Vercauteren optimized the Brakerski’s scheme by changing the based assumption to RLWE problem [FV12a]. Some other modifications to [Bra12] focused
on reducing the overhead of key switching and faster evaluation of homomorphic
operations [WWL12] and using re-linearization to improve efficiency [ZXJ+ 14].
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Recently, by [GSW13] a significant FHE scheme was introduced claiming three
important properties: simpler, faster, and attribute-based FHE. The scheme is
simpler and faster due to the ”approximate eigenvector” method replacing the relinearization technique. In this method, by keeping only some parameters small, the
format of the ciphertext can be preserved under the evaluation of homomorphic operations. In the previous schemes which use the bootstrapping technique, the secret
key (evaluation key) of the user is sent to the cloud to evaluate the ciphertext homomorphically for the bootstrapping. In contrast, [GSW13] eliminates that need and
leads to propose the first identity-based FHE scheme, which allows homomorphic
evaluation by only a target identity having the public parameters. Then, Brakerski
and Vaikuntanathan followed [GSW13] to construct an FHE scheme secure under
a polynomial LWE assumption [BV14b]. It is shown that the proposed scheme is
as secure as any other lattice-based PKE scheme. Recently, Paindavoine and Vialla
showed a way of minimizing the number of required bootstrapping based on the
linear programming techniques that can be applied to [GSW13] as well.
In addition to more recently proposed LWE-based FHE schemes in [ZXJ+ 14,
CWZX14, ZYZW16, WWL15b], some optimizations focused on better (faster) bootstrapping algorithms [ASP13, ASP14], speeding homomorphic operations [GHPS12],
and a new extension to FHE for multi-identity and multi-key usage [CM15]. More
recently, a new efficient SWHE scheme based on the polynomial approximate common divisor problem is presented in [CHLR16]. The presented scheme in [CHLR16]
can handle efficiently large message spaces.

NTRU-like FHE schemes
To obtain a practical and applicable FHE scheme, one of the crucial steps is taken
by showing the construction of an FHE scheme from NTRUEncrypt, which is an
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old encryption scheme proposed by Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silvermanin in [HPS98].
Specifically, how to obtain a multi-key FHE from the NTRUEncrypt (called NTRU)
was shown by [LATV12]. NTRU encryption scheme is one of earliest attempts based
on lattice problems. Compared with RSA and GGH cryptosystems, NTRU improves
the efficiency significantly in both hardware and software implementations. However, there were security concerns for 15 years until the study done by [SS11b].
They reduced the security of the scheme to standard worst-case problems over ideal
lattices by modifying the key generation algorithm. Since the security of the scheme
is improved, efficiency, easy implementation, and standardization issues attract researchers’ interest again. López-Alt et al. used the NTRU encryption scheme to
obtain a practical FHE [LATV12] with three differences. First, the set from which
the noise is sampled is changed from a deterministic set to a distribution. Second,
the modification introduced in [SS11b], which makes the scheme more secure, is used
and third, the parameters are chosen to allow fully homomorphism. Their proposed
NTRU-like encryption scheme in [LATV12] is as follows:
• KeyGen Algorithm: For chosen sampled polynomials f 0 and g from a distribution χ (specifically, a discrete Gaussian distribution), it is set f = 2f 0 + 1
to get f ≡ 1 (mod 2) and f is invertible. Then, the secret key sk = f ∈ R and
public key pk := h = 2gf −1 ∈ Rq .
• Encryption Algorithm: For chosen samples s and e from the same distribution
χ, the message m is encrypted by:
c = E(m) = hs + 2e + m,

(7.36)

where the ciphertext c ∈ Rq .
• Decryption Algorithm: The ciphertext can easily be decrypted as follows:
m = D(c) = f c (mod 2),
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(7.37)

where f c ∈ Rq . The correctness of the scheme can be verified using h =
2gf −1 and f ≡ 1 (mod 2). Moreover, the scheme proposed by López-Alt
et al. is a new type of FHE scheme, which is called multi-key FHE. Multikey FHE has the ability to evaluate on ciphertexts which are encrypted with
independent keys, i.e., each user can encrypt data with her own public key and
a third party can still perform a homomorphic evaluation on these ciphertexts.
The only interaction required between the users is to obtain a ”joint secret
key”. The homomorphically evaluated ciphertext is decrypted by using the
joint secret key, which is obtained by using all involved secret keys. The
message mi is encrypted by using public key hi = 2gi fi −1 with the formula,
ci = hi si + 2ei + mi . The multikey homomorphism properties for two party
computation is shown using joint secret key f1 f2 .
• Multi-key Homomorphism over Addition:
f1 f2 (c1 + c2 ) =2(f1 f2 e1 + f1 f2 e2 + f2 g1 s1 + f1 g2 s2 ) + f1 f2 (m1 + m2 )
(7.38)
= 2eadd + f1 f2 (m1 + m2 )
• Multi-key Homomorphism over Multiplication:
f1 f2 (c1 c2 ) =2(2g1 g2 s1 s2 + g1 s1 f2 (2e2 + m2 ) + g2 s2 f1 (2e1 + m1 )
+ f1 f2 (e1 m2 + e2 m1 + 2e1 e2 )) + f1 f2 (m1 m2 )

(7.39)

=2emult + f1 f2 (m1 m2 )
Here, it is seen that multi-key homomorphic operation increases noise more
than a single key homomorphic evaluation. However, m1 + m2 and m1 m2
can still be recovered correctly using the jointly obtained secret key since
f, g, s, e all are sampled from the bounded distribution χ. In other words, the
decryption still works if the each of the noise parameters eadd and emult are
smaller than |p/2|.
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As observed in all of the FHE schemes presented in detail in our work, since
in [LATV12] noise grows with homomorphic operations on encrypted data, the
proposed scheme is actually an SWHE scheme. To make it fully homomorphic,
López-Alt et al. also (like all others above) used Gentry’s bootstrapping technique.
However, to apply bootstrapping, one first needs to make the underlying SWHE
scheme bootstrappable. For this reason, first modulus reduction technique described
in [Bra12, BV14a] was used. Then, the final scheme was named a leveled-FHE because it had the ability to deal only a limited number of public keys. Although the
number of parties that can be used in homomorphic operations is limited, the complexity of circuit that can be used in homomorphic operations is still independent
of the number of parties that can join the communication.
Another issue to be taken account in [LATV12] is the assumptions. Specifically,
two assumptions are used in the scheme proposed by Lopez-Alt et al. First is RLWE
problems and second is Decisional Small Polynomial Ratio (DSPR). Though RLWE
is well-studied and about being a standard problem, DSPR assumption is a nonstandard one. Hence, in [BLLN13], Bos et al. showed how to modify [LATV12] to
remove DSRP assumption. While removing DSRP assumption, the tensoring technique introduced in [Bra12] is used to restrict the noise increase during homomorphic
operations. However, the tensoring technique used to avoid DSRP assumption results in a large evaluation key and a complicated key switching procedure, which
makes the scheme impractical. A practical variant of their scheme, which reintroduces the DSRP assumption is also presented in the same work. However, it is
later shown that the optimizations and parameter selection that yield a significant
increase in the performance makes it vulnerable to sub-field lattice attacks [ABD16].
The attack shown by Albrecht et al. affected not only [BLLN13], but every other
NTRU-like scheme, which relies on DSRP problem and whose parameters (e.g., se-
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cret key, modulus) are chosen poorly. Finally, in [DS16], a modified NTRU-like
FHE scheme, which does not require the DSRP assumption, thereby secure against
subfield lattice attacks, is proposed. Another attractive feature of the new FHE
scheme is that it also does not require the use of evaluation key during the homomorphic operations. The new scheme is based on [SS11b] and it uses a Flattening
noise management technique adopted from the flattening technique of [GSW13].
Two follow-up interesting works also improved the NTRU-like FHE using different techniques. While one of them focuses on a customized and a generic bit-sliced
implementation of NTRU-like FHE schemes [DHS16] and the other suggests the use
of GPU [DDS14]. Furthermore, in [DHS16], the AES circuit is chosen to evaluate
the homomorphic operations, which is faster than the proposed one in [GHS12].
Other improvements on hardware implementations of NTRU-like FHE schemes are
more recently published in [LW15, DÖSS15]. Another NTRU-like FHE scheme
was suggested in [RC14]. They used the bootstrapping proposed in [ASP13] and
”double-CRT” proposed in [GHS12] to modify the representation of the ciphertexts
in more efficient way.

7.3

Implementations of SWHE and FHE schemes

The ultimate goal with different HE schemes is to obtain an unbounded and practical
FHE scheme. PHE schemes and SWHE schemes proposed before Gentry’s breakthrough work in 2009 were stepping stone towards that goal. Nonetheless, they are
restricted in terms of the areas that can be applied. However, the SWHE schemes
proposed after Gentry’s work are mostly the part of the FHE schemes rather than
a different scheme. Moreover, a bounded (level) FHE can also be called as SWHE
scheme. Hence, it is not possible to separate SWHE and FHE schemes for the works
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Table 7.3: ”Fully” implemented FHE schemes
Scheme Information

Platform

Parameters

Running Times

Implemented Scheme

Base Scheme

Software

Security parameter, λ

dimension, n

PK size

KeyGen

Enc

Dec

GH11 [GH11]

Gen09 [Gen09]

C/C++

72

33768

2.25 GB

2.2 h

3 min (SWHE)

0.66 s (SWHE)

Recrypt
31 min

CMNT11 [CMNT11a]

DGHV10 [VDGHV10]

Sage 4.5.3

72

7897

802 MB

43 min

2 min 57 s

0.05 s

14 min 33 s

CNT12 (with compressed PK) [CNT12]

DGHV10 [VDGHV10]

Sage 4.7.2

72

7897

10.3 MB

10 min

7 min 15 s

0.05 s

11 min 34 s

CNT12 (leveled) [CNT12]

DGHV10 [VDGHV10]

Sage 4.7.2

72

5700

18 MB

6 min 18 s

3.4 s

0.00 s

2 h 27 min

proposed after Gentry’s work. In this section, we summarize the implementations
of the SWHE and FHE schemes, which can lead to the new works and speed up the
follow-up works, proposed after Gentry’s work.
Implementation of a cryptographic scheme is the middle step between designing
the scheme and applying it to a real life service and it provides a realistic performance
assessment of the designed scheme. Although some new proposed FHE schemes have
increased the efficiency and performance of the implementations significantly, the
overhead and cost of the FHE implementations are still too high to be applied
transparently in a real life service without disturbing the user.

”Fully” implemented FHE schemes
After solving the long term open problem of designing a fully homomorphic scheme
[Gen09], many new fully homomorphic scheme proposals were tested with implementation. In a very first attempt, Smart and Vercauteren implemented their scheme
in [SV10], which is a variant of Gentry’s original scheme. However, their key generation takes hours up to N = 211 , where N is the lattice dimension and does not
generate the key pairs after N = 211 . More importantly, their implementation did
not include the bootstrapping procedure. Hence, it is actually a SWHE scheme as it
was implemented. Then, Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi [GH11] succeeded to implement the FHE scheme first time by continuing the way that Smart and Vercauteren
had started. The running times for the implementation in [23] and other proposed
FHE implementations which are evaluated over random depth circuits are given in
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Table 7.3. Moreover, Gentry and Halevi in [GH11] introduced some optimizations
and simplifications on the squashing process to obtain a bootstrappable scheme.
In their implementation, they showed four security levels: toy, small, medium, and
large. They suggested that the large parameter settings are practically secure, which
have a lattice dimension of 215 . However, the performance of the implementation is
very inefficient in practical terms. For the large parameter setting, a key pair was
generated at 2.2 hours and public key size was 2.25 GB. Recrypting the ciphertexts
(bootstrapping) took 31 minutes. After that, in [CMNT11a], an integer variant of
the FHE scheme introduced originally in [VDGHV10] was implemented. In this
implementation, the key generation takes 43 min, and the public key size is 802
MB. The implementation showed that the same security level can be achieved with
a much simpler scheme. (The difference comes from the different definitions of security levels). Later, Coron et al. in a different work [CNT12] improved public key
size to 10 MB, key generation to 10 minutes, and recryption procedure to 11 min
34 seconds using the similar parameter settings in [CMNT11a]. This performance
is obtained using a compression technique on the public key. In [CNT12], a leveled DGHV scheme is also implemented with slightly worse performance. Yuanmi
Chen and Phong Q. Nguyen [CN12] proposed an algorithm to break the scheme
in [CNT12], which is faster than exhaustive search. This work showed that the
security level of the scheme proposed in [CNT12] is much lower than the scheme
proposed in [GH11].

FHE implementation for ”Low-depth” circuits
The second type of FHE implementations tried to implement leveled-FHE schemes
for small depth circuits with given run time for isolated and composed addition and
multiplication [NLV11, BLLN13, LN14, RC14]. The comparisons for these small-
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Table 7.4: FHE implementations for ”Low-depth” circuits
Scheme Information
Implemented Scheme

Platform

Parameters

Base Scheme

Software

BV11 [BV11]

Magma

w = 232

YASHE (by BLLN13 [BLLN13])

LTV12 [LATV12]

C/C++

YASHE (by LN14a [LN14])

LTV12 [LATV12]

NLV11 [NLV11]

FV (by LN14a [LN14])
RC14 [RC14]

Running times
Enc

Dec

Mult

q=127

756 ms

57 ms

1590 ms

Add
4 ms

t = 210

q=130

27 ms

5 ms

31 ms

0.024 ms

C/C++

w = 232

q=130

16 ms

15 ms

18 ms

0.7 ms

BV11 [BV11]

C/C++

w = 232

q=130

34 ms

16 ms

59 ms

1.4 ms

LTV12 [LATV12]

Matlab

n = 210

t=1

12 ms

3.36 ms

100 ms

0.56 ms

depth FHE implementations are given at Table 7.4. Since the performance of the
state of the art was unsatisfactory, as an early attempt, a relatively simpler FHE,
which allows only a few homomorphic multiplication operations was implemented
in [NLV11]. Later, this performance was improved by Bos et al. [BLLN13] due to
the new method to evaluate the homomorphic multiplication operation. Moreover,
unlike [NLV11], in [BLLN13] the underlying scheme was implemented in C programming language to avoid the unwelcome overhead due to the computer algebra
system. Then, a similar performances with [BLLN13] is obtained. Recently, a significant improvement is made by using double-CRT in the representation of ciphertexts
and used parallelism to accelerate the implementation in Matlab [RC14].

”Real world” complex FHE implementations
In contrast to above schemes, which are either proof of concept or small-depth
implementations, the authors in [GHS12] implemented FHE for the first time to
evaluate the circuit complex enough for a real life application. In [GHS12] Gentry et al. implemented a variant of BGV scheme proposed in [SV14]8 , which is a
leveled FHE without bootstrapping, in order to evaluate AES circuit homomorphically. Actually, the idea of homomorphic evaluation of AES is first discussed in
[NLV11] with the following scenario. A client first sends the key of AES by en8 Later

updated in [BGV14].
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crypting with FHE, F HE(K). Then, the client uploads the data by encrypting
with AES only, AES K (m). When the cloud wants to evaluate the data homomorphically, it computes F HE(AES K (m)) and decrypts AES homomorphically (blindfold) to obtain F HE(m). After that, the cloud can compute every homomorphic
operation on the data encrypted with FHE. The comparison of such more complex
”real world” FHE implementations are presented in Table 7.5. A realization of how
to achieve SIMD (single-instruction multiple-data) operations using homomorphic
evaluation of AES is proposed by Smart and Vercauteren [SV14]. Later, some works
[CLT13, MS13, CLT14, DHS16] also improved the performances of the homomorphic
evaluation of AES circuit by applying the recent improvements and optimizations in
theoretical side. In addition to the use of AES circuit to evaluate homomorphically,
lightweight block ciphers such as Prince [DSES14], SIMON [LN14], and LowMC
[ARS+ 15] are also proposed. In [MS13], Mella and Susella estimated the cost of
some of the symmetric cryptographic primitives such as AES-128, SHA-256 hash
function, Salsa20 stream cipher, and KECCAK sponge function. They concluded
that AES is best suited for the homomorphic evaluation because of its low number of rounds and absence of integer operations and logical ANDs in its internals.
However, in [MS13], only AES-128 is implemented.

Publicly available FHE implementations
Although all aforementioned implementations are published in the literature, unfortunately, only a few of them are publicly available to researchers. Some of the
publicly available implementations are listed in Table 7.6. From publicly available
implementations, HElib [HS14b] is the most important and widely utilized one.
HElib implements the BGV scheme [BGV11] with Smart-Vercauteren ciphertext
packing techniques and some new optimizations. The design and implementation of
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Table 7.5: ”Real world” complex FHE implementations
Scheme
Implemented Scheme
GHS12 (original)(packed) [GHS12]

Platform

Parameters

Circuit

Reported Specs

λ

AND depth

total evaluation time

number of parallel enc

relative time

BGV11 [BGV11]

AES

Intel Xeon CPU @ 2.0 GHz with 256GB RAM

80

40

48 hours

54

37 min

65 hours

720

5 min

18.3 hours

33

33 min

113 hours

GHS12 (original)(byte-sliced) [GHS12]
CLT13 (byte-wise) [CCK+ 13]

DGHV10 [VDGHV10]

AES

Intel Core i7 @ 3.4Ghz with 32GB RAM

72

40

DGHV10 [VDGHV10]

AES

Intel Xeon E5-2690 @ 2.9 GHz

80

40

+

CLT13 (state-wise) [CCK 13]
CLT14 (state-wise) [CLT14]
CLT14 (state-wise) [CLT14]

72

LN14a (YASHE) [LN14]

LTV12 [LATV12]

LN14a (FV) [LN14]

Running Times

Base scheme

SIMON

Intel Core i7-2600 @ 3.4 GHz

9

128

34

Bra12 [Bra12]

531

12 min 46 s

102 hours

1875

3 min 15 s

3 h 35 min

569

23 s

1 h 10 min

2048

2.04 s
6.06 s

3 h 27 min

2048

DHS14 [DHS16]

LTV12 [LATV12]

AES

Intel Xeon @ 2.9 GHz

∼80

40

31 hours

2048

55 s

DSES14 [DSES14]

LTV12 [LATV12]

Prince

Intel Core i7 3770K @ 3.5 Ghz with 32 GB RAM10

130

30

57 min

1024

3.3 s

ARSTZ15 [ARS 15]

BGV11 [BGV11]

LowMC

Intel Haswell i7-4770K CPU @ 3.5 GHz with 16GB RAM

80

12

0.8 s

GHS12 (updated)(no bootstrapping) [GHS12]

BGV11 [BGV11]

AES

Intel Core i5-3320M at 2.6GHz with 4GB RAM11

80

40

+

GHS12 (updated)(with bootstrapping) [GHS12]

8 min

600

4 min 12 s

120

2s

17 min 30 s

180

5.8 s

Table 7.6: Some publicly available FHE implementations
Name
HElib
[HS14b]
libScarab
[PBS11a]
FHEW
[DM14]
TFHE
[CGGI17]
SEAL
[LCP17]

Scheme
BGV
[BGV11]
SV
[SV10]
DM14
[DM15]
CGGI16
[CGGI16]
FV12
[FV12b]

Lang
C++
C
C++
C++
C++

Documentation
Yes
[HS13]
Yes
[PBS11b]
Yes
[DM15]
Yes
[CGGI16]
Yes
[CLP17]

Libraries
NTL, GMP
GMP, FLINT,
MPFR, MPIR
FFTW
FFTW
No external
dependency

HElib are documented in [HS13] and algorithms used in HElib are documented in
[HS14a]. HElib is designed using low-level programming, which deals with the hardware constraints and components of the computer without using the functions and
commands of a programming language and hence, defined as ”assembly language for
HE”. It was implemented using GPL-licensed C++ library. Since December 2014,
it supports bootstrapping [HS15] and since March 2015, it supports multi-threading.
In an important extension, homomorphic evaluation of AES was implemented on
top of HElib [GHS12] and included in the HElib source code in [HS14b].
9 With
10 Only
11 An

hyper-threading turned off and over-clocking (‘turbo boost’) disabled.
single thread is used.

Ubuntu 14.04 installed VM
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Unfortunately, the usage of HElib is not easy because of the sophistication needed
for its low-level implementation and parameter selection which effects both performance and security level. Another notable open source FHE implementation is
libScarab [PBS11a]. To the best of our knowledge, libScarab [PBS11a] is the first
open-source implementation of FHE. Its parameter selection is relatively easier than
that of HElib, but it suffers from a lot of limitations. For instance, it does not implement modern techniques (e.g., modulus reduction and re-linearization techniques
[BV14a]) to handle the noise level or it also does not support the SIMD techniques
introduced in [SV14]. It implements Smart-Vercauteren’s FHE scheme in [SV10]
and documentation is provided in [PBS11b].
Another major implementation is introduced by Ducas and Micciancio and called
”Fastest Homomorphic Encryption in the West” (FHEW) [DM14]. It is documented
in [DM15]. It significantly improves the time required to bootstrap the ciphertext
claiming homomorphic evaluation of a NAND gate ”in less than a second”. A NAND
gate is functionally complete. Hence, any possible boolean circuits can be built using
only NAND gates. In [DM15], the usage of ciphertext packing and SIMD techniques
provides an amortized cost. However, in FHEW such performance is achieved using
only a few hundred lines of code with the use of one additional library, FFTW
[FJ05]. Later, the homomorphic computation cost of any binary gate [DM15] is
increased by a factor of 50 by making some optimizations on the bootstrapping
algorithm. The main improvement is based on the torus representation of LWE
ciphertexts. This improved the cost of bootstrapping 10 times according to the best
known bootstrapping in [DM14]. They also further improved the noise propagation
overhead algorithms using some approximations. Finally, they also reduced the size
of bootstrapping key from 1GB to 24MB by achieving the same security level.
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More recently, another HE library called Simple Encrypted Arithmetic Library
(SEAL) [LCP17] is released by Microsoft. The goal of releasing this library is
explained as providing a well-documented HE library that can be easily used by
both crypto experts and non-experts with no crypto background like practitioners
in bioinformatics. The library does not have external dependencies like others and
it includes automatic parameter selection and noise estimator tools, which makes
it easier to use. Finally, the security estimates of two well-known LWE-based HE
libraries, HElib and SEAL, against dual lattice attacks are revised in [Alb17]. It is
shown that the parameters promising 80 bits of security actually gives an estimated
cost of 68 bits for SEAL v2.0 and 62 bits for HElib. As a final note, we give the list of
general-purpose HE libraries as follows: HEAAN implementing that supports fixed
point arithmetics [CKKS16], a GPU-accelerated library cuHE [DDS17], a general
lattice crypto library PALISADE [Roh17].

FHE hardware implementations and productions
The first known usage of FHE in a production environment is announced by Fujitsu Laboratories Ltd. [Ltd13]. Their reported implementation provides statistical
calculations and biometric authentication by using FHE-based security. They improved an FHE by batching the string bits of data. The practical testing of this FHE
implementation by Fujitsu is still pending as of this writing. Although the software
only implementations are considered promising to obtain a practical FHE implementation, there is still a substantial gap between the achieved and the targeted performance. This gap led to new alternative research area in hardware implementations.
The hardware solutions to accelerate both FHE and SWHE schemes mainly focused
on three implementation platforms: Graphics Processing Unit (GPU), ApplicationSpecific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), and Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
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(A useful survey of hardware implementations of homomorphic schemes can be
found in [MOO+ 14]). Although GPU is for graphical purposes, its highly parallel structure offers great promise over CPU for efficiency. Hence, it is suggested
in some studies to use GPU order to improve the efficiency of homomorphic evaluation [DDS14, WCH14, WHC+ 15, DDS15, LLCP15]. One of the major barriers
to a practical FHE is the noise growth in the homomorphic multiplication operation. This prompted researchers to find a solution that can deal with a large
number of modular multiplications. Therefore, there are some works focusing particularly on this problem using the customized ASICs [DÖS13, WHEW14, DÖS15].
In spite of the potential of GPU and ASIC solutions, most of the proposed studies
are based on the reconfigurable hardware, specifically FPGA. FPGA platforms offer not only Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), but also some optimization techniques
such as number theoretic transformation (NTT) and fast modular polynomial reduction at hardware level. Such large and reconfigurable environment provided by
FPGAs motivates many researchers to speed up the practicality of FHE schemes
[CRPS12, WH13, CMO+ 13, MHM+ 13, CMV+ 15, CMO+ 14, MOHO14, CGRS14,
SRJV+ 15, PNPM15, ÖDSS15].
In conclusion, some of the SWHE implementations (leveled-FHE) [GHS12] get
closer to a tolerable performance. However, the bootstrapping techniques in FHE
schemes need to be improved and the cost of homomorphic multiplications should
be reduced to increase the performance.

7.4

Further Research Directions and Lessons Learned

Performance of any encryption scheme is evaluated with three different criteria:
security, speed, and simplicity. First, an encryption scheme must be secure so that
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an attacker can not obtain any type of information by using a reasonable amount
of resources. Second, its efficiency must not disturb the user’s comfort, i.e., it
must be transparent to the users because users prefer usability against security.
Lastly, if and only if an encryption scheme is understandable by the other area
practitioners, they will implement the scheme for their applications and productions.
If the existing FHE schemes are evaluated in terms of the three criteria, there is,
though getting closer, still a substantial room for improvement in terms of all these
criteria, especially for the speed performance.
Even though some of the nonstandard security assumptions (e.g., SSSP12 [Lee11,
HR11]) in the Gentry’s original scheme are later removed, there are still some open
security issues about the FHE schemes. First one is the circular security of FHE.
Circular security (aka KDM security), as mentioned earlier, keeps its own secret key
secure by encrypting it with the public key. All known FHE schemes use Gentry’s
blueprint bootstrapping technique to obtain an unlimited FHE scheme. So, the encryption of the secret key is also sent to the cloud to bootstrap the noisy ciphertexts
and an eavesdropper can capture the encryption of secret key. Even though some
SWHE and leveled-FHE schemes are proven as semantically secure, an unbounded
FHE still has not been proven as semantically secure with respect to any function,
so it does not guarantee that an adversary can not reveal the secret key from its encryption under the public key. This unfortunate situation is still open to be proven.
Moreover, although some SWHE schemes [LMSV11] are proven as indistinguishable
under non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA1), none of the unbounded
FHE schemes is IND-CCA1 secure for now. (IND-CCA2 (adaptive) is not applicable
12 Indeed,

Moon Sung Lee showed that it is quite probable that SSSP challenges can be
solved within two days [Lee11, HR11].
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to FHE because FHE itself requires to be malleable.) In brief, FHE still needs to
be studied extensively to prove that it is secure enough.
FHE allows an unlimited number of functions on encrypted data. However, limitations on the efficiency of the FHE schemes prompts researchers to find the SWHE
schemes that can be good enough to use in real-life applications. Recently, homomorphic evaluation of one AES, which is a highly complex and nontrivial function,
is reduced to 2 seconds [GHS12] and researchers are now focusing to improve this
instead of trying to implement an FHE scheme, which is extremely slow for now.
The main process that increases the computational cost in FHE is the bootstrapping process. An unbounded FHE scheme that allows unlimited operations without
bootstrapping is still an open problem.
Showing the existence of FHE instilled hope to solve other long waiting problems (applications) such as Functional Encryption (FE) (i.e., Identity-based encryption (IBE) and Attribute-based encryption (ABE)). Functional encryption basically controls the access over data while allowing computation on it according
to the features of identity or attribute. The purpose of designing ABE or IBE
based on FHE is to take the advantage of the functionality of two worlds. However, for now, there exists a few [GSW13, CM14, CM16, WWL15a]. Another
fruitful application of FHE is multi-party computation (MPC) which allows the
computation of the function with multiple inputs from different users while keeping the inputs hidden. Even though there exist a few FHE-based MPC protocols
[DPSZ12, LATV12, CLO+ 13, DPR16] proposing these powerful and useful tools, unfortunately, their performances are not yet comparable with the conventional MPC
approaches [MGBF14, CMTB16, PH14, CMTB15] because of the computational
cost of the existing FHE schemes. However, FHE does not require any interaction,
which reduces the complexity of the communication protocol significantly. However,
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there are still some gaps on how to realize those protocols. Furthermore, FHE itself can not perform a homomorphic evaluation on independently encrypted data,
i.e., multi-key FHE. some primitive result to deal with this issue was presented in
[LATV12]. However, the proposed scheme can only handle a bounded number of
users. When the cloud and number of connected devices are considered, the restriction may not be feasible. Hence, a multi-key FHE with an unlimited number of
users is another promising direction for future applications.

7.5

Conclusion

In today’s always-on, Internet-centric world, the privacy of data plays a more significant role than ever before. For highly sensitive systems such as online retail and
e-banking, it is crucial to protect users’ accounts and assets from malicious third
parties. Nonetheless, today’s norm is to encrypt the data and share the keys with
the service provider, cloud operator, etc. In this model, the control over the privacy
of the sensitive data is lost. The users or service providers with the key have exclusive rights on the data. Untrusted providers, cloud operators can keep sensitive data
and its identifying credentials of users long after the user ends the relationship with
the services. One promising direction to preserve the privacy of the data is to utilize
homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes. HE is a special kind of encryption scheme,
which allows any third party to operate on the encrypted data without decrypting it
in advance. Indeed, the idea of HE has been around for over 30 years; however, the
first plausible and achievable Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme was
introduced by Craig Gentry in 2009. Since then, different FHE schemes demonstrated that FHE still needs to be improved significantly to be practical on every
platform as they are very expensive for real-life applications. Hence, in this chapter,
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we surveyed the HE and FHE schemes. Specifically, starting from the basics of
HE, the details of the well-known Partially HE (PHE) and Somewhat HE (SWHE),
which are important pillars of achieving FHE, were presented. Then, after classifying FHE schemes in the literature under four different categories, we presented
the major FHE schemes with this classification. Moreover, we articulated the implementations and the new improvements in Gentry-type FHE schemes. Finally,
we discussed promising research directions as well as lessons learned for interested
researchers.
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CHAPTER 8
CURIE: POLICY-BASED PRIVACY-AWARE SECURE DATA
EXCHANGE

8.1

Introduction

Inter-organizational data sharing is crucial to the advancement of many domains
including security, health care, and finance. Previous works have shown the benefit
of data sharing within distributed, collaborative, and federated learning [DCM+ 12,
SCST17, APP+ 18]. Privacy-preserving machine learning offers data sharing among
multiple members while avoiding the risks of disclosing the sensitive data (e.g., healthcare records, personally identifiable information) [EESA+ 12]. For example, secure
multiparty computation enables multiple members, each with its training dataset, to
collaboratively learn a shared predictive model without revealing their datasets [MZ17].
These approaches solve the privacy concerns of members during model computation,
yet do not consider the complex relationships such as regulations, competitive advantage, data sovereignty, and jurisdiction among members on private data sharing.
Members want to be able to articulate and enforce their conflicting requirements on
data sharing.
To illustrate such complex data sharing requirements, consider health care organizations that collaborate for a joint prediction model of diagnosis of patients experiencing blood clots (see Figure 8.1). Members wish to dictate their needs through
their legal and political limitations as follows: U.S.1 is able to share its complete
data for nation-wide members (U.S.2 ) [Ame17, Hea17], yet it is obliged to share the
data of patients deployed in NATO countries with NATO members (UK) [fMS17].
However, U.S.1 wishes to acquire all patient data from other countries. UK is able
to share and acquire complete data from NATO members, yet it desires to acquire
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RU

U.S.2

U.S.1
UK

Figure 8.1: An illustration of data exchange requirements of countries learning a
predictive model on their shared data. Arrows show the data requirements of countries.

only data of certain race groups from U.S1 to increase its data diversity. RU wishes
to share and acquire complete data from all members, yet members limit their data
share to Russian citizens who live in their countries. Such complex data sharing
requirements also commonly occur today in non-healthcare systems [BCD+ 09]. For
instance, National Security Agency has varying restrictions on how human intelligence is shared with other countries; financial companies share data based on trust,
and competition among each other.
In this chapter, we present a policy-based data exchange approach, called Curie,
that allows secure data exchange among members that have such complex relationships. Members specify their requirements on data exchange using a policy language
(CPL). The requirements defined with the use of CPL form the local data exchange
policies of members. Local policies are defined separately for data sharing and data
acquisition policies. This property allows asymmetric relations on data exchange.
For example, a member does not necessarily have to acquire the data that the other
members dictate to share. By using these two policies, members specify statements
of who to share/acquire and what to share/acquire. The statements are defined
using conditional and selection expressions. Selections allow members to filter data
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and limit the data to be exchanged, whereas conditional expressions allow members to define logical statements. Another advanced property of CPL is predefined
data-dependent conditionals for calculating the statistical metrics between member’s
data. For instance, members can define a conditional to compute the intersection
size of data columns without disclosing their data. This allows members to define
content-dependent conditional data exchange in their policies.
Once members have defined their local policies, they negotiate a sharing agreement. The guarantee provided by Curie is that all data exchanged among members
will respect the agreement. The agreement is executed in a multi-party privacypreserving prediction model enhanced with optional differential privacy guarantees.
We begin in the next section by defining the analysis task and outlining the security
and attacker models.

8.2

Problem Scope and Attacker Model

Problem Scope. We introduce Curie Policy Language (CPL) to express data
exchange requirements of distributed members. Unlike the programming languages
used for writing secure multiparty computation (MPC) [HKoS+ 10, RHH14] and
the frameworks designed for privacy-preserving machine learning (ML) [LWN+ 15,
O+ 16, BKLS18, EESA+ 12, MZ17], CPL is a policy language in a Backus Normal
Form (BNF) notation to express the conflicting relationships of members on data
sharing. Members can express data exchange requirements using the conditionals,
selections, and secure pairwise data-dependent statistics. Curie then enforces the
policy agreements in a shared predictive model through an MPC protocol that
ensures members comply with the policies as negotiated.
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We integrate Curie into 24 medical institutions. Without deployment of Curie,
institutions compute warfarin dosage of a patient using a model computed on
their local patient records. Curie allows institutions to construct various consortia wherein each member defines a data exchange policy for other members via
CPL. This enables institutions to acquire the patient records based on regulations
as well as the records that they need to improve the accuracy of their dose predictions. Curie implements a privacy-preserving dose model through homomorphic
encryption (HE) to enforce the policy agreements of the members. We note that
a centralized party in HE cannot provide a privacy-preserving model on negotiated
data [VDJ10]. However, Curie implements a novel protocol that allows institutions to perform local computations by aggregating the intermediate results of the
dose model. Additionally, Curie implements an optional differential private (DP)
mechanism that allows institutions to perform differentially-private (DP) secure
dose model. DP guarantees that no information leaks on the targeted individual
(i.e., patient) with high confidence from the released dose model.
Threat Model. We consider a semi-honest adversary model. That is, members in
a consortium runs the protocol exactly as specified, yet they try to learn the dataset
inputs of the other members as much as possible from their views of the protocol.
Additionally, we consider non-adaptive adversary wherein members cannot modify
inputs of their dataset once the protocol on shared data is initiated.

8.3

Organizational Data Exchange

Depicted in Figure 8.2, Curie includes two independent parts: policy management
and multiparty secure computation.
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Figure 8.2: Curie data exchange process in a collaborative learning setting. The
dashed boxes show data remains confidential.
Policy Management. We define a consortium that is a group made up of two or
more members–individuals, companies or governments ( a ). Members of a consortium aim to compute a predictive model m over their confidential data in a secure
manner. For instance, data may be curated from medical history of patients or financial reports of companies with the objective of building an ML model. Moreover,
each member wants to enforce a set of local constraints toward other consortium
members to control their requirements on how and with whom they share their
confidential data. These constraints define a member’s interest, trust, regulations
and data demands, and also impacts the accuracy of a model m. Thus, there is a
need for connecting data needs of members to the privacy-preserving models. In
Curie, each member of a consortium defines a local policy ( b ). The local policy of

a member dictates the requirements of data exchange as follows:
1. The member wishes to specify with whom to share and acquire data (partnership
requirement).
2. The member wishes to define what data to share and acquire (sharing and acquisition requirement).
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M2, M3: share
M2, M3: acquisi(on
M1

M2

M3
M1, M2: share
M1, M2: acquisi(on

M1, M3: share
M1, M3: acquisi(on

Figure 8.3: An example consortium of three members.
In this, the member wishes to refine its sharing and acquisition requirements to
express the following:
1. The member wishes to dictate a set of conditions to restrict data sharing and
select which data to be acquired (conditional selective share and acquisition); and
2. The member wishes to dictate conditionals based on the other member’s data
(data-dependent conditionals).
The policy of members need not be-nor are likely to be-symmetric. Local policy is
defined with requirements for sharing and acquisition that is tailored to each partner
member in the consortium–thus allowing each pairwise sharing to be unique. Here,
the local policies are used to negotiate pairwise sharing within the consortium. To
illustrate how members negotiate an agreement, consider the consortium of three
members in Figure 8.3.
Each member initiates pairwise policy negotiations with other members to reconcile contradictions between acquisition and share policies ( c ). A member starts the
negotiation by sending a request message including the acquisition policy defined for
a member. When a member receives the acquisition policy, it reconciles the received
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acquisition policy with its share policy specified for that member. Three negotiation
outcomes are possible: the acquisition policy is entirely satisfied, partially satisfied
with the intersection of acquisition and share policies or is an empty set. A member
completes its negotiations after all of its acquisition policies for interested parties
are negotiated.
Computations on Negotiated Data. Once members negotiate their policies
( d ), Curie provides a multiparty data exchange device using secure multi-party
computation techniques enhanced with (optional) differential privacy guarantees.
This device ensures data and individual privacy. The guarantee provided by Curie
is that all computations among members will respect their policies.
To ensure data privacy, Curie includes cryptographic primitives such as Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and garbled circuits from the secure multi-party computation literature that allows members to perform computations on negotiated data
with no disclosed data from any single member. At the end of the secure computation, all of the parties obtain a final predictive model based on their policy
negotiations. To ensure the privacy of the individuals in the dataset, which the final model is computed on, Curie integrates Differential Privacy (DP). DP protects
against an attacker who tries to extract a particular individual’s data in the dataset
from the final computed model at the end of the secure computation protocol.

8.4

Curie Policy Description Language

We now illustrate the format and semantics of the Curie Policy Language (CPL).
Turning to the example consortium in Figure 8.3 established with three members,
each member defines its requirements for other members on a dataset having the
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columns of age, race, genotype, and weight (see Table 8.1). The criteria defined by
members are used throughout to construct their local policies.
Share and Acquisition Clauses. Curie policies are collections of clauses. The
collection of clauses for partners defines the local policy of a member. The clauses
allow each member to dictate a member specific policy for each other member.
Clauses have the following structure:
hclause tagi : hmembersi : hconditionalsi :: hselectionsi;
Clause tags are reference names for policy entries. Share and acquire are two reserved tags. Those clauses are comprised of three parts. The first part, members,
defines a list of members with whom to share and acquire. This can be a single
member or a comma-separated list of members. An empty member entry matches
all members. The second part, conditionals, is a list of conditions controlling when
this clause will be executed. A condition is a Boolean function which expresses
whether the share or acquire is allowed or not. For instance, a member may define a
condition where the data size is greater than a specific value. Only if all conditions
listed in conditionals are true, then this clause is executed. Last part, selections,
states what to share or acquire. It can be a list of filters on a member’s data. For
instance, a member may define a filter on a column of a dataset to limit acquisition
to a subset of the dataset. More complex selections can be assigned using member
defined sub-clauses. A sub-clause has the following structure:
htagi : hconditionalsi :: hselectionsi;
where tag is the name of sub-clause; conditionals is, as explained above, a list of
conditions stating whether this clause will be executed; selections is a list of filters
or a reference to a new sub-clause. Complex data selection can be addressed with
nested sub-clauses.
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Consortia member: M1
M2 – desires to acquire complete data of users who
are older than 25
M2 – shares its complete data
M3 – desires to acquire Asian users such that the Jaccard similarity of its age column and M3 ’s age
column is greater than 0.3
M3 – shares its complete data
Consortia member: M2
M1 – desires to acquire complete data
M1 – limits its share to EU and NATO citizen users
if M1 is both NATO and EU member and located in North America. Otherwise, it shares
only White users
M3 – desires to acquire complete data if M3 is a
NATO member
M3 – shares its complete data
Consortia member: M3
M1 – desires to acquire complete data of users having
genotype ‘A/A’
M1 – share complete data if intersection size of its and
M1 ’s genotype column is less than 10. Otherwise, it shares data of users that weigh more
than 100 pounds
M2 – desires to acquire complete data
M2 – shares complete data if M2 is EU member and
its data size is greater than 1K

Table 8.1: An example of member’s data exchange requirements.
CPL allows members to define multiple clauses. For instance, a member may
share a distinct subset of data for different conditions. CPL evaluates multiple
clauses in a top-down order. When conditionals of a clause evaluate to false, it
moves to the next clause until a clause is matched or it reaches end of the policy
file.
Conditionals and Selections. We present the use of conditionals and selections
through policies with examples. Their format and semantics are detailed. Consider
an example of two members, M1 and M2 , within a consortium. They define their
local policies as:
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@M1 acquire : M2 :
share : M2 :

:: s1 ;
::

@M2 acquire : M1 :

;
::

;

share : M1 : c1 , c2 :: fine-select ;
fine-select : c3 :: s2 ;
fine-select :

:: s3 ;

where c1 , c2 and c3 are conditionals, s1 , s2 and s3 are selections and fine-select is a
tag defined by M2 .
The acquire clause of M1 states that data is requested from M2 after it applies
s1 selection (e.g., age > 25) to its data. In contrast, its share clause allows complete
share of its data if M2 requests. On the other hand, the acquisition clause of M1
dictates requesting complete data from M2 . However, M2 allows data sharing if
the acquisition clause issued by M1 holds c1 ∧ c2 conditions (e.g., is both NATO
and EU member). Then, M2 delegates selection to member-defined fine-select subclauses. fine-select states that if the request satisfies the c3 condition (located in
North America) then the request is met with the data that is selected by the s2
selection (e.g., limits share of its data to NATO and EU member country citizens).
Otherwise, it shares data that is specified by selection s3 (White users).
CPL supports selections through filters. A filter contains zero or more operations over data inputs describing the share and acquisition criteria to be enforced.
Operations are defined as keywords or symbols such as <, >, =, in, like, and so on.
Selections and filters are defined in CPL as follows:
Selections are executed when conditionals evaluated to be true. Conditionals can be
consortium and dataset-specific. For instance, a member may require other members
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to be in a particular country or to be in an alliance such as NATO and to have their
dataset size greater than a particular value. Such conditionals do not require any
data exchange between members to be evaluated. However, members may want to
incorporate a relation between their data and other member’s data into their policies
as detailed next.
Data-dependent Conditionals. A member’s decision on whether to share or to
acquire data can depend on other member’s data. Simply put, one example of a datadependent conditional among two members could be whether the intersection size of
the two sets (e.g., a specific column of a dataset) is not too high. Considering such
knowledge, a member can make a conditional decision about share or acquisition of
that data. For instance, consider a list of private IP addresses used for blacklisting
the domains. If a member knows that the intersection size is close to zero, then
the member may dictate an acquire clause to request complete features from that
member based on IP addresses [FDCB15].
CPL defines an evaluate keyword for data-dependent conditionals through functions on data. Data-dependent conditionals take the following form:
A member that uses the data-dependent conditionals defines a reference data
(data ref) required for a such computation, an algorithm (alg arg) and a threshold
(thshold arg) that is compared with the output of the computation. CPL includes
four algorithms for data-dependent conditionals (see Table 8.2). To be brief, intersection size measures the size of the overlap between two sets; Jaccard index is a
statistic measure of similarity between sets; Pearson correlation is a statistical measure of how much two sets are linearly dependent; and Cosine similarity is a measure
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Pairwise alg.

Output

Private protocol

Proof

Intersection size
|Di ∩ Dj |
Intersection cardinality [DCGT12]
Jaccard index
(|Di ∩ Dj |)/(|Di ∪ Dj |)
Jaccard similarity [BDCG12]
Pearson correlation (COV (Di , Dj ))/(σDi σDj )
Garbled circuits
[H+ 11]
Cosine similarity
(Di Dj )/(kDi kkDj k)
Garbled circuits
[H+ 11]

Table 8.2: CPL data-dependent conditional algorithms. Two members of a consortium use the conditionals to compute the pairwise statistics. The members then
use the output of the algorithm to determine whether to acquire or share data from
another party. (Di and Dj are the inputs of a dataset, and σ is std. deviation).
of similarity between two vectors. Each algorithm is based on a different assumption
about the underlying reference data. However, central to all of them is to privately
(without leaking any sensitive data) measure a relation between two members’ data
to offer an effective data exchange. We note that these algorithms are found to be
effective in capturing input relations in datasets [FDCB15, GPGMP16].
Data-dependent conditionals are implemented through private protocols (as defined in Table 8.2). These protocols are implemented with the cryptographic tools
of garbled circuits and private functions. Protocols preserve the confidentiality of
data. That is, each member gets the output indicated in Table 8.2 without revealing
their sensitive data in plain text. After the private protocol terminates, the output
of the algorithm is compared with a threshold value set by the requester. If the
output is below the threshold value, the conditional is evaluated to true. Turning
to above example M3 joins the consortium. M1 and M2 extend their local policies
for M3 :
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@M1 acquire : M3 : evaluate(local data, ’Jaccard’, 0.3) :: race=Asian;
share : M3 :

::

;

@M2 acquire : M3 : M3 in $NATO ::
share : M3 :
@M3 acquire : M1 :

::

;

;
:: Genotype = ’A/A’ ;

share : M1 : evaluate(local data,’intersection size’, 10) ::
share : M1 :
acquire : M2 :

;

:: weight>150 ;
::

;

share : M2 : M2 in $EU, size(data)> 1K ::

;

The acquire clause of M1 defines a data-dependent conditional for M3 . It defines a
Jaccard measure on its local data through evaluate keyword and sets its threshold
value equal to 0.3. M3 agrees to share its local data with M1 if intersection size of
its local data is less then 10. Otherwise, it consults the next share clause defined
for M1 which states that an individual’s weight greater than 150 pounds will be
shared. All other share and acquire clauses are trivial. Members agree to share and
acquire complete data based on data size (data size > 1K), alliance membership
(e.g., NATO or EU member) and inputs (e.g., genotype).
Putting pieces together, CPL allows members independently define a data exchange policy with share and acquire clauses. The policies are dictated through
conditionals and selections. This allows members to dictate policies in complex and
asymmetric relationships. Defined in Section 8.3, CPL provides members to dictate
partnership, share, acquisition, and data-dependent conditionals.
Policy Negotiation and Conflicts. Data exchange between members is governed
by matching share and acquire clauses in each member’s respective policies. Both
share and acquire clauses state conditions and selections on the data exchanged.
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Policy ID Consortium Name
Acquisition Policy Share Policy
Policy Definition
Each member uses its local patient dataset to learn warfarin dose model.
P.1
Single Source
7
7
Members in the same country establish a consortium based on state and country laws.
P.2
Nation-wide
3
3
Members
in
the
same
continent
establish
a
consortium.
P.3
Regional
3
3
NATO and EU members establish a consortium independently based on their mutual agreements.
P.4
NATO-EU
3
3
Members exchange their complete data to build the warfarin dose model.
P.5
Global
3
3

Table 8.3: Consortia constructed among members. Acquisition and share policies
of members for each consortium are studied in Section 8.7.
Consider two example local policies with a share clause @m2 (share : m1 : c1 :: s1 )
and matching acquire clause @m1 (acquire : m2 : c2 : s2 ). Curie’s negotiation
algorithm respects both autonomy of the data owner and the needs of the requester.
It conservatively negotiates share and acquire clauses such that it will return the
intersection of respective data sets in resulting policy assignment. The resolved
policy in this example is share : m1 : c1 ∧ c2 :: s1 ∧ s2 which states that the data
exchange from m2 to m1 is subject to both c1 and c2 conditionals and resulting
sharing has s1 and s2 selections on m2 ’s data. This authoritative negotiation makes
sure no member’s data is shared beyond its explicit intent, regardless how the other
members’ policies are defined. This is because negotiation fulfilling the criteria for
each clause is based on the union of logical expressions defined in two policies. Each
member runs the negotiation algorithm for members found in their member list.
After all members terminate their negotiations, the negotiated policy is enforced in
computations.

8.5

Deployment of Curie

To validate Curie in a real application, we integrated Curie into 24 medical institutions. Each institution wants to compute a warfarin dose model on the distributed
dataset without disclosing the patient health-care records. Without deployment of
Curie, institutions compute warfarin dosage of a patient using a model computed

on their local patient data. Curie first enables institutions to negotiate their data
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exchange requirements through CPL. In this, Curie allows members to construct
various consortia wherein each member defines a data exchange policy for other
members. The next step is to compute a privacy-preserving dose model such that
each party does not learn any information about the patient’s records of other medical institutions and respects the policy negotiated. Curie implements a secure
dose protocol through homomorphic encryption (HE) to enforce the policy agreements of the members. We next present the deployment of Curie to institutions
(Section 8.5.1) and integration of policy agreements in warfarin dose model (Section 8.5.2).

8.5.1

Deployment Setup

Warfarin- known as the brand name Coumadin is a widely prescribed (over 20
million times each year in the United States) anticoagulant medication. It is mainly
used to treat (or prevent) blood clots (thrombosis) in veins or arteries. Taking highdose warfarin causes thin blood which may result in intracranial and extracranial
bleeding. Taking low doses causes thick blood which may result in embolism and
stroke. Current clinical practices suggest a fixed initial dose of 5 or 10 mg/day.
Patients regularly have a blood test to check how long it takes for blood to clot
(international normalized ratio (INR)). Based on the INR, subsequent doses are adjusted to maintain the patient’s INR at the desired level. Therefore, it is important
to predict the proper warfarin dose for the patients.
Consortium Members. 24 medical institutions from nine countries and four
continents individually collected the largest patient data for predicting personalized
warfarin dose. Members collect 68 inputs from patients’ genotypic, demographic,
background information, yet a long study concluded that eight inputs are sufficient
for proper prescriptions [Int09].
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Warfarin Dose Prediction Model. To determine the proper personalized warfarin dosage, a long line of work concluded with an algorithm of an ordinary linear
regression model [Int09]. The model is a function f : X → Y that aim at predicting targets of warfarin dose y ∈ Y given a set of patient inputs x ∈ X . We
represent the patient dataset of each member Di = {(xi , yi )}ni=1 , and a loss function
` : Y × Y → [0, ∞). The loss function penalizes deviations between true dose and
predictions. Learning is then searching for a dose model f minimizing the average
loss:
n

L(D, f ) =

1X
`(f (xi ), yi ).
n

(8.1)

i=1

The dose model reduces to minimizing the average loss L(D, f ) with respect to
the parameters of the model f . The model is linear, i.e., f (x) = α> x + β, and the
loss function is the squared loss `(f (x), y) = (f (x) − y)2 . The dose model gives as
well or better results than other more complex numerical methods and outperforms
fixed-dose approach1 [Int09]. We re-implemented the algorithm in Python by direct
translation from the authors’ implementation and found that the accuracy of our
implementation has no statistically significant difference.
Consortia and Member Policies. We define consortia among medical institutions that they state partnerships for data exchange. Table 8.3 summarizes the
consortia. The consortia are defined based on statute and regulations between
members, as well as regional, and national partnerships are studied based on their
countries [fMS17, Ame17, Hea17, Rep17]. For example, NATO allied medical support doctrine allows strategic relationships that are otherwise not obtainable by
1 The

model has been released online http://www.warfarindosing.org to help doctors
and other clinicians for predicting ideal dose of warfarin.
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Secure Dose Algorithm Protocol
Pi
Phase 1
Initialize:
Random values:Vi =Xi T Yi ,Oi =Xi T Xi
Generate HE key pair (Ki ; Kpi )
Secure Data Transfer:
Mi :<E(Oi )K ,E(Vi )K ,Ki >
i
i
Phase n
From Pn :ΣE(Oi )K ,E(Vi )K
i
i
O,V=D(Σ(E(Oi )K ,E(Vi )K )K
i
i pi
True values:V t = Xi T Yi ; Ot = Xi T Xi
i
i
O=O-Oi +Ot ,V=V-Vi +V t
i
i
Global parameters: η=O -1 V

Pi+1
Phase 2
Post-Reconciliation:
Compute:Vj =Xj T Yj ,Oj =Xj T Xj
Secure Computation:
E(Oj )K ; E(Vj )K
i
i
HA: E(Oj )K +E(Oi )K
i
i
HA: E(Vj )K + E(Vi )K
i
i
Secure Data Transfer:
Mi+1 :<E(Oj )K +E(Oi )K ,
i
i
E(Vj )K +E(Vi )K ,Ki >
i
i

:::

Pn
:::
:::
:::

to Pi

Figure 8.4: Secure dose algorithm protocol: Member (Pi ) starts the protocol, the
procedures and message flow among members are highlighted in boldface. At the
final phase, Pi is able to compute the dose model coefficients from the negotiated
data.
non-NATO members. Each member in a consortium exchanges data with other
members based on its CPL policy. Various acquisition and share policies of CPL
are studied via conditionals and selections in Section 8.7. We note that policy construction is a subjective enterprise. Depending on the nature and constraints of
a given environment, any number of policies are appropriate. Such is the promise
of policy defined behavior; alternate interpretations leading to other application
requirements can be addressed through CPL.

8.5.2

Privacy-preserving Dose Prediction Model

The computation of local dose model of a medical institution is straightforward: a
member calculates the dose model through Equation 8.2 with the use of patient data
collected locally. To implement a privacy-preserving dose model among consortia
members of medical institutions, we define the dose prediction formula stated in
Equation 8.1 in a matrix form by minimizing with maximum likelihood estimation:
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β = (X | X )−1X | Y,

(8.2)

where X is the input matrix, Y is the dose matrix, and β is the coefficients of the
dose model.
Curie allows members to collaboratively learn a dose model without disclosing

their patient records and guarantees data sharing complies with the policy as negotiated. As shown in Equation 8.4, each member translates its negotiated data into
neutral input matrices [WKT11]. Particularly, patient samples to be exchanged
by each member are computed as an input matrix X0 , . . . , Xn and dose matrix
Y0 , . . . , Yn . The transformation defines each member’s local statistics Oi = X | X
and Vi = X | Y. Local statistics is the output of the negotiation of each member
in a consortium. The aggregation of the local statistics corresponds to a negotiated
dataset which is the exact amount that a member negotiates to obtain from other
members in a consortium. Curie constructs the dose algorithm of the negotiated
dataset as a concatenation of members’ local statistics as follows:

n
n
h
ih
i| X
X
|
|
|
X X = X1 | . . . |Xn X1 | . . . |Xn =
Xi Xi =
Vi = V
|

i|
h
ih
|
|
X Y = X1 | . . . |Xn Y1 | . . . |Xn =
|

i=1
n
X

Xi| Yi =

i=1

i=1
n
X

Oi = O

(8.3)
(8.4)

i=1

In Equation 8.4, a member computes model coefficients using the sum of other
members local statistics. The local statistics includes m × m constant matrices
where m is the number inputs (independent of number of dataset size). Using this
observation, a party computes the coefficients of the negotiated dataset:

η (negotiated) = (X | X )−1X | Y = O−1V
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(8.5)

In Equation 8.5, while the accuracy objective of the dose model is guaranteed using the coefficients obtained from the sum of local statistics, the exchange of clear
statistics among parties may leak information about members’ data. A member
can infer knowledge about the distribution of each input of other members from
matrices of Oi and Vi [EESA+ 12]. Furthermore, an adversary may sniff data traffic
to control and modify exchanged messages. To solve these problems, we use homomorphic encryption (HE) that allows computation on ciphertexts [AAUC18]. HE
allows members to perform the computation of joint of function without requiring
additional communication complexity other than the data exchange. We note that
HE itself cannot preserve the confidentiality of data from multiple parties in centralized settings [VDJ10]. However, Curie implements a distributed privacy-preserving
multi-party dose model, as shown in Figure 8.4.
To illustrate, we consider an example session of n members authorized for data
exchange in a consortium. In this example, a ring topology is used for secure group
communication (i.e., Pi talks to Pi+1 , and similarly Pn talks to Pi ). P1 initially generates a pair of encryption keys using the homomorphic cryptosystem and broadcasts
the public key to the members in its member list. P1 then generates random Vi , Oi
and encrypts them E(Oi )Ki and E(Vi )Ki using its public key Ki . It starts the session by sending them to the next member in the ring. When next member receives
the encrypted message, it adds its local Vi and Oi matrices through homomorphic
addition to the output of its policy reconciliation for P1 and passes to the next member. Remaining members take the similar steps. Secure computation executes one
round per member in which the computation for the particular member visits other
members. This allows Curie to enforce HE on shared data of a particular member
in each round uses and does not suffer insecurities associated with centralized HE
constructions [VDJ10].
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Total messages for policy agreement

10 4
P.5 Global
10 3

10

2

P.3 N. America

P.3 Europe
P.4 EU
P.4 NATO
P.2 U.S.

10 1

P.3 Asia
P.2 UK

10

0

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Consortia size

Figure 8.5: CPL negotiation cost - Costs associated with a number of varying members in a consortium. Each member defines asymmetric share and acquisition policy
for other members. The number of members in warfarin consortia is marked with
red circles.
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Figure 8.6: CPL selections and data-dependent conditional costs - Costs associated with varying members and algorithms. All consortia members agree on policy
including a different data-dependent conditional and selections over one input of
having 200 samples.
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At the final stage of the protocol, P1 receives the sum statistics of Oi and Vi from
Pn . P1 decrypts the sum of the statistics using its private key and then subtracts
the initial random values of Vi , Oi and adds its true values used for computation
of the local dose model coefficients. The final result O and V is the coefficients of
the dose model that respects P1 ’s policy negotiations. Other consortium members
similarly start the protocol and compute the coefficients.

8.6

Security Analysis of the Dose Algorithm

We present security and privacy guarantees of the dose algorithm provided to all
members through the share of encrypted integrated statistics, (Oi = X | X and
Vi = X | Y matrices). Since all data exchange among parties is encrypted through
the use of HE, the security of the algorithm against any adversary outside the
authorized parties is based on the underlying HE cryptosystem.
An adversary not involving session initiator. Assume for now that a session
initiator does not collude with other parties. Loosely speaking, since all computations are performed on the encrypted data, none of the parties learn anything about
other parties’ input.
We consider a party Pi+1 in Figure 8.4. The party Pi+1 has the public key
generated by the session initiator Ki , the encryption of local statistics of previous parties Mi = (E(Oi )K , E(Vi )K ). Its input is (Vi+1 , Oi+1 ) and its output is
Mi+1 = (E(Oi + Oi+1 ), E(Vi + Vi+1 )). A simulator S selects random values for
0
0
its own inputs (Vi+1
, Oi+1
) and encrypts them using the public key published by

the session initiator. Then, the simulator S performs the homomorphic operation
0
0
0
on the received message Mi and outputs Mi+1
= (E(Oi + Oi+1
)K , E(Vi + Vi+1
)K ).

Here, we assume the underlying HE is semantically secure. Therefore, the output
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0
of the simulator Mi+1
is computationally indistinguishable from output of the real

execution of the protocol Mi+1 for every input pairs. Therefore, using the definition
in [Gol09] the protocol privately computes the function in the presence of one semihonest corrupted party. The extension to multi-corrupted semi-honest adversaries
is straightforward as the only difference is the view of a subset of parties having
many encrypted messages. Since the semantic security of the underlying HE is hold
for any pair of these many encrypted messages, no information leaks about the
corresponding plaintexts.
Adversary involving session initiator. We consider the case when the session
initiator is corrupted. The corrupted parties including session initiator can infer
the input of an honest party if the predecessor (previous party) and successor (next
party) of an honest party are both corrupted. We consider the possible cases for
data leakage: (1) 2-party: The session initiator is corrupted, and another party is
honest. In this case, predecessor and successor of the honest party are both the
corrupted session initiator. Therefore, the input of honest party is learned by the
corrupted party, (2) 3-party: A corrupted session initiator is either predecessor or
successor; thus it can learn inputs of the one of the honest party only if another
party is corrupted, and (3) n-party (n > 3): To learn an honest party’s input, at
least two parties must be corrupted and placed in previous and next of the honest
party.
While the individual raw data of members does not leak, the risk of inappropriate
disclosures from local summary statistics exists in some extreme cases [EESA+ 12].
Consider the exchange of plain matrix Vi = X | Y among two parties; a party may
use the extreme values found in Vi to identify particular patients. For instance, in
dose algorithm, taking inducers such as Rifadin and Dilantin could indicate high
dose prescriptions. If the values of Vi are high, then a party may infer a patient that
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takes enzyme inducers and the presence of high dosage warfarin intake. Similarly,
exchange of Oi = X | X may leak information about the number of observations and
represent the number of 0s or 1s in a column. For instance, for the former first entry
in the matrix, X | X, gives the total number of patients. For the latter, (X | X)j,j
gives the number of 1s in the column. This type information lets a party infer
knowledge, particularly when binary inputs (e.g., use of the medicine) are used.
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Figure 8.7: CPL performance on privacy-preserving and differential private protocol
- All members define an asymmetric share and acquisition policy through selections
and conditionals. The agreements of CPL policies between consortia members are
studied with the different number of consortia members, data samples, and input
size. (Std. dev. of ten runs is ± 3.6 and ± 0.3 sec. with and without homomorphic
key generation.)

8.7

Evaluation

This section details the operation of the Curie through policies. We show how
flexible data exchange policies are implemented and operated. We focus on the
following questions:
1. What are the performance trade-offs in configuring CPL?
2. Can members reliably use Curie to integrate various policies?
3. Do members improve the accuracy of dose predictions with the use of CPL?
The answers to the first two questions are addressed in Section 8.7.1, and the
last question is answered in Section 8.7.2. As detailed throughout, Curie allows 50
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members to compute the privacy-preserving model using 5K data samples with 40
inputs in less than a minute. We also show how an algorithm with flexible data
exchange policies can improve–often substantially–the accuracy of the warfarin dose
model accuracy.
Experimental Setup. The experiments were performed on a cluster of machines
with 32 GB of maximum memory and 16-core Intel Xeon CPU at 1.90 GHz, where
we use one core to get a lower bound estimate. Each member is simulated in a server
that stores its data. Secure computation protocols of Curie are implemented using
the open-source HElib library [HS14b]. We set the security parameter of HElib
as 128 bits. Multiplication level is optimized per member to increase the number
of allowed homomorphic operations without decryption failure and to reduce the
computation time.
We validate the accuracy of dose model in various consortia defined in Table 8.3
with members defining different data exchange policies. The dataset used in our
experiments contains 5700 patient records from 21 members. Dose model accuracy
of each member is validated with Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE). MAPE
measures the percentage of how far predicted dosages are away from true dosage.
Lower values indicate better quality of treatment.

8.7.1

Performance Evaluation

We present the costs associated with various Curie mechanisms. We illustrate the
cost of the CPL in policy negotiations, in the use of data-dependent conditionals,
and in the dose algorithm.
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Figure 8.8: The implication of policies on model accuracy - errors are validated
in various consortia through data exchange policies. Figure 6(c-f): The local acquisition policies of members comply with the sharing policy within a consortium
(i.e., members acquire complete data of the consortia members. Std. devs. of errors
are within %5, if not illustrated).
CPL Benchmarks
Our first set of experiments characterize the policy construction and negotiation
costs. Various consortia and policies are instrumented to analyze the overhead of
the number of messages and time required to compute the CPL selections and datadependent conditionals. All the costs not specific to the policies are excluded in
measurements (e.g., network latency). The benchmark results are summarized in
Figure 8.5 and 8.6 and discussed below.
Figure 8.5 shows the number of messages for policy construction required for
different consortia size. The number of members in warfarin study is also labeled.
For instance, NATO consortium has 13 members; ten members from U.S. and three
from UK. The experiments illustrate the upper bound results wherein each member
defines a different share and acquisition policy for other members (i.e., asymmetric relations). In this, each member sends acquisition policy request to consortium
members. After a member gets the acquisition request, it reconciles with its share
policy and output of negotiation message is returned. The number of messages asso-
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ciated with varying number of selections and conditionals dictated by the members
does not require any additional messages. For instance, the acquisition request of a
member includes arguments when conditionals are defined (e.g., reference data and a
threshold value for data-dependent conditionals such as pairwise Jaccard distance),
and the result is returned with the negotiation output message. However, the use
of the selections and data-dependent conditionals brings additional processing cost
as detailed next.
Figure 8.6 shows the costs associated with the use of CPL selection and datadependent conditionals. All the members dictate data-dependent conditionals and
selections on a single input. The members input size for the data-dependent conditional computations is set to 200 real values. This is the average number of inputs
found in members’ dataset. Since selections and conditionals reconcile contradictions between acquisition and share policies, they do not require any additional
computation overhead and yield a processing time of milliseconds. However, the
time associated with varying data-dependent conditionals depend on the protocol
of associated secure pairwise algorithm. In our experiments, cosine similarity and
intersection size exhibited shorter computation time than Pearson correlation and
Jaccard distance. Overall, we found that 25 members compute the metrics less than
18 seconds. Note that the results serve as an upper bound that all members define
a set of selections and a data-dependent conditional on one input.
Dose Model Benchmarks
Our second series of experiments characterize the impact of CPL on the average
time of computing privacy-preserving dose model with varying number of members
and dataset sizes. Though the warfarin study includes eight inputs, evaluations are
repeated with the input size of 8, 16, 24, 32, and 40 through various dataset sample
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sizes for completeness. The input and sample size together represents the total
dataset shared for a member as a result of the policy agreements. Our experiments
show that 80% of computation overhead is attributed to HE key generation. The
cost of the differential privacy takes microseconds, as the members can calculate
the (optional) differential private algorithm model at the end of the secure dose
protocol. Computations are instrumented to classify the overheads incurred by key
generation, encryption, decryption, and evaluation. We next present the costs with
and without key generation to study the impact of the number of members and data
size.
Figure 8.7 (a-b) presents the computation cost with varying number of members.
Each member’s dataset includes 5000 data samples which acquired as a result of the
policy negotiations. Figure 8.7 (a) presents the cost of the total computation time
excluding HE key generation. There is a linear increase in time with the growing
number of members. This is the fundamental cost of encryption and evaluation
operations dominated by matrix encryption and addition. To profile the generation
of key cost, in Figure 8.7 (b), we conducted similar experiments. Each input size
cost increases because of the key generation overhead. The increase is quadratic as
a number of slots (plaintext elements) are set to square of input size not to lose any
data during input conversion. It is important to note that the cost is independent
of the member size because a member generates the key only once in a computation
of a consortium. We note that the time overhead of key generation is not a limiting
factor as members may generate keys before a consortium is established.
In Figure 8.7 (c-d), we show the costs associated with different data samples. The
number of members in a consortium is set to 20. Similar to the previous experiments,
the key generation dominates the computation costs. Our experiments also reported
no relationship between the cost and number of samples. That is, even though the
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Member
U.S.
Brasil
UK
Israel
Taiwan
S. Korea

Agreement of policy negotiations


(Race=“Asian”)∨(EVALUATE(age))∨(height <160) ∨(weight <65)∨(CYP2C9 IN ( 2*/*2, 2*/*3)∨(Amiodarone=“Y”)∨(Enzyme=“Y”)


(Race=“Asian”)∨(height <165)∨(CYP2C9 IN (2*/*2, 2*/*3)∨EVALUATE (Amiodarone)∨(Enzyme=“Y”)


(Race6=“White”)∨(age BETWEEN 20-29 AND >80)∨(height<165)∨(60<weight <100)∨EVALUATE(CYP2C9)∨(Amiodarone=“Y”), (Enzyme=“Y”)


(Race6= “White”)∨(height <160cm)∨(weight <60)∨(CYP2C9=3*/*3)∨(Amiodarone=“Y”)∨(Enzyme Inducer =“Y”)


(Race=All)∨(age BETWEEN 20-29)∨(height >170)∨(weight >65)∨(CYP2C9 IN (1*/*2, 2*/*2, 2*/*3, 3*/*3)∨(VK0RC1=“G/G”)∨(Amiodarone=“Y”)∨(Enzyme=“Y”)


(Race=All)∨ (age BETWEEN 20-29)∨(height >165)∨(weight >60)∨(CYP2C9 IN (1*/*2, 2*/*2, 2*/*3, 3*/*3)∨(VK0RC1=“G/G”)∨(Amiodarone=“Y”)∨(Enzyme=“Y”)

Table 8.4: An exploration of CPL policies in the global consortium (illustrated as
a plain language): Each member defines asymmetric local policy based on its data
diversity. The agreement of share and acquisition policies are depicted as a policy
clause in a single row. The agreement result of each member for other members is
not presented for brevity.
size of the data samples increases, the overhead is amortized over the operations on
the local statistics of the computations (which is the square matrix of the input size
in the warfarin dataset); thus the time of computing dose algorithm converges to
the number of dataset inputs. This explains the similar trends observed in plots.

8.7.2

Effectiveness of Policies

We validate the performance of privacy-preserving dose model quantitatively and
qualitatively. For the warfarin study, these are translated to the following questions:
How do policies impact the accuracy of members’ warfarin dose prediction? (Section 8.7.2), and Does policies help to prevent the adverse impacts of dose errors on
patient health? (Section 8.7.2).
Implications of CPL on Model Accuracy
In our first set of experiments, we validate how well a member prescribe warfarin dose
for its local patients and patient’s of the consortium members without using CPL.
These results are used as a baseline for comparison of varying consortia and data
exchange policies throughout. Figure 8.8 (a) sought to identify the local algorithm
errors (P.1). The errors significantly differ between countries and for the members
of the same country (depicted as M1 and M2 in the U.S.). The low results are
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due to having homogeneous data; all the inputs in these countries have similar
traits. For instance, similar age and ethnicity found in a dataset produce overfitted computation results for its local patients. These findings are validated with
use of local algorithms for treatment of other countries’ patients. As illustrated
in Figure 8.8 (b), the dose errors yield significantly high for particular countries’
patients. The results indicate that improvements in dose predictions of local patients
and members’ patients lay in the creation of data exchange policies to increase the
patient diversity.
The next experiments measure the impact of CPL in nation-wide (P.2), regional
(P.3), NATO-EU (P.4) and global (P.5) consortia. Each member creates a local
acquisition policy to acquire the complete data of consortia members (i.e., the acquisition policy of a consortium member complies with the share policy of the requested
member). We make three major observations. First, varying partnerships yield different dose accuracy. For instance, members of nation-wide consortium get better
dose accuracy than their local results. This result is validated through nationwide
consortia and a single member (M1 ) in United States (see Figure 8.8 (c)). Second,
supporting previous findings, all regional (excluding Asia) and NATO-EU policies
decrease the error for both treatment of their patients and the other countries’ patients (see Figure 8.8 (d-e)). However, Asia consortium results in unexpected dose
errors for the treatment of other regions’ patients. This is because nation-wide,
regional, and NATO-EU policies include patient population having different characteristics; thus the data obtained through policy negotiations better generalize to
the dosages. In contrast, Asia collaboration lacks large enough White and Black
groups. Third, the global consortium results in higher dose errors when evaluated
for particular countries such as Brazil and Taiwan (see Figure 8.8 (f)). To conclude,
while CPL is effective in reducing dose error of a member, the results highlight the
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need for the systematic use of CPL through selections and conditionals to obtain
better results.
In these experiments, each member dictates a different acquisition policy based
on its racial groups. Members aim at having an ideal patient population uniformity.
To do so, each member defines a local acquisition policy and negotiates it with
other members. Each member sets its share policy to conditionals of being in the
same consortium and data size greater than 200; thus, the policy of each member
is asymmetric. Table 8.4 shows the simplified notation of the policy agreements
in the global consortium. For instance, a member having a small number of white
patients defines selections to solely acquire that group and a member having large
enough patients for all genotypes sets data-dependent conditionals to obtain patient
inputs that are not similar in its data samples (e.g., acquires different genotypes).
Figure 8.9 presents a subset of results on dose errors per patient race. The errors
of the other races yield similar for each member. The results without CPL conditionals and selections are plotted as a dashed line for comparison. We find that
members can improve the dose accuracy with the use of policies. We note that the
use of different data-dependent conditionals defined in evaluate does not result in
statistically significant accuracy gain.
Implications of CPL on Patient Health
We examine the impact of the dose errors found in the previous section to better
quantify the effectiveness of policies on patient health.
To identify the adverse effects of warfarin, we use a clinical study to evaluate
the clinical relevance of prediction errors [CLM17] and a medical guide to identify
the consequences of over- and under-prescriptions [FA17]. We define errors that
are inside and outside of the warfarin safety window, and the under- or over pre-
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Figure 8.9: Dose accuracy of members using CPL policies defined in Table 8.4.
Members construct a model per race after they reconcile the policies. The dashed
line is the average error found without the use of conditionals and selections in
policies.
scriptions. We consider weekly errors for each patient because using weekly values
eliminates the errors posed by the initial (daily) dose. The weekly dose is in the
safety window if an estimated dose falls within 20% of its corresponding clinicallydeduced value [Int09, K+ 13]. The deviations falling outside of the safety window is
an under- or over prescriptions, and cause health-related risks.
Table 8.5 presents the percentage of patients falls in safety window, over- and
-under prescriptions with varying policies of a member. We find that use of CPL
increases the number of patients in the safety window. For instance, a member
has 43.4% patient with using its local data (single source model), and the member
increases the percentage of patients in a safety window with varying consortia and
policies, for instance, it is 52.4% in the nation-wide consortium. We conclude that
CPL might be useful in preventing errors that introduce health-related risks.
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Consortium
Single Source
Nation-wide
NATO
Regional
Global

U
37.7%
18.9%
19.3%
19%
21.2%

SW
43.4%
52.3%
51.5%
51.3%
46.8%

O
Selections Conditionals
18.8%
7
7
28.8%
3
3
29.2%
3
3
29.7%
3
3
32%
3
3

Table 8.5: Impact of policies on health-related risks: Results are from a global
consortium patients using policy agreement of a member located in the U.S. The
member uses the policy defined in Table 8.4. (U: Under-prescription, SW: Safety
Window, O: Over-prescription)

8.8

Limitations and Discussion

One requirement for correctly interpreting the CPL policies is a shared schema
for solving the compatibility issues among members. For instance, members may
interpret the data columns (e.g., column names and types) differently or may not
have the information about consortium members (e.g., membership status of an
alliance). CPL implements a shared schema describing column names, their types,
and explanations of data fields as well as consortium-specific information. Members
can negotiate the schema similar to the policy negotiations and revise the schema
based on the schema of a negotiation initiator.
CPL provides a set of data-dependent statistical functions (e.g., cosine similarity)
to compute pairwise statistics among member’s local data. However, there might be
a need for other functions that help members decide their data exchange policies.
For example, data exchange among finance companies may require calculating the
similarity between data distributions. Future work will investigate the integration
of different data-dependent statistics into CPL.
Lastly, we did not focus much on the reasons of policy impacts on the prediction
success of the dose algorithm and its adverse outcomes on patient health over time.
While our evaluation results showed that members could express both complex rela-
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tions and constraints on the data exchange through CPL policies, members require
establishing true partnerships to improve the prediction model accuracy. While
this explanation matches both our intuition and the experimental results, a further
domain-specific formal analysis is needed. We plan to pursue this in future work.

8.9

Conclusions

In this chapter, we presented Curie which provides a novel policy language called
CPL to define the specifications of data exchange requirements securely for use in
collaborative learning settings. Members can assert who and what to exchange
separately for data sharing and data acquisition policies. This allows members to
efficiently dictate their policies in complex and asymmetric relationships through selections, conditionals, and pairwise data-dependent statistics. We validated Curie
in an example real-world healthcare application through varying policies of consortia members. A secure multi-party and (optional) differentially-private model
is implemented to illustrate the policy/performance trade-offs. Curie allowed 50
different members to efficiently compute a privacy-preserving model using 5K data
samples with 40 inputs in less than a minute. We also showed how an algorithm
with effective use of data exchange policies could improve the accuracy of the dose
prediction model.
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CHAPTER 9
ACHIEVING SECURE AND DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE
COMPUTATIONS IN MULTIPARTY SETTINGS

9.1

Introduction

Secure and private computation of statistical models is increasingly used in different
operational settings from healthcare [KHK+ 16, CAA+ 19] to finance [BTW12] and
security sensitive applications [FDCB15]. Given the distributed nature of these
applications, security and privacy are mostly achieved by utilizing Secure Multiparty
Computation (SMC). SMC allows distributed parties to jointly compute an agreed
function over their private inputs without revealing those inputs to other parties.
Each party learns the final result, but no other information. However, SMC has a
major privacy concern for a targeted individual as it does not guarantee that the
final result of distributed computation would not leak any information about an
individual in a sensitive dataset. Privacy of individuals and their data can be easily
violated. [EESA+ 12, NS08, GKS08]. Therefore, there is a need for a mechanism,
where individual parties do not see each others’ inputs and further can not infer their
data from the final constructed model. Indeed, combining SMC with Differential
Privacy (DP) could solve this privacy problem as DP introduces sufficient noise into
the final result to prevent any leakage about a single individual.
However, combining SMC with DP is not a trivial task. In an ideal case, a trusted
data collector1 can collect the data, aggregate them and add calibrated noise to the
results of the queries (predictions) (Centralized DP (CDP) in Fig. 9.1). However, a
trusted party does not exist in many real life scenarios. This technique would easily
1A

data collector is either one of the parties or a third party. Every discussion here
applies to both of the types.
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Figure 9.1: Illustration of secure multiparty computation with distributed and centralized differential privacy methods.
leak the model of the sensitive data to an untrusted data collector who collects the
final model of the data. Even for scenarios with a trusted data collector, relying on
the centralized entity makes it a single point of failure for the entire data collection
mechanism.
On the other hand, another mechanism involves applying a data sanitization
technique (Distributed DP (DDP) in Fig. 9.1) directly on the local data held by
the parties. In this case, the untrusted data collector can not infer individuals’ data
since sufficient noise is injected by DP to hide the individuals’ data. However, this
mechanism requires a meticulous analysis since it may lead to a divergent or excessive amount of accumulated noise due to DP at the data collector end. As such,
this process may lead to a significant accuracy loss in the final models, which may
cause catastrophic consequences in, for example, the healthcare domain. Therefore, enabling distributed differential privacy on local data with differential privacy
guarantees on final results is a challenging problem.
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In this chapter, we are motivated to provide a solution to this problem. Specifically, we propose a novel protocol for achieving Secure Multiparty Distributed
Differentially Private (SM-DDP) computations on sensitive data. The protocol
provides the guarantees of both SMC and DP. SMC is provided through Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [Gen09] while DP is provided via Functional Mechanism
(FM) [ZZX+ 12]. An important characteristic of FM is that it injects noise into the
feature matrices (i.e., coefficients of objective function), which can be computed independently by each party in a multiparty computational environment. We explore
this feature of FM and apply it to linear regression using our SM-DDP protocol, but
it can be applied to the computation of any statistical model function that allows
independent calculation from the local statistics. We show that the accumulated
noise in our protocol is still bounded and convergent by using the infinite divisibility
property of Laplacian distribution [McN02]. Finally, we evaluated SM-DDP protocol’s computational efficacy on linear regression using two real-world datasets. We
compare our results with the use of Centralized DP (CDP) in a multiparty setting
as in Fig. 9.1. The intuition is that the distributed setting of DP (DDP), which is
proposed in this paper, would cause a greater accuracy loss than the typical clientserver setting of SMC systems. However, we show exactly same trade-off can be
achieved using the SM-DDP protocol that is presented in Fig. 9.3. The extensive
evaluation results indicate that the proposed SM-DDP protocol yields minimal computational overhead—less than a minute for 20 parties with 32 attributes and 10K
samples. The individual parties obtain better accuracy than that would be obtained
from a single party model. Finally, SM-DDP is scalable while providing security and
privacy guarantees.
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9.2

Linear Models

In this section, we start by introducing the linear models. We, then, show how to
compute linear regression in a distributed fashion.

9.2.1

Background

Assume a database D consists of n observations {xi , yi }ni=1 , where xi is a vector of d
attributes (i.e., xi = (xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xid ) and yi is a scalar response. The aim is to find
a model function f : X → Y that can predict yi ∈ Y as close as its actual value using
the attributes xi ∈ X. The type of the regression model is decided by the type of
the model function. For instance, in linear regression, the model function is simply
a straight line. Model function f takes model coefficients w = (w1 , w2 , . . . , wd ) and
xi as inputs and outputs a prediction for the value of yi . The deviations between
predicted value and the actual response value are calculated through a loss function
` : Y × Y → R. The global value of w over the training data D is calculated by the
objective function. We denote the objective function by L and it is calculated as
follows:
L(f, D) =

n
X

`(f (xi , w), yi ).

(9.1)

i=1

9.2.2

Distributed Linear Regression

Regression is a statistical approach that explores the relationships between a set of
independent variables called attributes and one dependent variable called response.
In regression, the relationship between the attributes and the response is modeled
using a prediction function.
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In linear regression, L2 -norm of the objective function (i.e., `(f (xi , w), yi ) =
(w · xi − yi )2 ) that is minimized in the matrix form as follows:
w∗ = arg min L(f, D) = arg min
w

w

m
X

(w · xi − yi )2 ,

(9.2)

i=1

where m is the number of tuples in the database. To calculate the regression in
a distributed way, we represent the regression objective by minimizing with the
Maximum likelihood Estimation (MLE). MLE allows us to obtain the global solution
of the Equation 9.2 as follows2 :
w∗ = (X> X)−1 X> Y.

(9.3)

We characterize the model parameter w of each party using three parameters:

>
>
Pi = X>
i Xi , Vi = Xi Yi , Oi = Yi Yi

(9.4)

Each party computes its local statistics < Pi , Vi , Oi > and shares with other
parties. Then, the global values of P,V and O are computed using the shared local
statistics as follows:
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n
X
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>
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X
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>
>
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Xi k Yi k =
Vk
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unique solution only exists if (X> X)−1 is non-singular. In other cases, there are
techniques for solving Equation 9.2 [Myu03]; however, it is out of the scope of this paper.
2A
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where n is the number of parties in the collaboration. Using this, the global coefficients can be computed as follows:

w∗ = (X> X)−1 X> Y = P −1 V.

(9.5)

In order to calculate the error of the global function, we rewrite the objective
function in Equation 9.2 in terms of the local statistics (i.e., matrix form) as follows:

m
X
(w · xi − yi )2 = (Xw − Y)> (Xw − Y)
i=1

= ||(Xw − Y)||2

(9.6)

= w> X> Xw − 2w> X> Y + Y> Y
= w> Pw − 2w> V + O,
where || · || denotes the Euclidean norm. We note that even though we do not need
O to calculate the global coefficients, it is used for computing the error of the model.

9.3

Technical Preliminaries

Preserving the privacy of the users and data is a long-studied problem in the area of
cryptography [SCR+ 11, DPSZ12, Dan15, CMS11, SKLR04, DKM+ 06]. As a result
of these long-term studies, there are several theoretically well-studied tools that can
be employed to protect the data and user privacy such as Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) [DPSZ12] and Differential Privacy (DP) [Dwo08]. In this section, we
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introduce the essentials of the secure computation and differential privacy primitives
to understand the implementation of SM-DDP algorithms. Particularly, we introduce Homomorphic Encryption (HE) to provide SMC and Functional Mechanism
(FM) to provide DP guarantees.

9.3.1

Secure Multiparty Computation

SMC allows the computation of a function with multiple inputs from different users
while keeping the users’ inputs hidden from each other. For instance, each party Pi
in a n-party environment holds input xi learns nothing but the output f (x1 , ..., xn )
of a computation. In the literature, SMC schemes are mostly achieved via either
the Yao’s garbled circuits [Yao82] or Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [Gen09]. In
the following, we use HE to provide guarantees of secure computation.
Homomorphic Encryption (HE)- HE provides an ability to evaluate the functions directly on the encrypted data while keeping the data confidential. The primary advantage of the HE is that it does not require any interaction between the
parties other than the data exchange. That is, there is no additional communication complexity. However, it may introduce computational overhead on large
plaintexts. Recent works improved its performance significantly by introducing new
techniques like single instruction, multiple data (SIMD) operations [SV14] or using
different mathematical assumptions like learning with errors LWE [BGV14, BV14a]
(see [AAUC18] for a recent survey about HE).
An HE scheme is primarily characterized by four operations: key generation
(KeyGen), encryption (Enc), decryption (Dec), and evaluation (Eval). KeyGen
is the operation that is used to generate a secret and public key pair for the asymmetric version of HE or a single key for the symmetric version. KeyGen, Enc and
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c1 , c2

Eval(...)
f (c1 , c2 )

Encpk (...)
Decsk (...)
m1 , m2
f (...)

f (m1 , m2 )

Figure 9.2: HE operations of encryption, evaluation, and decryption (pk is the public
key, sk is the secret key, and f is the function desired to be computed).
Dec are similar to the ones used in conventional encryption schemes. However,
Eval is an HE-specific operation, which takes ciphertexts as input and outputs a
ciphertext corresponding to a functioned plaintext. Fig. 9.2 illustrates a commutative diagram depicting the relationship among the four major operations. The
simplified version of the diagram shows only one homomorphic encryption with two
ciphertexts [Gen14].

9.3.2

Differential Privacy (DP)

DP is a statistical disclosure control technique ensuring that the outputs of queries
do not leak information about the individuals found in a dataset. It injects a certain
amount of noise into the replies of the queries so that while it is not possible to infer
an individual-level leak, the output of the query is still “almost” the same. In other
words, query results of a data release algorithm for two closely similar data sets give
the same answer. The formal definition of −differential privacy is formulated as
follows [DR14]:
Definition 1. A randomized algorithm M is -differentially private if for all data
sets D and D0 differing on at most one element and all S ⊆ Range(M),
P r[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp() × P r[M(D0 ) ∈ S],
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(9.7)

where Range(M) shows all possible outputs of the function (query), f .
The definition states that two adjacent sets D and D0 , which differs at most one
element, act approximately the same against a query3 defined by a given mechanism
M .  can be considered as the degree of the privacy guarantee and the amount of
information which can be learned from a result of a single query is bounded by exp().
Since  is too small, its guarantee is preserved for consecutive queries. Differential
privacy works on the release mechanism and does not modify data or the format of
the data in any way.
The parameter , called privacy budget, is the main parameter to tune the balance
between privacy and accuracy. Decreasing  increases the privacy guarantees while
decreasing the accuracy. The common mechanism to control the amount of noise
that needs to be added is Laplace Mechanism (LM). In this case, the noise is drawn
from a Laplace Distribution. The probability density function of LM is as follows:


|x|
1
,
Lap(x|b) = exp −
2b
b

(9.8)

for scale b and center 0. It is shown that LM preserves -differential privacy [DR14].
Definition 2. Given any function f : N|X | → Rk , the mechanism is a Laplace
Mechanism M if:
M(x) = f (x) + η,

(9.9)

where x ∈ X and η is a vector of independent and identically distributed random
variables drawn from Lap(∆f /).
In addition to the , sensitivity is another important parameter in DP to determine the optimum noise amount. It is defined as follows:
3 The

queries or functions correspond to the predictions in the statistical models.
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Definition 3. For a function f : D → Rk , sensitivity of f is
∆f = max0 k f (D) − f (D0 ) k
D,D

(9.10)

for all D, D0 differing in at most one element.
The sensitivity shows the maximum number of elements that can change in two
different queries.
Functional Mechanism (FM)- FM is an algorithm that is used to provide differential privacy guarantees for a set of linear models [ZZX+ 12]. It is an extension
of the Laplace Mechanism. The goal of the algorithm is injecting the noise to the
polynomial coefficients of a model’s objective function. This is accomplished with
the mechanism of objective perturbation [CMS11]. The optimization of the noisy
objective function gives new model parameters that ensure the -privacy of each
element in a database. Algorithm 1 [ZZX+ 12] presents the functional mechanism.
As illustrated in Algorithm 1, FM takes a dataset D, the polynomial representation of the objective function L, and the privacy budget  as inputs and it returns
the differentially private model coefficients w∗ . It firstly injects noise drawn from
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a Laplacian distribution (Lap( ∆ )) into all the coefficients λφi of the polynomial
representation of the objective function and then the optimization is performed using noisy coefficients. It is shown that it satisfies -differential privacy [ZZX+ 12]
i.e., the predictions using w∗ does not leak any information about an individual in
the database data. For example, if we have a quadratic objective function in the
matrix form of w> Pw + w> V + O, where P, V, and O are the coefficients of the
polynomial representation of the objective function. FM firstly injects noise into the
coefficients, which results in w> P ∗ w + w> V ∗ + O∗ . Then, the optimization problem
(i.e., w∗ = arg min L(f, D)) is solved using P ∗ , V ∗ , and O∗ .
w

9.4

Secure and Differentially-private Distributed Computations

In this section, we propose a novel protocol for secure multiparty distributed and
differentially private (SM-DDP) computations through the use of homomorphic encryption (HM) and functional mechanism (FM). We evaluate its application to linear regression and discuss its extension to the logistic regression that can be used
in supervised classification.
Consider n parties P1 , . . . , Pn , where each has private horizontally distributed
database D1 , . . . , Dn . Each database consists of a certain number of tuples in the
format of ti = (xi , yi ). The parties would like to jointly build a linear model of
the pooled database f (D), where D = ∪ni=1 Di so that the security guarantees
of both SMC and DP are preserved. Before running the protocol, each party
in the collaboration agrees on the function to be computed and compute a collection of local statistics Mi = (Li1 , . . . , Lit ). We assume the linear model can
be computed using the local statistics generated by each party independently i.e.,
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ηglobal = f (M1 , . . . , Mi , . . . , Mn ). We define the guarantees and goals of our protocol
as follows:
• Individual privacy: No information leaks about the individuals in the private
databases held by the parties, i.e., tuples ti is not leaked.
• Data privacy: Information about the statistics of the data does not leak in
the databases held by the parties, i.e., the statistics about the data Mi is not
leaked.
• Correctness: The parties receive the correct output of the model.
We note that using SMC only would violate the individual privacy while using DP
only violates the data privacy. In our combined protocol, we achieve individual
privacy through FM and data privacy through HE and since all operations in the
protocol are deterministic, the correctness is satisfied by design. We note that we
assume there is a secure channel between parties to exchange messages.
Fig. 9.3 illustrates our protocol to be able to perform SM-DDP computations. It
is initiated by one of the parties called data collector (DC). In the setup phase, DC
generates a key pair (pk i , sk i ) and computes its own local statistics Mi independent
from other parties. Then, in the next phase, DC applies DP by injecting (adding)
noise drawn from a random distribution that satisfies -differential privacy into its
local statistics. The encryption of the noisy local statistics is transmitted to the
next party Pi+1 . The next party Pi+1 also computes its local statistics and injects
noise into them. The result is encrypted with pki and the function is evaluated
homomorphically with the inputs of parties Pi and Pi+1 . The protocol is continuous
in the same way, where parties are located in a ring topology. At the final step, the
securely evaluated function result is used by the party Pi which decrypts it with ski .
In the end, Pi reveals the differentially private global model.
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𝑷𝒊 (𝑫𝑪)

𝑷𝒊+𝟐

𝑷𝒊+𝟏

Setup:
Compute local statistics: Mi = (𝐿𝑖1 , … , 𝐿𝑖𝑡 )
Generate HE key pair key: (𝑝𝑘𝑖 , 𝑠𝑘𝑖 )
Send 𝑝𝑘𝑖 to all parties

Differential Privacy:

Setup:
Compute local statistics: (𝐿𝑖+11 , … , 𝐿𝑖+1𝑡 )
Differential Privacy:
Noise injection into local statistics:
∗
𝑀𝑖+1
= 𝑀𝑖+1 + 𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒

Noise injection into local statistics:
𝑀𝑖∗ = 𝑀𝑖 + 𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒

Multiparty Computation:

...

Encrypt noisy local statistics and transfer
the output:

...

𝐶𝑖∗ = 𝐸𝑝𝑘𝑖 (𝑀𝑖∗ )
Multiparty Computation:
Encrypt the local statistics:

From 𝑷𝒊−𝟏
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To 𝑷𝒊+𝟑

Evaluate homomorphically:
∗
∗
𝐸𝑝𝑘𝑖 (𝑓 𝑀𝑖∗ , 𝑀𝑖+1
) ← 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑙(𝑓, 𝐶𝑖∗ , 𝐶𝑖+1
)
Transfer the output securely:

Calculate the noisy global model
parameters:

∗
𝐸𝑝𝑘𝑖 (𝑓 𝑀𝑖∗ , 𝑀𝑖+1
)

∗
𝜂𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙
= 𝑓 𝑀1∗ , . . . , 𝑀𝑖∗ , … , 𝑀𝑛∗

Figure 9.3: Secure Multiparty Distributed Differentially Private (SM-DDP) protocol
for the computation of a linear model coefficients. The parties create a ring topology
and the Data Collector (DC) initiates the protocol. The protocol can be applied to
any statistical model function that allows independent calculation of local statistics.
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9.4.1

Case Study: Linear Regression

In this subsection, we show how to compute linear regression using our protocol proposed in Fig. 9.3. Particularly, we use functional mechanism shown in Algorithm
1 by splitting it into two parts: N oiseInject() and Optimize(). In N oiseInject(),
the noise drawn from Laplacian distribution (Equation 9.8) is injected into each
coefficient of the polynomial representation of the objective function. Then, in
Optimize(), the optimization problem of the objective function is solved by applying regularization and spectral trimming introduced in [ZZX+ 12] in order to
avoid unbounded noisy objective function. Moreover, in FM, it is assumed that
qP
d
2
i=1 xid ≤ 1. Therefore, a secure maximum computation is performed to calculate ηmin and ηmax in setup phase of Algorithm 2, where ηmin (resp. ηmax ) is vector
consists of global minimum (resp. maximum) of each attribute. Before applying
FM, each party normalizes its database using the global maximum and minimum
values. This guarantees that the local sensitivity of the parties is always same as
the global sensitivity as we focus on the horizontally distributed data.
Algorithm 2 illustrates the computation of linear regression algorithm using the
protocol presented in Fig. 9.3. In linear regression, the global model is calculated by
simply aggregating locally calculated noisy statistics. While aggregating the local
statistics, the noise of each party is aggregated as well. Therefore, it is necessary
to make sure the final model will not violate -differential privacy nor cause an
unbounded noise. Particularly, the noise is injected to each coefficient as follows:
Pi ∗ = Pi + Lap

∆
.
i

(9.11)

Then, when DC computes the global model, the local statistics are summed up as
follows:
∗

P =

n
X
i=1

∗

Pi =

n 
X
i=1

n
 ∆ 
∆
X
Pi + Lap
=P+
Lap
.
i
i
i=1

279

(9.12)

Moreover, V ∗ and O∗ can be computed similarly. In all P ∗ , V ∗ , and O∗ , the noise

P
term is ni=1 Lap ∆
. In order to make sure that the accumulated noise is also
i
Laplacian distribution, we use the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let Y , Y1 , Y2 ... be non-degenerate and symmetric i.i.d. random
variables with variance σ 2 > 0, and let νp be a geometric random variable with mean
1/p, independent of the Yi ’s. Then, the following statements are equivalent (Proof
is given in [McN02]):
(i) Y is stable with respect to geometric summation, i.e., there exist constants ap > 0
and bp ∈ R, such that
νp
X
(Yi + bp ) = Y
ap

∀p ∈ (0, 1)

(9.13)

i=1

(ii) Y possesses the Laplace distribution with mean zero and variance ν2 . Moreover,
√
the constants ap and bp must be of the form: ap = p, bp = 0
From the theorem above, a Laplace distribution can be calculated by summing
up several Laplace distributions in a certain form. In other words, the sequence
Pνp
(Yi + bp ) converges to a Laplace distribution under betaof partial sums, ap i=1
distributed ap . We addressed requirements of the theorem in Algorithm 2 by multiplying the noise distribution of local parties with a number drawn from the geometric

P
distribution i.e., ap ni=1 Lap ∆
, where ap is a geometric random variable.
i

9.5

Performance Evaluation

In this section, we give the experimental results for the application of our SM-DDP
protocol to linear regression. Table 9.1 presents the notations used throughout the
experiments. We first demonstrate how we set the parameters that are introduced
in the distributed setting. Particularly, the success probability of the geometric
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random variable p in Equation 9.13 and α introduced in Algorithm 2 is investigated.
After experimentally tuning these two parameters, we test the final protocol with
a different dataset without random sampling directly as it is collected. During
evaluation, we focus on the following questions: (i) Can we obtain a differentially
private global linear regression model from differentially private local statistics? (ii)
Does our approach support up to 100 parties? (iii) How long does it take to complete
the protocol? (iv) Does it guarantee the security and privacy of both data and
individuals? We analyzed and discussed each of these questions in Sections 9.5.19.5.4.
Dataset- We used two real-world datasets to evaluate the algorithms of our protocol. Both datasets include highly sensitive data. The first dataset is Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) [II17]. It contains 370K decennial census
records of people living in the US with 14 attributes, 7 of which are demographic
information and the rest are working hours per week, the number of years residing
in the current location, the number of children, the number of automobiles, and the
annual income. The attributes are used to predict the annual income of a person.
The second dataset is the warfarin dataset collected by the International Warfarin
Pharmacogenetics Consortium (IWPC) [Int09]. The dataset contains clinical and
genetic data of patients to predict the stable therapeutic dose of warfarin. Clinical
data includes demographics, background, and phenotypic attributes. Genetic data
includes genotype variants of CYP2C9 (*1, *2 and *3) and VKORC1 (one of seven
single nucleotide polymorphisms in linkage disequilibrium). 21 sites in 9 countries
and four continents contributed to the dataset. We used a subset of this dataset
wherein patient samples include no missing attributes. Overall, we used 1400 complete patient samples from seven medical institutions. We used IPUMS dataset to
experimentally set the parameters of our protocol and we tested the final protocol

281

Table 9.1: Abbreviations and notations used in experiments
Notation
DDP
NoDP
CDP

i
α
p
n
L
nslots
s

Description
Distributed Differential Privacy
No Differential Privacy
Centralized Differential Privacy
global privacy budget
local privacy budget
local privacy ratio i.e., α = i /
success probability of the geometric random variable, ap
number of parties
number of levels in HElib
number of slots in HElib
minimum of nslots

Range
{0.1,0.2,0.4,0.8,1.6,3.2,6.4,12.8}
i = α
{1,10,100}
{0.1,0.5,0.9}
[1,100]
{4,6}
calculated by HElib
{82 , 162 , 242 , 322 , 402 }

with the IWPC dataset, where each party corresponds to a medical institution in
the dataset.
Evaluation Metrics- We applied stratified cross validation to split the dataset
into training and test sets. To evaluate the model’s prediction accuracy, we used
Mean Squared Error (MSE) as it is a commonly used metric for linear regression
P
analysis. It is calculated as n1 ni=1 (ŷi − yi ), which gives the average of the squared
errors between actual (yi ) and predicted (ŷi ) values in n data samples. The lower
values of MSE shows better predictions. Finally, it is worth mentioning that all the
experiments show 100 independent runs and their average is reported in this work.
Experimental Setup- To evaluate the computational overhead, we used opensource HE library (HElib) [], which implements BGV homomorphic cryptosystem [BGV14] and we ran experiments on 16-core Intel Xeon CPU at 1.90 GHz
running Linux Server. In BGV, a prior level L should be set before initiating the
computation. In addition to the level L, HElib also has a parameter nslots which
defines a number of slots for the utilization of SIMD techniques [SV10, SV14]. HElib
allows encrypting multiple messages at one time through its SIMD features by pack-
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ing the messages into the independent slots of an array. We note that the parameter
L affects not only the number of allowed homomorphic operation but also all the
other timings and the key size. Therefore, the parameter L should be optimized
so that the minimum L is set without failure of the decryption. To do so, we first
calculated the table of a number of homomorphic operations for each level L and
we used the minimum level for each number of the party.
Furthermore, in our experiments, the data encrypted is the local statistics i.e., not
the raw data. The size of the local statistics is considered the same for all the parties. The homomorphic operation computed for linear regression is the element-wise
matrix addition. To take advantage of HElib library SIMD features, we converted
matrices into arrays and the parameter of minimum number for nslots was set to the
length of the array for each statistics. This prevents data loss during the conversion.
We did not utilize any multi-threading technique during our experiments to see the
lower bound of the performance of our protocol. Thus, our results are lower bound
and can be improved with the use of any multi-threading technique.

9.5.1

Accuracy Analysis

We evaluate the accuracy-privacy trade-off of distributed evaluation of differential
privacy on linear regression. Specifically, we compare our results with the centralized
approach. In Centralized Differential Privacy (CDP), the accuracy of the regression
depends only on the global privacy budget . However, in Distributed Differential
Privacy (DDP), each party has its own local privacy budget i and DDP is applied
independently by each party. We note that this is a particular property of FM.
In FM, data is first normalized and the optimum noise amount is only determined
by the number of the attributes which is same for all parties. Therefore, the size
and the range of the local statistics are same for all the parties; it does not depend
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Figure 9.4: Tuning p . Variation of error is tested for several values of p. As a result,
p = 0.1 is not stable or convergent; p = 0.5 is convergent, but error is much higher
than CDP for especially small  values. Hence, we chose p = 0.9 as the best case.
on the number of tuples in the local database. Since all parties are identical, we
choose the same local privacy budget i for all the parties. Finally, in our fist three
experiments (Fig. 9.4, 9.5, and 9.7), we used IPUMS dataset and split it into parties
using random sampling methods. In the last experiment, we used IWPC dataset for
accuracy evaluation. We split the dataset based on the given medical institutions
(See Fig. 9.6)
The first set of experiments was conducted to analyze the optimum value of p,
which is a parameter of geometric random variable ap given in Equation 9.13. In
theory, ap is required to obtain a Laplace distribution in the global model, thereby it
is required to be able to satisfy -differential private model. To present the impact of
the parameter p on the accumulated global noise, we kept the party number constant
for several values of p and various  values (i = ). To do so, each party multiplies
the noise drawn from Laplace distribution with a random variable ap , which is a
geometric random variable with success probability p. We compared the error rates
of CDP, DDP, and NoDP algorithms in terms of MSE.
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Figure 9.5: Tuning i . Variation of error is tested for several values of local privacy
budget i for α = i /. For α = 1, error is too high for small  values. For α = 10,
error is lower than CDP and and it converging to the value as NoDP. For α = 1,
error is low, but it converges to a value higher than NoDP. Hence, we chose α = 10
as the best case.
Fig. 9.4 illustrates the error and privacy budget trade-off for various values of p.
We varied p from {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. We found that DDP with p = 0.1 does not converge
to a value while increasing the value of . However, p = 0.5 and p = 0.9 converges
to the same value as NoDP as it is desired and when p is 0.9, it gives similar results
to CDP. In the sequel, we tuned p = 0.9 and used it in our experiments.
In the second set of experiments, we were interested in finding the optimal local
privacy budget i for a predetermined global privacy budget. In other words, we
assume all parties agree on a global privacy budget according to the sensitivity of
the dataset, which was indeed calculated by the number of attributes. We denote
the ratio of local privacy budget to the global privacy budget as α, i.e., α = i /. We
first tried the value of α less than 1, the result of DDP was much worse than CDP.
This is because smaller i means more noise injected locally by each party than the
centralized approach. This noise decreases the accuracy significantly. Therefore,
we changed α from {1, 10, 100} and compared the results with CDP and NoDP
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Figure 9.6: A real test: Warfarin dataset with 7 parties with i = n and p = 0.9.
Exactly the same trade-off as the centralized differential privacy is obtained.
mechanisms. The results are presented in Fig. 9.5. We found that if α is the
number of parties, which is 10 in this experiment, the plot gets closer to CDP and
the error is converging to NoDP, which is the desired case. Therefore, in the rest of
experiments, we set α = n, where n is the number of parties.
So far, we tuned the parameters of our approach experimentally. Now, in our
last experiment, we evaluated the efficiency of our protocol using the dataset (IWPC
dataset) collected from multi sources. We applied DP locally on each party’s dataset
and calculated the global model and error. Our goal was to see the feasibility of our
approach in a real case and test the feasibility of our approach.
In this experiment, we set i = n, p = 0.9 as we found in earlier experiments.
We compared the performance of CDP, DDP, and NoDP algorithms. Fig. 9.6 shows
MSE rates for varying . We found that the same trade-off with CDP can be
achieved by applying DP while training the classifiers locally. We note the DDP is
also converging to the error of NoDP when  approaches infinity as desired.
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Figure 9.7: Impact of number of parties in the collaboration for i = n and p = 0.9.

9.5.2

Scalability Analysis

In this set of experiments, we evaluated the scalability of our proposed protocol. We
set i = n, where n is the number of parties; as we found α = n is optimum and
for a different number of parties, we split the dataset into the number of parties (n)
by using random sub-sampling. Then, each party applies DP locally, but we note
that the pooled dataset is still the same.
Laplace distribution is infinitely divisible [McN02]. Therefore, the accumulated
error of global model should not be affected by the number of parties. We ran the
analysis for some users ranging from 1 to 100 and present the results in Fig. 9.7.
The results demonstrated an interesting point, which is when  = 0.01, even though
CDP is not stable, DDP is. On the other hand, when  is 1 or 100, the error rate
stays the same even for 100 parties. This means our protocol is scalable even for
100 parties.
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Figure 9.8: Performance evaluation of SM-DDP computations of linear regression
algorithm.

9.5.3

Computational Overhead Analysis

In this subsection, we evaluate the computational overhead of linear regression presented in Algorithm 2. We found that DP algorithms do not introduce computational overhead. Therefore, we only evaluate the computational overhead of our
SMC algorithm, which consists of three main parts: Key generation of HE, min-max,
and regression computation.
Fig. 9.8 shows the computation time for different dimension sizes. Fig. 9.8a
presents the time for secure computation of finding global min-max of each attribute.
It increases quadratically with the number of parties. However, this algorithm runs
at the setup phase, so it is performed before initiating the computations. There are
two interesting results worth to note. First, the time of secure regression computation increases linearly as a number of parties in the collaboration increases, but with
a different slope for dimension, which is illustrated in Fig. 9.8. The reason for the
linear increase is that the number of encryptions and homomorphic evaluations are
directly scaled by the number of parties in the group. Second, similar results hold
for the overall computation time (see Fig. 9.8c), but as a minor change since the key
generation time shifts the lines in the y-axis and also increases the scale. However,
similar to the secure min-max computation, the execution of the key generation
algorithm does not require all parties in the group to be online since it occurs in the
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setup phase. On the other hand, we also note that size of the local database of each
party does not have an impact on the total computational time since parties only
share the local statistics, which is dependent on the attribute size, instead of the raw
data. As can be seen in Fig. 9.8c, the overall computation of the protocol including
both offline and online phases for 20 parties with 32 attributes and 10K samples
is less than a minute. Hence, our SM-DDP protocol yields minimal computational
overhead.

9.5.4

Security and Privacy Analysis

In this section, we discuss the security and privacy guarantees of SM-DDP protocol
given in Fig. 9.3. As all the communication among the parties is encrypted, the
security of the algorithm is simply reduced to the security of underlying HE scheme.
A leak can occur only if DC is corrupted since the data is encrypted using the public
key generated by DC. However, even in this case, DC will only obtain the noisy local
statistics, not the raw data, and at the end of the protocol, DC has only control
over the aggregated data while reconstructing the global model and it can not know
which party contributed to the result. While the protocol is running, the view of
all the other parties consists of homomorphically encrypted data. Therefore, if the
given homomorphic encryption scheme is semantically secure, the parties can not
distinguish the corresponding plaintexts. So, the computation is private even in the
presence of an honest, but curious adversary model presented in [Gol09]. Therefore,
data privacy is preserved.
On the other hand, we both showed theoretically (Section 9.4.1) and experimentally (Fig. 9.6), a differentially private global model can be obtained through the
locally applied DP. Therefore, it is not possible that an untrusted data collector can
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infer information about the individuals. Furthermore, the collaboration comes with
a price as the local parties used i instead of . Therefore, the local privacy guarantee is decreased by α (i.e., i is increased by α), even though the global model’s
guarantee is still the same, meaning that data privacy against an untrusted DC is
still preserved and the local privacy guarantee is important only if the underlying
SMC is bypassed. Finally, since we set α as the number of parties in the collaboration, each party should take this into consideration while deciding on the global
privacy budget.

9.6

Discussion

The preceding analysis showed how to achieve secure multiparty computation and
differential privacy in distributed settings focusing on linear regression on horizontally distributed data. That is, parties do not see each others’ inputs and further
can not infer individuals’ data from the final constructed model. A limitation of
our algorithm is that we assume parties do not collaborate to learn a target party’s
input. However, if the party that generates the key pair conspires with the parties
that are neighbors of a target in the ring topology, the noisy local statistics (ξ, κ, δ)
of the victim can be extracted. More generally, this is known as active corruption,
where the data collector is an active attacker and has control over the other corrupted parties. Our protocol in Fig. 9.3 achieves only a collusion threshold of 1, but
the distributed DP algorithm that we present here can easily be adapted to work
with recent solutions in SMC such as [DPSZ12], which is secure in the presence of
an active adversary corrupting up to n − 1 of the n parties. To extend our work with
these more secure SMC schemes, it suffices to use the noisy output of the functional
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mechanism instead of using the local statistics directly as input to the underlying
SMC algorithm.
In our evaluation, we used HElib, an implementation of the fully homomorphic
operation, to compute generic results. It supports both addition and multiplication; however, while computing the linear regression coefficients, we only used the
addition operation. The performance of secure computation can be improved by
using other libraries such as Paillier cryptosystem [Pai99a], which is only additively
homomorphic cryptosystem.
Finally, our algorithms can be easily extended to other algorithms such as logistic
regression in a supervised classification setting. In logistic regression, each party
independently computes a score vector ui and information matrix Ii . Instead of
injecting noise to the local statistics as in linear regression, noise can be injected
into ui and Ii vectors. However, the optimization of objective function differs in
logistic regression as it requires several iterations. Fortunately, there exist some
techniques that let implementing the iterations for computing the secure multi-site
logistic regression [EESA+ 12]. Combining this secure multi-site logistic regression
algorithm with FM would solve this issue. We defer the detailed application of this
method to future work.

9.7

Conclusion

In this chapter, we proposed a novel Secure Multiparty Distributed Differentially
Private (SM-DDP) protocol to achieve private computations in a multiparty environment as an application in linear regression. Using homomorphic encryption and
functional mechanism, we first presented a protocol to provide the guarantees of secure multiparty computation and differential privacy. Then, we built the algorithms
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that would allow distributed parties to compute a global model while preserving the
privacy of their data and individuals found in the dataset. Any statistical model
function that can be independently calculated by sharing the local statistics of the
parties can be computed through this protocol. Finally, we evaluated the performance of the proposed protocol on two datasets, namely, warfarin dose and budget
predictions. Our findings show that a party can achieve individual-level privacy via
our proposed protocol for distributed differential privacy, which is independently
applied by each party in a distributed fashion. Moreover, the experiment results
demonstrated that the proposed SM-DDP protocol is both feasible and scalable
that is its computational overhead is minimal and overall computation time is sublinear with the number of parties. Indeed, SM-DDP protocol provides security and
privacy guarantees while being feasible and scalable.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

10.1

Conclusions

In this dissertation, we introduced several privacy-aware security solutions. We
split them under three categories: 1) Alternative Complementary Authentication
Methods 2) Smart Home User Privacy, and 3) Secure Data Exchange Methods.
Among alternative authentication methods, in WACA, we used the motion sensors
of wrist-worn wearables, such as to capture the typing behavior of computer users.
Captured sensor data is used to design a CA system. This system has an advantage
of capturing user behavior seamlessly, but also it may have more challenges as the
smartwatches are still not mature enough to be used in a real-life application. Besides, we tested WACA against more powerful active attacks such as imitation and
statistical attacks. Our experiments showed that the active attacker has the same
success rate as the zero-effort attackers, which are used as a base for biometric-based
studies. Moreover, the literature lacks a biometric-based continuous authentication
protocol. In PACA, we designed a privacy-aware continuous authentication protocol using the noise-tolerant secure template matching method called NTT-Sec-R.
This method allows template comparison of noisy biometric data by transforming
the feature vectors in an irreversible way. This provides privacy guarantees without
relying on any trusted party or any long-term keys. Furthermore, for the security
and privacy analysis, we tested our protocol against eight different attacks, which
are known in biometric-based authentication systems. In PINTA, we used a hybrid
behavioral profile of the user as a second factor in the authentication system. Since
these features may include sensitive information, we utilize Fuzzy Hashing and Homomorphic Encryption to provide the authentication in a privacy-preserving. Our
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approach has only shown a slight reduction in the performance compared to the
traditional MAF techniques.
For the smart home user privacy, in Peek-a-boo, we discovered a multi-stage privacy attack, wherein every stage attacker reveals information related to the devices
and the user activities at a smart home using the machine learning-based methods.
The advantage of this method can work even on encrypted traffic as only the metadata of the network traffic is used. However, it has the limitation that the attacker
should be within the radio frequency range to capture the pairwise network traffic.
Finally, we designed a policy-based privacy-aware secure data exchange approach. For this, we first investigated the state-of-the art HE schemes. Then,
we defined a policy language called Curie Policy Language (CPL). CPL allows each
party in a group to define their requirements on the data to be exchanged. Moreover,
we introduced a method for achieving secure and differentially private computation
at the same time in multiparty settings. Our method allows distributed parties to
make computations while the parties learn nothing about each other’s data, but
the final result. For this, we combined Homomorphic Encryption and Differential
Privacy. For homomorphic encryption, we used an FHE scheme [HS14b] and for
the differential privacy, we utilized a method called Functional Mechanism, which
allows the addition of noise on the local data directly.

10.2

Future Work

The studies in this dissertation aim to use the ubiquitous of IoT and smart devices
for alternative complementary authentication systems offering a better securityusability trade-off than the existing systems while additionally protecting the privacy
of the sensitive user information.
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In WACA, we only utilized the typing behavior of the user, while it would be
interesting to see the effect of covering more activities of the user. This may offer
both better usability as it may decrease the false rejections of genuine users and
also increase security by reducing the vulnerable window of time. Moreover, an
alternative design can be a multimodal system utilizing both keystroke-dynamics
captured by keyboards and the keystroke-dynamics captured from motion sensors.
Such an approach would combine the best of traditional and modern approaches.
In PACA, we designed a privacy-aware continuous authentication protocol and also
proposed an actual system using the WACA. However, as a future work, our protocol
with other biometric-based authentication methods where the feature vectors are
fixed-size real-valued vectors can be tested. In PINTA, we used a long period of
data (30 minutes), while future works would propose methods for decreasing the
data collection time to get the same or better performance.
In Peek-a-boo, we designed a multi-stage privacy attack on smart home users.
However, the same approach can also be used for the authentication of smart home
users. Such an approach would provide an unobtrusive way of authenticating the
smart home users, maybe even in a continuous way. However, the heterogeneity
of smart home devices and variability of the authentication accuracy would be the
possible challenges that needs to be handled.
Finally, in Curie, an interesting future work would be to investigate the use
of Curie in other collaborative learning settings exploring different statistics for
data-dependent conditionals and explore its performance trade-offs by integrating it
into other off-the-shelf secure computation frameworks. And, a future work of our
differentially private secure computation study can extend the algorithms outside
the linear models and investigate the accuracy and performance trade-offs of other
algorithms. Similarly, it would also be interesting to compare the performance of
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Laplacian mechanism used in FM with other DP mechanisms such as Exponential
Mechanism [MT07] and Sample-and-aggregate [NRS07].
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Jean-Sébastien Coron, Avradip Mandal, David Naccache, and Mehdi
Tibouchi. Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers with
shorter public keys. In Phillip Rogaway, editor, Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO 2011, volume 6841 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 487–504. Springer, 2011.

309

[CMO+ 13]
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Wilko Henecka, Stefan K ögl, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Thomas Schneider, and Immo Wehrenberg. Tasty: Tool for automating secure twoparty computations. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference
on Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’10, page 451–462,
New York, NY, USA, 2010. Association for Computing Machinery.

[HP14]

Darko Hrestak and Stjepan Picek. Homomorphic encryption in the
cloud. In Information and Communication Technology, Electronics
and Microelectronics (MIPRO), 2014 37th International Convention
on, pages 1400–1404. IEEE, 2014.

[HPS98]

Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher, and Joseph H Silverman. Ntru: A ringbased public key cryptosystem. In Algorithmic number theory, pages
267–288. Springer, 1998.

321

[HPSS08]

Jeffrey Hoffstein, Jill Pipher, Joseph H Silverman, and Joseph H Silverman. An introduction to mathematical cryptography, volume 1.
Springer, 2008.

[HR11]

Shai Halevi and Nalini K. Ratha. Public challenges for fullyhomomorphic encryption. http://researcher.watson.ibm.com/
researcher/view_group.php?id=1548, 2011. [Online; accessed
March-2016].

[HS13]

Shai Halevi and Victor Shoup. Design and implementation of a
homomorphic-encryption library. IBM Research (Manuscript), pages
1–46, 2013.

[HS14a]

Shai Halevi and Victor Shoup. Algorithms in helib. In Advances in
Cryptology–CRYPTO 2014, pages 554–571. Springer, 2014.

[HS14b]

Shai Halevi and Victor Shoup. An implementation of homomorphic
encryption. https://github.com/shaih/HElib, 2014. [Online; accessed 01-January-2017].

[HS15]

Shai Halevi and Victor Shoup. Bootstrapping for helib. In Advances
in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT 2015, pages 641–670. Springer, 2015.

[HSU+ 16]

O Huhta, P Shrestha, S Udar, M Juuti, N Saxena, and N Asokan.
Pitfalls in designing zero-effort deauthentication: Opportunistic human observation attacks. In The Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium (NDSS), pages 1–14, 2016.

[IET08]

IETF. Transport layer security (tls). http://datatracker.ietf.
org/wg/tls/, 2008. [Online; accessed 2020-3-20].

[iF96]

Josep Domingo i Ferrer. A new privacy homomorphism and applications. Information Processing Letters, 60(5):277–282, 1996.

[II17]

IPUMS-International. Harmonized international census data for social science and health research. https://international.ipums.
org/international/, 2017. [Online; accessed March-2017].

[Int09]

International Warfarin Pharmacogenetics Consortium. Estimation of
the Warfarin Dose with Clinical and Pharmacogenetic Data. The New
England Journal of Medicine, 360:1–12, 2009.

322

[Int18]

Mordor Intelligence.
Iot sensor market size - segmented by
type (pressure sensor, temperature sensor, proximity sensor),
end-user industry (healthcare, automotive, consumer electronics), and region - growth, trends, and forecast (2018 - 2023).
https://www.mordorintelligence.com/industry-reports/iotsensor-market, 2018.

[IP07]

Yuval Ishai and Anat Paskin. Evaluating branching programs on
encrypted data. In Theory of Cryptography, pages 575–594. Springer,
2007.

[Jag12]

Tibor Jager. The Generic Composite Residuosity Problem, pages 49–
56. Vieweg+Teubner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2012.

[JFF19]
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